I think we are now making hidden assumptions about the nature of time,
namely that it "really exists", and then we are trying to argue that
you can still have immortality (in different senses). However, it is
far more natural to assume that time does not exist and then you get
immortality (in the sense of my conscious states that have a finite
memory always existing) in a far more straightforward way.
That time does not exist is a quite natural assumption. To see this,
assume that it does exist. But then, since time evolution is given by a
unitary transform, the past still exists in a scrambled way in the
present (when taking into account parallel universes). E.g. your past
brain state of ten years ago can still be described in terms of the
physical variables as they exist today. Of course such a description is
extremely complicated involving the physical state of today's
multiverse within a sphere of ten lightyears.
Then assuming that the details of implementation does not affect
consciousness (as long as the right program is being run), one has to
conclude that your past state of coinsciousess exists also today. You
could therefore just as well assume that time does not exist, as the
two possibilities are operationally equivalent.
Saibal
Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
On 01 Apr 2011, at 20:06, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 7:20 PM, <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote:
QTI is trivially false, because it is a paradoxical result, similar to an
alleged proof that 1 + 1 = 3. You don't need to check to proof to see that
it must be wrong.
You could apply that exact same argument to any hypothesis that sounds
ridiculous to you.
The reason why QTI is a paradoxical is because we have a finite
memory. The
class of all observers that can represent you is some finite set of
machine
states, so you can't have any memories that exceeds a certain limit.
Therefore, "you" can't live forever, stay the same person who then also
subjectively experiences an unbounded time evolution.
The paradox only exists if you disregard that he have the ability to
forget selectively. Since I have only lived a finite amount of time
and my memory is finite, there is a finite set of machine states that
is sufficient to represent "me" (whatever that means). I could
conceivably live forever and selectively forget, while always
maintaining the core states that preserve my identity.
Indeed. Nick Prince made clear that he would accept a notion of
surviving as an infant, with plausibly less souvenirs.
Also, we might survive reconstituted in a future with technologies
making it possible to add more memories (hard disk).
The subjective time grows in a non computable way (to say it grows a
lot) from the memory available. It is a sort of busy beaver function.
We already save some neuron memory space by using agenda, books and
computers.
Then in a steady universe, we might just develop indefinitely growing
brain. In some sense, "our" brain has grown a lot since we were
amoebas.
Then we might become immortal by losing or making sleeping some
neurons, for example the neurons which handle the hallucination of
time. That the mystic way, and some plant are fascinating with that
respect.
There are many path, many possibilities. It is a rich and complex subject.
Saibal is right on this: if we keep a fixed limited brain, we will
stop or cycle. But cycling forever can still be considered as a form
of immortality!
In Platonia, all occur. But it might depend on us which one can be
made more relatively probable. If we teach enough arithmetic to our
children, the most probable will be sorts of "Tipler-omega points". I
think.
Bruno
Saibal
Citeren Nick Prince <nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com>:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many
discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single
biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being
false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate -
which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out
to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach.
So is QTI false?
Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests
the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious
mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby
that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an
appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event.
(This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC)
To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a
critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form
of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby
requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another
consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person
dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state,
there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking
Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness
– at least the form that applies to the NCDSC.
Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very
specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would
be something special about the architecture which the substrate
employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode
of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an
appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of
the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could
simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to
implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say
no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false?
The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of
Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the
physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as
a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent
extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul
de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness
is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement
it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques
for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even
as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that
if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then
they must be built somewhere in some universes!
But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in
some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to
how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people
living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the
facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater
than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t
get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated
with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued
extensions of consciousness by branching into worlds where we
supervene over new born babies (or something – animals, aliens?) -
accidental deaths of people of any “normal ages” we can think about
could of course be accommodated by the NCDSC).
The mechanics of such reincarnational transitions would be
interesting to speculate about since I see this as the only way out
for a QTI.
Nick Prince
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