On 10 Jul 2011, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/9/2011 9:58 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
unconscious by definition.

But analog ones are? It is generally thought that any analog circuit can be reproduced at any give level of precision by a digital circuit.

You can build analog circuit which are not Turing emulable, but it depends on your theory of computation on the reals, which lacks the equivalent of Church thesis, so that there is no unanimity of what this is, and if that exists in nature. I am agnostic.

 Bruno's idea depends on this being true.

Which idea? I just show that comp makes physics necessarily a branch of math, and precisely a branch of universal machine theology. I am not saying that comp is true or false. That is the job of philosophers.

It is questionable though because it may be the case that spacetime is truly a continuum: http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128204.200-distant-light-hints-at-size-of-spacetime-grains.html It's hard to believe though that the continuous nature of spacetime would effect the function of brains. However, it would prevent the digital simulation of large regions.

Comp explains that physics is not Turing emulable. Indeed, today, physics seems still too much Turing emulable compared to what we can extract intuitively from comp. But comp is not refuted by that fact, because the real extraction of physics must obeys to the self- referential constraints, which shows the question being highly non trivial.



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