On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
emulable.
Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
believe in substantial infinite souls.
Your computer
can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.
Why?
The problem with
emulating molecules is that we are only emulating the side of the coin
we can see.
That is true.
The other side is blank and that's the side that
interiority and awareness is made of. We can add chips to our brain
though, or build a computer out of cells.
The other side is well explained in the comp theory.
Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
third person point of view and first person points of view. The
machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
qualia and quanta seems different.
If you are saying that the machine may already have it's own qualia,
then sure, I agree, I just don't think it will be our qualia. I think
that our experience of yellow, for example, probably comes through
cellular experiences with photosynthesis and probably has not evolved
much since the Pre-Cambrian. Of course that's a guess. It could be a
mammalian thing or a hominid thing that arises out of the experience
of elaborations throughout the cortex. In order for a silicon chip to
generate that experience of yellow, I think it would have to learn to
speak chlorophyll and hemoglobin.
No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It
does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of
the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is
false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we
don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a
regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp assumption.
I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
need to introduce any physics (old or new).
It could be that, but the transparency of comp to physical realities
and semantic consistencies are pretty convincing to me.
It is not.
I would rather
think that I am feeling what my fingers are feeling then imagining
that feeling is just a mathematical illusion. Mathematics seem
abstract and yellow seems concrete.
But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.
That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).
I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine,
natural
or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable.
It
already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.
Sorry, not sure what you mean. Probably over my head. What is it that
explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
try to understand.
Read http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.
That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
hypothesis.
Again, I'm not familiar enough with the theories. It sounds like
you're saying that the brain is made of numbers. Maybe? Not sure it
makes a difference?
The brain is not made of numbers.
The belief in brains (and atoms) entirely results from infinities of
number relations.
Or comp is false.
My point is just that computer science makes this enough precise so
that comp can be tested.
Bruno
On Jul 10, 11:32 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to
produce
different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules
the
benefit of the doubt.
All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
emulable.
What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units
are
vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does
the
ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow
or
does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the
minimum
mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?
Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
third person point of view and first person points of view. The
machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
qualia and quanta seems different.
You need to speculate
on a new physics,
Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists.
I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
need to introduce any physics (old or new).
What we
experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
topology. I did a post this morning that might
help:http://s33light.org/post/7453105138
That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).
I do appreciate your point, and I think there is great value in
studying cognitive mechanics and pursuing AGI regardless of it's
premature assumption to lead to synthetic consciousness.
I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine,
natural
or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable.
It
already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.
I think that
physicalism and mechanism are both useful in their appropriate
contexts -
Mechanism and physicalism are incompatible.
the brain does have physical organization which determines
how consciousness develops,
I do agree with this.
just as a cell phone or desktop determines
how the internet is presented. It's a bidirectional flow of
influence.
We unknowingly affect the brain and the brain unknowingly affects
us.
They are two intertwined but mutually ignorant topologies of the
same
ontological coin.
That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
hypothesis.
Bruno
Craig
On Jul 9, 2:35 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I
have
no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial
leg,
however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
completely different story. It's like writing a computer program
to
replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits
are
unconscious by definition.
You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to
speculate
on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very
special
analogical infinite machine. Why not?
You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today
someone
shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a
reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person,
or, at
some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a
testable
way.
But there is no problem with what you say. If you believe in
physicalism, then indeed mechanism is no more an option.
In my opinion, mechanism is more plausible than physicalism, and
also
more satisfactory in explaining where the "illusion" of matter come
from. Actually I don't know of any other explanation.
Bruno
On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones <kimjo...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the
patient saying 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits.
Meat circuits are fine, though there might be something better. I
mean, if something better than 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my
skin for that. Probably need the brain upgrade anyway to read the
new skin. You could even make me believe I had a new skin via the
firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all.
I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was
composed of meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else.
You
only have to believe what your brain presents you.
Kim Jones
On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:
Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial
circuits
are
made of. For them to be experienced as something like human
consciousness then I think they would have to be made of
biological
tissue.
Why? Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and
electrons just like computer chips. Why should anything other
than their input/output function matter?
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