On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > ** > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >> On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >>> On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >>>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>>>> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation > >>>>>> to be there. > > >>>>> The computations are concrete relations. > > >>>> If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them. > > >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, > >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of > >>> the > >>> computation implementing your mind. > > >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a > >>> concrete existence. How would a many-worlder point to the other branches > >>> of > >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past? How would an AI or > >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is > >>> rendering its environment? > > >>>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be > >>>>> described by some axiomatic. > > >>>> And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the > >>>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of > >>>> relations. > > >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a > >>> chair? > > >>>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs. > > >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence > >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter, > > >>> That's the question. It seems that comp requires more than the > >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or > >>> equivalent. > > >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144... > >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2). > >> This is a simple recursive definition. You might even say the number line > >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1. > >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers > >> (different ways of progressing through the integers). In some of these > >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well > >> defined ways, > > >> There's the rub. Nothing changes in Platonia. Nothing "moves around" or > >> "computes". Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101. Numbers are > >> not. > > > Nothing changes in physics either. Block time is the only consistent view > > given relativity. > > > Different t ==> different g_ab. > > Different N ==> different Fib(N) > > > That's change in physics. Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not > > compatible with QM. > > All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been > confirmed. The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's > theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit. > > > > > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined > > relations between the bits. > > >> some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve > >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce > >> themselves. Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as > >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations > >> of bit patterns within the number. Let's call this function Universe. > >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their > >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of > >> Universe(n+x). There are number relations which define such sequences of > >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci > >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive > >> relations). > > >> I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept > >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John > >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes. > > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, if > > not the cause of the universe. > > > That assumes numbers exist. > > It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists. Both theories > are consistent with observation. > > > > > In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than any > > physical object. Your view is like that of a being who has spent its whole > > life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual reality and > > items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements the > > virtual environment. The beings only justification for this belief is that > > he can't access that computer using his senses, nor point is he able to > > point to it. > > > That's logically possible and maybe nomologically possible - but there's > > also not an iota of evidence for it. > > There is not one iota for evidence that matter is primary. > > On the other hand, mathematical truth seems to exist independently of > mathematicians, humans, and the universe itself.

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Mathematical truth seems to be true independently of humans. It doens't seem to exist at all. We see things , not numbers. Of course, if the mathematical world is basically non existent, it would not covary with any else that existed. > > So my view is *also* like that of a being who has spent his whole life in > > this material universe. My justification for believing this (to the limited > > extent I do) is that it is a model consistent with everything known and has > > been successful all its predictions, from what I'll find in my refrigerator > > if I look, to the spectra of emissions of galaxies at z=20. The idea that > > I'm living in a computer simulation predicts everything and nothing. > > How is that any different from the idea of living in a physical universe > predicting everything and nothing? > > Also, I am not suggesting that you are in a computer simulation, only you > can't be sure our universe isn't a program or set of infinite program > proceeding platonically as number relations. > > Jason There's no Platonic proceding. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.