On Jul 22, 4:04 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > > **
> > > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
> > wrote:
>
> > > >>  On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
> > wrote:
>
> > > >>>  On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
> > wrote:
>
> > > >>>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > > >>>>> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
> > computation
> > > >>>>>> to be there.
>
> > > >>>>> The computations are concrete relations.
>
> > > >>>>  If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
>
> > > >>> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them,
> > > >>> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence
> > of the
> > > >>> computation implementing your mind.
>
> > > >>> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> > > >>> concrete existence.  How would a many-worlder point to the other
> > branches of
> > > >>> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past?  How would an
> > AI or
> > > >>> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> > > >>> rendering its environment?
>
> > > >>>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> > > >>>>> described by some axiomatic.
>
> > > >>>>  And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations.  So
> > the
> > > >>>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of
> > relations.
>
> > > >>> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of
> > a
> > > >>> chair?
>
> > > >>>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and
> > chairs.
>
> > > >>> Assume both matter and number relations exist.  With comp, the
> > existence
> > > >>> of number relations explains the existence of matter,
>
> > > >>>  That's the question.  It seems that comp requires more than the
> > > >>> existence of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or
> > > >>> equivalent.
>
> > > >> The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89,
> > 144...
> > > >> It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) +
> > Fib(n-2).
> > > >> This is a simple recursive definition.  You might even say the number
> > line
> > > >> has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1.
> > > >> Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of
> > numbers
> > > >> (different ways of progressing through the integers).  In some of
> > these
> > > >> definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well
> > > >> defined ways,
>
> > > >>  There's the rub.  Nothing changes in Platonia.  Nothing "moves
> > around" or
> > > >> "computes".  Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101.  Numbers
> > are
> > > >> not.
>
> > > > Nothing changes in physics either.  Block time is the only consistent
> > view
> > > > given relativity.
>
> > > > Different t ==> different g_ab.
>
> > > Different N ==> different Fib(N)
>
> > > > That's change in physics.  Anyway, GR must be incomplete since it's not
> > > > compatible with QM.
>
> > > All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
> > > confirmed.  The above is like arguing against gravity because Newton's
> > > theory wasn't compatible with the observations of Mercury's orbit.
>
> > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
> > defined
> > > > relations between the bits.
>
> > > >>  some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even
> > evolve
> > > >> into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce
> > > >> themselves.  Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness,
> > as
> > > >> they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future
> > observations
> > > >> of bit patterns within the number.  Let's call this function Universe.
> > > >> There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve
> > their
> > > >> survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of
> > > >> Universe(n+x).  There are number relations which define such sequences
> > of
> > > >> numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci
> > > >> sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of
> > recursive
> > > >> relations).
>
> > > >>  I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still
> > accept
> > > >> that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that
> > John
> > > >> Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes.
>
> > > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe,
> > if
> > > > not the cause of the universe.
>
> > > > That assumes numbers exist.
>
> > > It is no worse than assuming the physical universe exists.  Both theories
> > > are consistent with observation.
>
> > > >    In that sense, they are just as concrete if not more concrete than
> > any
> > > > physical object.  Your view is like that of a being who has spent its
> > whole
> > > > life in a simulated virtual environment: It believes the virtual
> > reality and
> > > > items in it are "more real" than the actual computer which implements
> > the
> > > > virtual environment.  The beings only justification for this belief is
> > that
> > > > he can't access that computer using his senses, nor point is he able to
> > > > point to it.
>
> > > > That's logically possible and maybe nomologically possible - but
> > there's
> > > > also not an iota of evidence for it.
>
> > > There is not one iota for evidence that matter is primary.
>
> > > On the other hand, mathematical truth seems to exist independently of
> > > mathematicians, humans, and the universe itself.
>
> > Mathematical truth seems to be true independently of humans.
> > It doens't seem to exist at all. We see things , not numbers.
> > Of course, if the mathematical world is basically non existent,
> > it would not covary with any else that existed.
>
> Much exists independently of humans that we cannot access with our senses.
> Beyond the cosmological horizon, the past and future, other branches of the
> wave function, and so on.  

We don't have any physical theory requiring numbers
to exist somewhere unseen.

Luckily, we are able to use our reasoning to
> access math, and it seems statements that are true, were true before we
> realized it or found a reason for it to be true.
>
>
>
>
>
> > > >   So my view is *also* like that of a being who has spent his whole
> > life in
> > > > this material universe.  My justification for believing this (to the
> > limited
> > > > extent I do) is that it is a model consistent with everything known and
> > has
> > > > been successful all its predictions, from what I'll find in my
> > refrigerator
> > > > if I look, to the spectra of emissions of galaxies at z=20.  The idea
> > that
> > > > I'm living in a computer simulation predicts everything and nothing.
>
> > > How is that any different from the idea of living in a physical universe
> > > predicting everything and nothing?
>
> > > Also, I am not suggesting that you are in a computer simulation, only you
> > > can't be sure our universe isn't a program or set of infinite program
> > > proceeding platonically as number relations.
>
> > > Jason
> > There's no Platonic proceding.
>
> Would you say the Fibonacci sequence does not have a progression?

It does if it is computed, and it doesnt if it exists timelessly.

> If there
> were a life form (pattern) embedded in successive states of a recursive
> function, would it not consider itself to be proceeding as it noticed itself
> change through successive states?
>
> Jason

How could an illusion of change even exist in a timeless Platonia?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to