On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > ** > > On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >> On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > >>> On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>>> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation > >>>>> to be there. > > >>>> The computations are concrete relations. > > >>> If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them. > > >> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, > >> everything you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of > >> the > >> computation implementing your mind. > > >> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a > >> concrete existence. How would a many-worlder point to the other branches > >> of > >> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past? How would an AI or > >> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is > >> rendering its environment? > > >>> They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be > >>>> described by some axiomatic. > > >>> And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the > >>> "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of > >>> relations. > > >> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a > >> chair? > > >>> The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs. > > >> Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence > >> of number relations explains the existence of matter, > > >> That's the question. It seems that comp requires more than the existence > >> of number relations, it requires the existence of a UD or equivalent. > > > The Fibonacci sequence is, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144... > > It is defined by the simple number relation Fib(n) = Fib(n-1) + Fib(n-2). > > This is a simple recursive definition. You might even say the number line > > has a simple recursive definition, where Number(n) = Number(n-1) + 1. > > Different recursive definitions result in different sequences of numbers > > (different ways of progressing through the integers). In some of these > > definitions, bits patterns (within the number) may move around in well > > defined ways, > > > There's the rub. Nothing changes in Platonia. Nothing "moves around" or > > "computes". Bit patterns are physical things, like 101101. Numbers are > > not. > > Nothing changes in physics either. Block time is the only consistent view > given relativity. > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined > relations between the bits.
And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation. > > some of these bit patterns become self-reproducing, and may even evolve > > into more complex bit patterns, which are better able to reproduce > > themselves. Some of these bit patterns may even evolve consciousness, as > > they build brains which attempt to discern and predict future observations > > of bit patterns within the number. Let's call this function Universe. > > There may be bit patterns (life forms) in Universe(n) which improve their > > survival or reproductive success by correctly predicting parts of > > Universe(n+x). There are number relations which define such sequences of > > numbers; you cannot deny their existence without denying the Fibonacci > > sequence or the number line (these are just simpler instances of recursive > > relations). > > > I can deny that the numbers exist the way tables and do and still accept > > that certain relations are true of them; just like I can accept that John > > Watson was a friend of Sherlock Holmes. > > Numbers, unlike fictional characters, are co-eternal with the universe, Meaning they end with the universe? Why assume that? What difference does it make. > if > not the cause of the universe. Causation requires events. Maths is timeless. > In that sense, they are just as concrete if > not more concrete than any physical object. Your view is like that of a > being who has spent its whole life in a simulated virtual environment: It > believes the virtual reality and items in it are "more real" than the actual > computer which implements the virtual environment. The beings only > justification for this belief is that he can't access that computer using > his senses, nor point is he able to point to it. > > Jason I think we all have a pretty strong justification for the Real Reality theory in the shape of Occam's razor. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.