On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

It embraces it at many places. First the first person indeterminacy
leads to the taking into account of uncomputable sequences in the
first person experiences. Just iterate the Washington-Moscow
experience n times. There will be 2^n resulting version of you, and
most will acknowledge the apparent non computability of their history
(like WWMMWWWWMWMMWMMMMWWW ...).

Ok, I've been able to parse the first six steps now, more or less. I
think that we are talking about two entirely different kinds of
uncomputability. I think yours is borne of untraceable variables in
the context of recursive hypercomplexity,

I am not sure I understand. The first person indeterminacy does not involve "hypercomplexity", nor does the other notion.



while mine is ontologically
unquantifiable in it's elemental simplicity. Your view is concerned
with the logic of circumstantial process,

I reason in a theory.



where mine is the trans-
logical experience of the processors themselves.

Define "translogical", "experience" and "processors", and tell me in which theory. What do you ssume?




I like your thought experiment, and it's very interesting, but I might
accuse it of limiting 1-p phenomena to a 3p report of 1-p
circumstance.

At that stage I don't need more, and you cannot be scientific without given a 3p definition of what you talk about. Even on the 1p notion, which admittdely are not compeletely definable by the machine, or the scientists.



The diary of the subject is really the subject you are
working with, the facts of the subject's relation to their geography,
etc rather than what it is to be able to feel like a person.

Feeling being here or there is a feeling, and that is enough for the reasoning.


In your
exercise, I would say that you could scan a person's body and upload
it into a swarm of nanobot printers to create your hyper-clones, who
would maybe have the same memories as the original but from the
instant they incarnate in a different city and or different time, they
begin to diverge.

Yes.



The Moscow h-c cloned from a Polish original would
have a different experience of course from the Washington DC h-c, and
I don't think we know enough about how memory and meaning function to
know whether there would be a quasi amnesiac depersonalization at
having been reborn as a prefabricated adult.

In which theory? By definition of comp, this does not happen when the doctor choose the correct level, which exists (by comp).



Identity might be
disproportionately re-imprinted, as in a psychedelic response, to
being expressed through a perfect replica of another body in another
life.

This sentence does not make sense for me. Sorry.




I was thinking about how a sperm resembles a brain and spinal cord but
that the egg is more like a microcosm of a world. Conception plays out
metaphorically as a miniature sensorimotive self entering a single
life as a sphere which progressively articulates itself as it absorbs
not only the genetic information, but the informer as well.

Secondly, at the modal first order level, none of the hypostases are
decidable. provable Bp is PI-2 complete, and true Bp is P1-complete in
the oracle of truth. This means "terribly non computable".
The theory of computability is full of result showing that the
behavior of machines is terribly NOT computable, and the machine's
theology is full of highly undecidable sentences. This should kill any
reductionist view of what numbers are capable of.

Sure, yeah. I can just look at

x = 0.999...
10x = 9.999...
10x - x = 9.999... - 0.999...
9x = 9
x = 1

and see that numbers aren't what they might appear to be.

I don't see the relevance of this. I don't do analogies in the reasoning, or I show precisely the dictionary, like in the interpretation of Plotinus.




I'm talking
about something else though. I'm talking about numbers not being able
to feel anything, but that numbers and feelings arise out of each
other, and that the two phenomena represent opposite ends of an
involuted continuum.

You can remember the result, which is going in *you* direction (at
least UDA). We cannot have both comp and materialism.

I think that the fact we can even talk about comp or materialism is
evidence that we of course must have them both.

It is evidence that we might suffer similar delusion. I can talk about unicorn. Your argument does not follow.



Why does it have to be
one or the other?

That is what the reasoning explains.



I can excite my body by thinking about something
exciting, and my brain can excite me by metabolizing a stimulant
molecule. Where's the conflict?

In step seven and eight. The conflict is that you can attach consciousness to a piece of body, but you cannot attach a piece of body to consciousness, only infinities of computations.




You keep
materialism, so you are coherent in abandoning comp. Unfortunately the
result is non intelligible, because you don't say explicitly what is
non Turing emulable in the human body.

What is non Turing emulable is the experience of the human life that
is associated with and through the body. The body alone is just a
cadaver that has been temporarily prevented from decay.

OK. That follows logically from comp, although I would avoid the word cadaver.



Just tell us what you don't understand.

Step 7 for starters. But I get the gist I think. You're dealing with a
tokenized 3p view of 1p experience, which is great for your purposes.
I'm more about reconciling the full depths and breadth of 1p sentience
with physical phenomena and the cosmos in general.

The point is that with comp you*have to* justify the cosmos and physics from the number. And then the self-reference logics pave the mathematical way to do that, and the nice surprise is that we get the qualia (and the quanta among them).

Bruno




On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 23 Jul 2011, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jul 22, 7:26 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Comp embraces the non computable. If you study the work you will
understand that both matter and mind arise from the non computable,
with comp.

See the second part of sane04. Ask question if there are problems.

I know you must have gone over it too many times already in other
places, so I'm not expecting you to reiterate comp for me, but I
haven't been able to see how comp embraces the non computable.

It embraces it at many places. First the first person indeterminacy
leads to the taking into account of uncomputable sequences in the
first person experiences. Just iterate the Washington-Moscow
experience n times. There will be 2^n resulting version of you, and
most will acknowledge the apparent non computability of their history
(like WWMMWWWWMWMMWMMMMWWW ...).

Secondly, at the modal first order level, none of the hypostases are
decidable. provable Bp is PI-2 complete, and true Bp is P1-complete in
the oracle of truth. This means "terribly non computable".

The theory of computability is full of result showing that the
behavior of machines is terribly NOT computable, and the machine's
theology is full of highly undecidable sentences. This should kill any
reductionist view of what numbers are capable of.

To me, any time you say that comp explains something or direct me to
your
work, it's the same as someone saying 'The Bible explains that'.

I have worked a lot to make all this available to any good willing
people. The first six step of UDA in the sane04 people can be
understood without reading any textbook. Step seven needs familiarity
with the Church-Turing thesis, or with a bit of computer programming.
The AUDA "interview of the UM" needs some familiarity with Gödel's
1931 paper.
It should be obvious that computationalism needs of a bit of computer
science.

Not
trying to disparage your way of teaching or motivating, just saying
that I can't seem to do anything with it.

You can remember the result, which is going in *you* direction (at
least UDA). We cannot have both comp and materialism. You keep
materialism, so you are coherent in abandoning comp. Unfortunately the
result is non intelligible, because you don't say explicitly what is
non Turing emulable in the human body.

To me, if it can't be made
understandable within the context of the discussion at hand, it's
better left to another discussion.

Just tell us what you don't understand.



I'm
just going by my observation that numbers are in many ways
everything
that feeling is not. To get to the feeling of numbers, you have to
look at something like numerology.

I doubt that very much. Lol.
All you need is computer science. Actually all you need is addition
and multiplication (and working a little bit, well, a lot probably).

What are your doubts based upon?

Numerology is poetry. It has nothing to tell on the consequences of
comp. To refer to numerology in that setting is like to ask an
astrologist for sending a rocket in space.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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