On Jul 24, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I am not sure I understand. The first person indeterminacy does not
> involve "hypercomplexity", nor does the other notion.

"There will be 2^n resulting version of you, and most will acknowledge
the apparent non computability" I'm thinking that you mean here that
indeterminacy is non-computable do to unrecoverable complexity.

> I reason in a theory.

To me reason is only one category of sense, and not necessarily the
superlative one. Perception is more elemental than reason.

> > where mine is the trans-
> > logical experience of the processors themselves.
> Define "translogical", "experience" and "processors", and tell me in
> which theory. What do you ssume?

Translogical is the appearance of qualitative properties which would
not be predicted by number systems alone but nonetheless factor into
the functionality of a phenomenon.

Experience is sensorimotive perception-participation.

Processors are phenomena which perceive and participate in the cosmos.

> At that stage I don't need more, and you cannot be scientific without
> given a 3p definition of what you talk about. Even on the 1p notion,
> which admittdely are not compeletely definable by the machine, or the
> scientists.

But a scientific TOE cannot be complete unless it addresses the full
range of 1p phenomena.

> > The diary of the subject is really the subject you are
> > working with, the facts of the subject's relation to their geography,
> > etc rather than what it is to be able to feel like a person.
> Feeling being here or there is a feeling, and that is enough for the
> reasoning.

That's not a feeling, it's a one dimensional geographical-
autobiographical vector.

> > The Moscow h-c cloned from a Polish original would
> > have a different experience of course from the Washington DC h-c, and
> > I don't think we know enough about how memory and meaning function to
> > know whether there would be a quasi amnesiac depersonalization at
> > having been reborn as a prefabricated adult.
> In which theory? By definition of comp, this does not happen when the
> doctor choose the correct level, which exists (by comp).

Isn't that just using comp to rationalize comp? What I get from comp
is 1) There is a level at which functional equivalence through
substitution is possible. 2) All emulation based on math is
functionally equivalent or identical. 3) Math is real. What I'm saying
is that even with 1 satisfied, you have a cloned person who is
potentially functionally equivalent to the original, or would be in
theory, but that the cloning process itself may not automatically
bring with it consciousness-in-progress. Imagine that the original
brain is like a trillion flywheels all spinning at different rates,
many are synchronized and many groups are dynamically synched to
derived functions of velocities of other groups. I'm suggesting that
those mutually dependent velocities cannot necessarily be carried
over, even if the cloned flywheels are functionally equivalent. It's
like an Excel spreadsheet where the formula pointers will be broken
when separated from the original document context. You can recalculate
the spreadsheet with new values of the new geography, but the
constants from the base document are missing.

> > Identity might be
> > disproportionately re-imprinted, as in a psychedelic response, to
> > being expressed through a perfect replica of another body in another
> > life.
> This sentence does not make sense for me. Sorry.

Saying the same as above. What cloning an adult cannot be accomplished
without passing through a kind of psychic reboot.

> I don't see the relevance of this. I don't do analogies in the
> reasoning, or I show precisely the dictionary, like in the
> interpretation of Plotinus.

I think analogies are critically important, personally.

> It is evidence that we might suffer similar delusion. I can talk about
> unicorn. Your argument does not follow.

In a TOE though, if you have two main possibilities that seem mutually
exclusive, you should be able to either reconcile them or explain why
the delusion is compelling.

> > I can excite my body by thinking about something
> > exciting, and my brain can excite me by metabolizing a stimulant
> > molecule. Where's the conflict?
> In step seven and eight. The conflict is that you can attach
> consciousness to a piece of body, but you cannot attach a piece of
> body to consciousness, only infinities of computations.

In my view, there is no piece of body without some degree of awareness
because they are opposite ends of the same thing.

> The point is that with comp you*have to* justify the cosmos and
> physics from the number. And then the self-reference logics pave the
> mathematical way to do that, and the nice surprise is that we get the
> qualia (and the quanta among them).

what does the number have to be justified by?


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to