On Jul 26, 4:48 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>  All known biology is Turing emulable.
> The carbon atom is Turing emulable.

Since our biology is the only biology that we can know from the
inside, why would we assume that what we can emulate the interior
qualities of other organisms or even atoms based upon how they appear
to us from the outside?

> Too bas cells are not Löbian (apparently). But the "soul" of the
> Löbian machine have a topological space associated to them. Now I am
> not sure in which sense you talk about "interior topology of
> biological cells". It looks poetical to me.

The interior topology is literally poetic. The cosmos has figurative,
metaphorical properties. That's where they live.

> > What are you saying that consciousness is the result of then?
> On the first person point of view of a machine whose states belongs to
> an infinity of computations (those below its substitution level.

Why and how would there be a such thing as a first person point of

> I don't believe in a "granted" (primitive) cosmos, nor in any thing
> primitively physical. Nor do I believe in their inexistence. I heard
> only rumor. I am agnostic on that issue. But I don't believe in the
> compatibility of such beliefs with comp.

The idea of a granted anything presupposes causality as granted. I see
causality as a consequence of existence - that is, the unfolding of
essential non-local, non-temporal sense through the existential
process of timespace self-involution.

> > I'm not sure about infinities and zombies. I would have to know
> > specifically what case you mean.
> Frankly it is a consequence of the whole UDA. But you have to do the
> thought experience to understand, and so accept comp at least for the
> sake of the argument. Do you accept that comp implies I can accept in
> principle the use of teletransportation. Do you accept to reason on
> the assumption such transportation machine reconstitute you at the
> right level?

I'm not sure about teletransportation as far as it implies the
continuity of a chain of custody of identity. When you destroy the
template, that could be the end of the identity as far as it's 1p
experience goes. We would have no way of knowing whether that 1p
experience carries over to the clones. If the clones were physically
identical biological organisms, I think that they would be identical
internally as well, but as we know identical twins are not
interchangeable. Not claiming that identical twins would be as exact a
duplicate, but the lack of intimation of potential redundancy in twins
as far as identity goes as well as anecdotal reports of reincarnation
(rare but interesting) leaves open the possibility of a unique
identifier for experiential phenomena. The clone could not be exactly
the same as the original, after all, as it would be composed of
different individual atoms in a different geographical-physical
context. Who knows?

> > Only by reverse engineering. There's no mathematical inevitability for
> > chlorophyll or carbon. Carbon could be as inert as Neon in another
> > universe. Six could be the saturated valence number instead of ten.
> > Geometry could work differently.
> But we don't escape the Turing emulable realm here.

You could emulate it if you knew what you were emulating, but you
can't predict what yellow would taste like in a universe where color
is a flavor and carbon is based on imaginary flat-bubble geometry..

> > But you don't have the right software. You would need software that
> > makes up new colors out of nothing. Software that would rather try to
> > kill you than do what you program it to do.
> ? I say, if the right software does not exist, you need infinite
> specification for your body, and comp is made wrong. That's OK, and
> coherent with your cosmos religion. No problem. You might just miss a
> cute and rather natural, theory, and I hope you will be kind enough to
> give a steak to my son in law (and dont' tell him, nor me, that he is
> a zombie).

Haha, Of course. Steaks are on the house. I'm not sure if brains are
preferred warm or chilled though. I do like what I can understand of
your thought experiment, I'm just trying to point out where and how I
think that the universe differently from what the experiment takes
into account.

> > I agree, although I call it awareness. Consciousness to me implies the
> > potential for self awareness.
> That is not saying much.

A little goes a long way?

> > It's finite but it's not characterized by something other than itself.
> > Yellow is yellow. Hydrogen is Hydrogen.
> And Unicorn are Unicorn. With comp, Hydrogen are convenient fictions,
> stable patterns in winning (?) computational histories (winning in the
> sense that they do stabilize coherent first person plural sharable
> realities.

If Hydrogen is a convenient fiction, and I can sort of go along with
that, then does that make Unicorns inconvenient facts?

> > What do addition and multiplication emerge from?
> I don't know. That is why I assume them. What ever you assume
> (cosmos?, cells, water, molecules, fields, consciousness?) I will ask
> where that come from. Comp start from the simplest to get the riddle
> of the puzzle, not from the complex, which *is* the problem.

I see something like pain as being simpler than addition or
multiplication. Every organism knows what feeling is without needing
it explained. Wouldn't those be the natural primitives? Arithmetic
logic is symbolic and requires higher order thinking to comprehend. It
needs to be explained - usually through concrete example. Once the
language is imprinted on our minds, it seems quite simple and
intuitive, just as words written in our own language appear to already
be readable when we look at them, but objectively it is the meaning
behind the letters and numbers that is the phenomenological reality.
It's gestural, experiential, raw sensorimotive coherence which
precedes the names we give it.


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