Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 13 Aug 2011, at 23:07, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>> We are going in circles, because I am just totally unable to explain  
>> what I
>> mean. I guess because words can't convey what I want to convey.  
>> Probably I
>> am trying to argue something that is incommunicable, like you kindly
>> reminded me. On many levels I could just agree with you. But on a very
>> important level I disagree, but unfortunately the point I disagree  
>> with is
>> subtle. It seems to me you are confusing representation and  
>> actuality, but I
>> am not sure this is precisely it, either.
> 
> It can be that, indeed, unless you meant that comp is false. Comp does  
> a sort of bet that a brain is already representing you, and that some  
> digital machine can be sued for a representation of you <here and now>  
> as faithful as the one already done by nature with the brain, or with  
> the body, or whatever observable who would play that role.
I might suggest that the notion of a faithful representation is already
relative and subjective. In some sense no representation is faithful because
it is just a representation. It always contains a "lie" *if* taken as the
real thing.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> So I am not going to argue anymore, it seems pointless.
> 
> It is indeed, because my point is a point of logic. People find a flaw  
> or get the point. I would say it is a scientific discovery: the  
> discovery of the universal machines and some of their abities,  
> including theor theology, including their physics (making comp  
> testable).
As far as I can see your logic is sound. But logic can't tackle the problem
of seperating actuality and representation, it just concerns whether the
representation makes sense.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on  
>> consciousness
>> is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean it's
>> independent of it, or prior to it.
> 
> I would say of course, except that "independent" and 'prior" are a bit  
> fuzzy.
I can only to invite you to be skeptic of this "of course". For me it isn't
obvious at all.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> And the fact that it derived from numbers
>> within the theory still doesn't mean that it is in actuality the  
>> reason for
>> it.
> 
> Logically you are right. But remember the invisible horses.
>From a scientific standpoint this remark makes sense. But I believe this
point is beyond science. From my intuition the simple difference is that
invisible horses are not primary or necessary and consciousness is.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a  
>> (strong)
>> intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.
> 
> Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of knowledge,  
> suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with the  
> correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
This may be a strong point against COMP. In some sense you could say it is
close to self-refuting. If COMP shows the machines intuitions will be wrong,
their intuition to say YES likely is wrong!  But it seems you don't want to
discuss whether COMP is credible or not.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> The question is why do you take as obvious that consciousness cannot
>>> be explained, or explained at some degree n%.
>>>
>> I can't answer this question in some logical sense. It is just  
>> obvious that
>> there can be no external explanation, as there is obviously no  
>> exterior to
>> consciousness. And it is equally obvious that all internal  
>> explanations are
>> incomplete, as explaining yourself is always a bit like a dog  
>> chasing its
>> tail (well, a lot more productive and interesting ;) ).
> 
> Well thanks, but that's the point.
If that's the point your question doesn't make much sense, does it?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> So the needle falling in the forest not only does not make any noise,
>>> but it makes also no vibrations in the air? I doubt it.
>>>
>> It makes a noise, and it makes vibrations. We are just not very  
>> aware of it.
>> It is part of our sub-conscious.
> 
> Hmm... then all arithmetical truth is part of our subconscious I'm  
> afraid.
Is that bad? Why not? Indeed I would say all mathematicians do is bringing
things from their subconscious into their awareness in a formal form.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> ...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming that WE are  
>> all God,
>> though. :D
> 
> They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify you, and of  
> course censor the discovery.
> It can make sense when you see how far some are able to misunderstand  
> the statement.
> 
> In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that, but if  
> assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself into  
> bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom. That it is
paradoxically may be acceptable, if we accept that on some level reality is
paradoxical. It is just that in some context we simply want more precise
formulations than "reality is paradoxical" / "0=1". You might be right that
the axiom is useless in formal contexts. But science is already not totally
formal.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> That is extreme relativism which leads to instrumentalism.  
>>> Fundamental
>>> science is driven by the search of knowledge. To say yes to the  
>>> doctor
>>> cannot be just a useful story. Either you die through it, or you
>>> survive. That *can* make a difference.
>>>
>> I guess I am to near to a transpersonal view to accept this. It  
>> doesn't
>> ultimately really matter whether I die or survive.
> 
> The irony of comp: once a machine has the cognitive ability to  
> understand that she can survive through a digital functional  
> substitution, then she has the ability to understand that she will  
> survive no matter what.
> 
> But then she understands that the real goal is not surviving, the real  
> goal is making high the probability of seeing the near soccer cup  
> nearby. For which an artificial brain can be handy. Of course it is a  
> little ego affair, like life, dreams and realities.
OK, this makes sense. But I don't think what you mentioned as ego affairs
are ego affairs. They are just ego affairs through the lens of ego. God
seems to be very much interested in life, dreams and realities, after all
this is what pretty much all of his experience revolves around!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> (as long as you promise to not abandon your
>> responsibilities) :D.
> 
> Ah Ah! The key point!
But really I believe it comes naturally with awakening. God is happy to take
on whatever responsibilities he presents himself with. Just ego has problems
with it, understandably. The ego can't understand why and how, and suffers
from the problems that go with responsibilites, etc...
Wanting to abandon responsibilities and feeling to have to take on
responsibilities may both be forms of ego.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> My explanation is my job, my little-responsibility on this planet, in  
> this game.
Do you feel it as a responsibility? I am not sure it is. Why should you have
to explain those things if it isn't your passion? 

benjayk
-- 
View this message in context: 
http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p32260389.html
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to