On 14 Aug 2011, at 20:09, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Aug 2011, at 23:07, benjayk wrote:


We are going in circles, because I am just totally unable to explain
what I
mean. I guess because words can't convey what I want to convey.
Probably I
am trying to argue something that is incommunicable, like you kindly
reminded me. On many levels I could just agree with you. But on a very
important level I disagree, but unfortunately the point I disagree
with is
subtle. It seems to me you are confusing representation and
actuality, but I
am not sure this is precisely it, either.

It can be that, indeed, unless you meant that comp is false. Comp does
a sort of bet that a brain is already representing you, and that some
digital machine can be sued for a representation of you <here and now>
as faithful as the one already done by nature with the brain, or with
the body, or whatever observable who would play that role.
I might suggest that the notion of a faithful representation is already relative and subjective. In some sense no representation is faithful because it is just a representation. It always contains a "lie" *if* taken as the
real thing.

Remember that I do assume comp. It presupposes a level at which there is a faithful representation of my computational state in the state of a "Turing machine" or equivalent digital device.






Bruno Marchal wrote:

So I am not going to argue anymore, it seems pointless.

It is indeed, because my point is a point of logic. People find a flaw
or get the point. I would say it is a scientific discovery: the
discovery of the universal machines and some of their abities,
including theor theology, including their physics (making comp
testable).
As far as I can see your logic is sound. But logic can't tackle the problem of seperating actuality and representation, it just concerns whether the
representation makes sense.

We might think that nature has already bet on some representation, and a self-refrentially correct machine is a machine which represent itself faithfully relatively to some other universal machine. At the substitution level the map cross the territory. Computer science allows this for digital representations.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on
consciousness
is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean it's
independent of it, or prior to it.

I would say of course, except that "independent" and 'prior" are a bit
fuzzy.
I can only to invite you to be skeptic of this "of course". For me it isn't
obvious at all.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

And the fact that it derived from numbers
within the theory still doesn't mean that it is in actuality the
reason for
it.

Logically you are right. But remember the invisible horses.
From a scientific standpoint this remark makes sense. But I believe this point is beyond science. From my intuition the simple difference is that
invisible horses are not primary or necessary and consciousness is.

Necessary with logic and numbers: yes.
Necessary as a primitive ontological entity? I am not sure.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a
(strong)
intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.

Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of knowledge,
suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with the
correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
This may be a strong point against COMP.

Why? On the contrary, it mirrors the emergence of a mind-body problem in the discourse of the universal numbers. Once I say "yes" to the doctor, I lost the option of taking those discourses as zombies one.



In some sense you could say it is
close to self-refuting.

I agree. It is close to self-refuting. The simple LUMs already reflect the left and right brain difference and the conflict between intuition and the counter-intuition.
But close to self-refutation is not self-refutation.



If COMP shows the machines intuitions will be wrong,
their intuition to say YES likely is wrong! But it seems you don't want to
discuss whether COMP is credible or not.

I don't need too. I have already prove that comp is incredible for the first person. Incredible but true, like the self-consistency statement (Dt, ~Bf) for which we have, for Peano Arithmetic, ZF and all correct LUMs, that their G* proves Dt & ~BDt. That is why I insist that comp asks for an act of faith, and is a theology.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

So the needle falling in the forest not only does not make any noise,
but it makes also no vibrations in the air? I doubt it.

It makes a noise, and it makes vibrations. We are just not very
aware of it.
It is part of our sub-conscious.

Hmm... then all arithmetical truth is part of our subconscious I'm
afraid.
Is that bad? Why not? Indeed I would say all mathematicians do is bringing
things from their subconscious into their awareness in a formal form.

No problem. It makes the physical universe the observable border of the subconscious, which may seems a bit stretched.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming that WE are
all God,
though. :D

They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify you, and of
course censor the discovery.
It can make sense when you see how far some are able to misunderstand
the statement.

In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that, but if
assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself into
bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom.

Because you will become inconsistent.



That it is
paradoxically may be acceptable, if we accept that on some level reality is
paradoxical.

It is true but not communicable. That is paradoxical, but noneless true and non contradictory. But when taken as axiom, it becomes communicable, and that makes it false. you become inconsistent, and unsound.
Well, in the theology of the ideally correct machine.



It is just that in some context we simply want more precise
formulations than "reality is paradoxical" / "0=1". You might be right that the axiom is useless in formal contexts. But science is already not totally
formal.

Bp is formal for the machine. But
Bp & p cannot be formal for the machine. The third hypostase is a tour de force made possible by Theaetetus+Gödel's incompleteness: it leads to a formal system describing what is necessarili informal from the machine's point of view. It makes possible for a strongLUM to study the theology of a weak LUM (strong and weak with respect to arithmetical provability). The strong LUM cannot lift that theology on herself, because she cannot know if she is consistent, and still less know if she is correct, which again will explain why she will have to make an act of faith.

Comp makes science able to study some feature of what extends science. Machines *can* do that.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is extreme relativism which leads to instrumentalism.
Fundamental
science is driven by the search of knowledge. To say yes to the
doctor
cannot be just a useful story. Either you die through it, or you
survive. That *can* make a difference.

I guess I am to near to a transpersonal view to accept this. It
doesn't
ultimately really matter whether I die or survive.

The irony of comp: once a machine has the cognitive ability to
understand that she can survive through a digital functional
substitution, then she has the ability to understand that she will
survive no matter what.

But then she understands that the real goal is not surviving, the real
goal is making high the probability of seeing the near soccer cup
nearby. For which an artificial brain can be handy. Of course it is a
little ego affair, like life, dreams and realities.
OK, this makes sense. But I don't think what you mentioned as ego affairs are ego affairs. They are just ego affairs through the lens of ego. God seems to be very much interested in life, dreams and realities, after all
this is what pretty much all of his experience revolves around!

I am not sure about that. I don't know.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

(as long as you promise to not abandon your
responsibilities) :D.

Ah Ah! The key point!
But really I believe it comes naturally with awakening. God is happy to take on whatever responsibilities he presents himself with. Just ego has problems with it, understandably. The ego can't understand why and how, and suffers
from the problems that go with responsibilites, etc...
Wanting to abandon responsibilities and feeling to have to take on
responsibilities may both be forms of ego.

Not sure. In buddhism, in Chan and Zen, they describe often the awakening as the penultimate spiritual stage. The last stage is the coming back "in the village", which seems to be the hardest task for many.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

My explanation is my job, my little-responsibility on this planet, in
this game.
Do you feel it as a responsibility?

Like any job. If I was plumber, I would feel responsible for the quality of the plumbing.


I am not sure it is. Why should you have
to explain those things if it isn't your passion?

Happy the one who can manage its job and its passion. (Well it is a bit double edged and can entail self-exploitation, and self-revolution which don't ease life, but then that's the price).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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