On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 14, 12:05 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 13 Aug 2011, at 21:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The further our imaginary reality is from our own
PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences
that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically.

How would you justify that?

Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more
morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the
bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal
attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of
like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple
privacies.

That does not justify it.

Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska,
I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly
imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's
because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic
incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get
from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that
your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more
precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the
self projected outward onto the 'other'.

That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture.



You just repeat it in a more complex way,
with even more assumptions, and when you say "sort of like perceptual
polarization by interference between multiple privacie", you are the
1004 wonderland.

What's 1004?

An allusion to an error made by Bruno is Lewis Carroll's "Sylvie and Bruno":

Bruno "There is about 1004 muttons in that flock of sheep."

Sylvie: "You can't say 'about 1004'. You should say 'about 1000'. The four is insignifiant with the use of 'about'.

That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision.

(Of course Bruno did not accept to be defeated so easily, so he justified himself in adding: "The four is *very*significant because I see four muttons nearby. The about was for 1000, because they might be 500 or 1500 muttons". :)




I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence,

Nice.



but I'm trying to
use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how
perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other.

Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the contrary.


When
you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other
polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter.
Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the
tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful,
misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The
increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my
guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a
molecule very well.

?



But I not saying you don't intuit something, because it does makes
sense in AUDA, except for his reification of a concrete reality, at
least if your answer, which does more use the term "physical" is
supposed to answer my question.



What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in
front
of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a
reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive
belief in
a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief
in
a separation between the believer and the believed.

I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as
to
what they will be able to believe or develop.

What do you mean by "physically"?

What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells,
organisms, etc.

Organism are physical?
Are you assuming physicalism?

Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are
physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo-
physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the
outside

In the physical description. But do you take that description as basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be justified by a non physicalist theory?



and sensori-motive on the inside,

Which is poetry, according to you.


but they exist and insist on
different PRIF scales.

You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low.



It's a holarchy, so that organisms include
physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena,
but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level
awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step
further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content
of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing
teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions.

I don't see any problem with this view in the comp theory, unless you reify matter, mind and the link between, which is a way to create a magical sort of mind body problem, and solving with magic, not just poetical, links.



If you execute the
machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of
belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief.

So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable.

It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical.

That's follows from the comp hypothesis. In the sense that the first
person is distributed on a non computable structure on which its
bodies will rely. It is simpler to say that the mind is 3-Turing
emulable, and that 3-matter is not. Well, at least this can be
explained to anybody, when we assume that we can survive at some level
of digital emulation.

The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies.

For a mathematician the term "topology" has precise technical meaning,
making such sentence looking weird.

Sorry. I just think of a topology as an ideal surface that can me
mapped in consistent terms. In this case it could be the intersection
of two sets, but set seems abstract to me, whereas a topology implies
a concrete fabric. The point being that outside of the overlap, the
two sets are truly incompatible and unknowable to each other. Within
the overlap each side can be fully known, but not in the same terms.
Matter must be understood as a-signifying, generic, quantitative
processes, and Mind must be understood as signifying, proprietary,
qualitative experiences.

But we don't
know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or
recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition).
So,
to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is
already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call
that a "fuite en avant" (forward-escape).

It's not the topology of the physical objects which we can encounter
externally which is non Turing emulable, it's the private interior
which we can only guess at through out own imagination. It's not a
cypher though, it's just metaphorical. Objects cannot tell us what
they mean, but through our understanding of what they mean to us,

replace "objects" by "south americans", and you will see your sentence
already asserts by de Sepulveda for arguing that they have no soul
comparable to ours.

I'm not saying that objects have no soul, I'm saying that 'soul' is a
figment of comparability itself. The more something seems to look like
you, act like you, think like you,  the more you think it has a soul.
That doesn't mean that the thing actually does have a soul like yours
though. I think that your position is that of a de Sepulveda
equivalent - to say that we are no better than a robot is a baseless
elevation of mechanism at the expense of human sovereignty,


I can understand that if you believe that machines are irremediably stupid, you don't like the idea that you might be one of them. But let us assume that you are self-confident. In that case you can take this as a good news: the news that a machine can be as much nice as you.





plus it's
incredibly premature given that we have no reason to believe that any
electronic device has any more feeling than a doorknob so far.

If you do a computer with doorknob, it might implement a dream that he is a human. It is not the doorknob which thinks, nor the brain, nor the electronic device, but the person emulated by such device.

You are the one introducing implicitly infinities and non Turing emulability in he picture, where, using comp, you could get the same picture that you intuit by making the substitution level very low.





If we
had discovered a continent of robots with their own culture, then I
would agree, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Since we
are creating machines from components known to be unconscious which
show no signs of autopoietic development, I don't see why I would want
to dismiss the differences between living organisms and such organized
inorganisms.

The discovery of the universal machine is, imo, a profound conceptual reason to do so. But all the evidences from biology and neurophysiology not only are in favor of comp, but even for a rather high substitution level.
And the evidences from physics is that it might not be that high.

But you make a strong statement: there is no level at. We are not duplicable, at any level. And the evidence you give are just providing fuel to the idea that the level is low, or based on the counter- intuitive nature of mechanism, which is indeed, as I said just to Benjayk, hard to believe ... by machine. So I expect them, and illustrate that they confirm mechanism more than they refute it.




personally and collectively, we can get a reading through the
alchemical prism that may partially correlate to external emulables.
It's not necessary to solve the mystery but to acknowledge that
mystery is a legitimate primitive phenomena of the cosmos.

To make a mystery primitive is automatically an authoritative move. It
is like saying "dont try to understand".

I don't say 'don't try to understand', I say 'render unto existence
what is quantifiable, and render unto qualia what is essential'.

You talk like Aristotle.




You are a guru, after all.

What makes someone a guru? I'm not claiming to know anything special,

You did once actually.


I'm just presenting ideas that seem to make sense of the mind body
problem to me.

Too bad my job consists to kill all gurus.

Hah, Now who is calling the kettle intolerantly ethnocentric?

?
I kill all guru independently of sex, race, religion, origin. The immaterial and the material one. OK, I am 'poetical too', and alluding to the buddhist motto that you have to kill all the buddhas when on the spiritual path. It is a way to say that I try to dismiss all argument by authority. Even nature's one.




You are no doing science, but promoting a personal opinion.

The science of consciousness cannot exclude the personal, or else it's
not being scientific. To disqualify the personal from the cosmos is to
disown the very asker of the questions of science.

You make a confusion of levels. You can assume subjects and develop theory on their experiences, and eventually confront them with experience reports, even with your own. But you cannot use your own in the presentation of your idea. You can't use expression "because I feel so". Especially in the mind body problem, where, beyond being invalid, it makes things pretty obscure.





It is
problematic because it excludes entities from the club of conscious
entities from appearances.

It's not just appearances. Again, if we land on the planet of the
robots, I'm all in favor of giving them the benefit of the doubt. If I
make a device specifically to impersonate a human-like intelligence
out of refined minerals and petrochemicals, why would I assume that at
some point they might become something else?

Because you get the bill of the hospital and discover that those bastard doctors put your a petrochemicals brain in the skull, and you did not notice. Now you noticed it just by seeing the exorbitant bill.

Doctor, why don't I feel like being a petrochemical being?

Because you feel to be the person executed by the computer, you don't feel the matter which constitute that computer. There are no nerves in the petrochemical product.





The math alone can
create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics

With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of
numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at
least not in a primitively grounded way.

It can still be an emerging pattern in the mind, but the experience of
it goes beyond what could be achieved or anticipated through pure
mathematics.

Agree for "anticipate", not for "achieved".

Also you confuse the mathematical reality, and the mathematical tools
to explore that reality. It is as different as a finger pointing to
the moon and the moon.
I am not saying there is a mathematical reality, just that it is
different from the mathematical theories.
I do believe in the arithmetical reality, to be precise.

What is the difference between the mathematical reality that you are
saying does not exist and the arithmetical reality that you do
'believe in'? What is an example of each?

Arithmetical truth concerns the sentence involving natural numbers, and addition and multiplication, + the logical symbols. I do intuit that all such sentence is either true or false. Even complex one like the twin prime conjecture, or any statement about what do, or don't, a machine.

Set theoretical truth concerns the sentence involving sets and appartenance, with basic law of union, intersection, power set, comprehension. I don't intuit them aswell, especially for big infinite sets. So it makes no sense for me to believe that the continuum hypothesis (a typical complex statement in set theory) is true of false. There are too much different sort of models (structures satisfying the axiom).

For arithmetic we have a reasonable notion of standard model.






It's a pattern with one side as quantitative sequential
sophistication and the other as qualitative simultaneous simplicity.

can
create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic,
which is what gives the believer not only separation but something
of
a trump-card privilege over the believed.

I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical.

It's not magical but it explains the existence of the feeling of, or
desire for magical. It's the potential of teleology to actualize
itself, defined by and in contradistinction to, the inertial of
teleonomy to limit teleological actualization.

In a contest of math v
physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of
math,

But what is the physical?

Physical is the tails side of the coin of awareness.

Not bad.

Awareness and
experience inside out. It's like your two universal machines except
that they are the same machine twisted into a Mobius strip,

Why not a Klein Bottle?

Yeah I was thinking Klein Bottle also, but I like the strip metaphor
because it emphasizes the set complimentary, opposite relationship of
one side of the strip to the other. A Klein bottle juxtaposes the
interior and exterior surfaces in a less polarized way.

A universal machine can emulate a pair of
universal machine, without the need to twist itself.

That's the problem. If it can twist itself, it can untwist itself,
whereas the mind cannot untwist the body into mind.

Have you a proof of this? But "twist" is too metaphorical to ask for a proof, I guess.



I have seen
concrete early warnings of this in server virtualization. In theory
each server is an identical, isolated partition within a larger
hardware node. It works ok most of the time, but sometimes there are
corruptions of the logic underlying the partitions so that the entire
node needs to be reboot. There is no way to recover from within the
system or to save a particular partition, you have to physically power
the whole thing down and restart it. Restarting devices is by far the
most effective way of fixing computer problems. Error messages are
generally not helpful, and self-monitoring in general is less reliable
than the system it is monitoring.

With PC. Not with Mac :)



The doing of the
mind lives in other sort of topologies. You tell me you don't do math,
so each of your use of mathematical term are 1004 fallacies (to be
over-precise with respect to what we try to understand).

I don't know 1004.

See above.


meeting
itself through the mutual ignorance of objectification rather than
through mathematical correspondence - scrambled through the maximal
decoherence

You begin to look like a program failing to succeed a Turing test.
I wrote generators of sentence like that in my youth.

See, this is what I'm talking about with degenerating into ad hominem
or condescending arguments.

OK. Apology for that. But it was a way to tell you it looks like jargon.



I'm not offended, but I don't focus on my
difficulties in understanding your writing, even though it is a
significant barrier at times. It doesn't really help either of us to
define the debate in terms of how well we like each others style of
communication or attitude or personality.

I don't want to be hominem, but we are not on the same length wave.
You argue for he truth of something, where I propose assumption and reasoning. What you do looks like continental philosophy, and this seems to me to lead to arbitrary segregation, that you show up indeed by asserting that humans cannot survive with digital brain, that machine cannot think, etc.



Shouldn't it just be about
figuring out the best truths?

I think the best way to get close to truth consists in making clear what we are willing to assume, and to develop reasoning and submitting them to others. Even, perhaps especially in a field which concerns personal experience and their relations with what is or might be.




Our perception obeys mathematical laws when it examines physical
external phenomena. That is how physical objects are rendered as
separate from hallucinations which are dynamic, fluid, self
referential, metaphorical, and non-mathematical. Physics is
mathematical...to us.

Who us?

Us capable of understanding physics in mathematical terms.

Our experiences may very well be mathematical to
the universe (which is a comp friendly thought, right?)

I cannot say. What to you mean by "mathematical to the universe"?

From an perspective outside of our own. The noumenal 3p view of the
phenomena which we experience subjectively as 1p.

Well, comp makes the 3p-physics a 1p plural view. That shocks myself a little bit.



but to try to
execute our own mathematical sense as if it were universally
mathematical I think fails because we are missing the perspectives
outside of our minds.

Sure. But this can only be true in case comp is not just false, but
refuted.

What is required to refute comp?

An observable phenomenon which contradict our self-finiteness/Turing emulability. A physical phenomenon which contradicts the physics derived from arithmetic and some reasonable theory of knowledge. Or the discovery of the brain of a very special type of non Turing emulable process + an argument that it plays a role in our consciousness.






We need help from the work that has already been
done by our cells and genes to prop up a true artificial
consciousness, or else settle for the more useful option of developing
an unconscious but highly sophisticated intelliform machine in
microelectronics.

But this has nothing to do with the weak comp thesis I used as tools.
It means that you put the comp level low. For, without evidence,
nothing prevent the biochemical law to be Turing emulable. So with
comp, you can survive with a silicon-laser super computer simulating
your brain at the level of the basic quantum field. You can some of
joint and you will have the effect of the tobacco and marijuana in the
brain.

I am with you on this. I have evidences that pour level might be
exactly the classical electron level at the Heisenberg uncertainties.
IF QM is a consequence of DM as it seems, and should be assuming comp
in the cognitive/theological science, THEN the Heisenberg
uncertainties might be the whole from which we get the trace of the
"other computations, by other universal machines" takes it places.
Neurons, like amoebas, are probably less dumbs than most humans would
thought.

cool.

OK. But despite I *could* attribute consciousness to neurons, I still don't take for granted that this would imply my own level needs that consciousness. I am neutral on such "implementation" question.




Physics
cannot be anticipated from the math alone,

Why?

Exactly, why? If it were all math, then two billiard balls should
behave just like two hydrogen atoms. There should be no illusion or
appearances, no simplifications or transductions. It should be numbers
all the way up and down the cosmos. Why the puppet show? Why the
flavors and colors? The fact that there is anything other than math
requires an explanation before the idea that everything should be
reducible to mathematics demands support.

I assure you that there is a theory of qualia (and quanta) for (ideal) machine. And the theory fits with both the neuro-theories, and the religious or philosophical theories, especially with the non- reductionist one. There is only a pedagogical problem, which is that it relies on theoretical computer science, which is not astonishing, given the comp hypothesis. It relies specifically on the discovery of arithmetical self-reference (Post, Kleene, Gödel, Tarski, ... Solovay). It fits well with Maturana and Varella autopoesis, but perhaps at a more abstract level than biologist are used too.




Because no equation feels like a supernova or smells like bacon.

If the equation describe a Turing universal numbers running relatively to another universal number, as many equations in physics can do (even
just the one describing the open billiard ball) what you say is just,
again, an affirmation that comp is false.

I can see clearly why the subjective psyche that we are would be able
to assign agency to a computer process, since our awareness runs on
figurative sense-making by analogy, but I can't see my a computer
process would assign anything figurative to it's own computation.
Metaphor can be work on a literal level, but from where would literal
quantitative functions infer non-literal associations?

Excellent question. When a machine (quantitive relations) looks inward, its faces non-literal association, because they are there. Numbers cannot put numbers on most on the views on their intrinsic ignorance. It would also cost a lot to enumerate the names to find their quantitative quality so that the soul (an ultra non quantitative being) and consciousness (the instinctive bet that there is a reality, perhaps an invariant reality) provides tremendous self-speeding up ability (common, I bet, on all self-moving entities).




It is not the equation which feels something, it is the being
appearing in the solution of the equation who makes the thinking. This is true even for physicalist, nor just for number theorist or computer
scientists.

That doesn't sound metaphysical and guru-esque to you? A being appears
in the solution of the equation? Like  X=\cup_{s\in S} f_s(X) = Fred
the Malevolent? What part of the Turing machine is experiencing being?

The soul of the Turing machine has no part. It is the first person. It is not a material entity, nor even a number from the view of the machine. The math is given by defining knowledge of the machine simply by its true beliefs, and "believe" is defined, for ideally correct machine (well defined mathematical object) by a machine's assertion. take a look perhaps on the second part of the sane04 where I explain this.

Note that there is a recreative introduction by Raymond Smullyan on the self-reference logic G. "Forever Undecided". It might help, and in sane04 I have been inspired by its pedagogy.



Is it the tape, the read head, the chip, the marker?

It is not even the program. It is a person emulated by a program. We might call it an engram, because it is not a program programmed by someone, but a program selected by billions years of evolution.



Is it an
invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
remains locally constrained?

Yes.





To me it makes sense that the only thing experiencing the Turing
Machine as a machine is us. The machine itself is not a machine in
it's own experience,

OK.



it is different isolated materials with common
sense only on a physical and chemical level, not on a semantic level.

I don't understand your sentence.




I can understand that is true for geography, but why to assert this
for physics? What is physics?

I'm using physics here as distinct from math in the sense of relating
to physical bodies themselves rather than our understanding of the
principles governing physical bodies. Once we observe the body, it's
motion and changes, we can abstract an arithmetic description, but it
doesn't work the other way around.

We might agree. All my point is that if COMP is TRUE, then PHYSICS is
a branch of number theology.

My point is that physics cannot be entirely enveloped by number
theology. If that means that comp is false, then comp is certainly
false.

Well, the point is that it can be tested. Up to now, thanks to the quantum, it does fit rather well.

You cannot demolish a (sufficiently precise theory) by a philosophical prejudice.




I define, roughly, the theology of a number by all what is true about
that number, and I define the science of the number by all what that
number can prove.
Incompleteness then associated a theology to each number, and the self-
referentially correct numbers share all the same abstract theology
(but different from inside). But the fundamental laws are the same for all, and they contain and justify the way the physical laws appear and
get stable in some first person plural point of views.

I think you're saying here that what physical is can be described by
numbers because what is true about the physical can be enumerated.

Not at all. And most things that machine can discover looking inward are not enumerable. The whole recursion theory (theoretical computer science) study the degrees on non-mechanicalness of what machine can discover inside its head (figuratively speaking). Big features of physicalness are not enumerable.




If
so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,

It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved, inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I can see what that means.




it is also
what might be true, and what can be made true through motive action.

Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all the "might be true". (Assuming comp).




We can't take the mathematical
modeling of the visible electromagnetic spectrum to make concrete an
expectation of the color of gamma rays.

We can make that, by using that mathematical modelling and interface
it to a mathematical modelling done at the right substitution level of
a human brain, and then using the mathematical modelling of the vocal
cords to translate and hear a guy saying "oh! yes, I distinctively see
something".

Would he say that what he sees is a warm color? A cool color? Is it
bold or shy? Is it very similar to other visible colors or is it as
different from RGB as salty is to dizzy? Would his answers be random
or if we asked enough questions could we get a sense of what the
actual color of gamma rays looks like?

Here the theory says that you have to ask this to him. It might be difficult, but not much more to figure out what might sounds look for bat.




But here you will say that the guy is just a zombie, where
the correct computationalist will say that the experience itself is in Platonia, and the modeling being done by the equation's solution or by
the physical universe just changes probabilities of the relative
manifestation of that consciousness.

Sounds like obfuscation to me.

I have to refer to a work. Sorry. But I refer to a precise couple of theories which are standard: comp and arithmetic (including its meta- arithmetic which is not added, but really part of arithmetic).




Seeing a color is a simple thing if you
can see in color.

Well, it is 1-simple, but 3-complex.


Whether the experience is in Platonia or not, the
logic of the visible spectrum is as convincingly primitive as that of
numbers to me without being reducible to numbers. If it could be,
there would be no debate, we would both be able to agree 'oh yes,
because blue is so much more yellow than red, then we can know
precisely how much more blue gamma rays would be and therefore can
easily describe that color in terms others will understand.' It
doesn't work that way though.

You are right. It is part of the machine's qualia theory that we cannot compared ours with the one by others. We can bet on some neurophysiological cricuits, make copies, but we can't decode them introspectively.





it can only be reverse
engineered from factual physical observations.

But what is that?

Intersubjective sensorimotive experiences. Synchronized perceptions
which extend to the secondhand 'perceptions' of objects relating to
other objects. Measurement.

Math can of course be
used to build on physics as well (nuclear fission, etc) but it still requires a priori indexes of atomic behaviors which are independent
from pure arithmetic.

Why? I mean, even if comp is false, why would we a priori reject an
explanation, if the goal was not for justifying that sort of silicon
racism. It seems to me that you make matter, mind, the relation
between awfully mysterious just to justify a segregation among
possible entities for personhood.

I'm just saying that like the color of gamma rays, math would never
have been able to conceive of the properties of atoms were it not for
having those properties already available for justification.

How could you know that? You talk like if you knew the arithmetical
reality.

I don't know it, but i have a hard time believing that gold is
intrinsically 79-like in all possible universes. It doesn't follow
logically. I think that 79 is only gold if you are calculating protons
in a nucleus, and not ping pong balls in a bag or pixels on a screen.

Particles comes from symmetries for group transformation, but we don't know really where the parameters come from. Physics has not yet anwered, but has put a lot of light. is gold a geographical object or a physical object? That is obviously a complex open problem in the machine physics.




It's not
me that's silicon racist, it's the universe for excluding it and the
other inorganic atoms from participating in cellular elaboration.

Again de Sepulveda. It's not me which is "indian" racist, it is Jesus
itself for excluding the Indians for the truth.

In that case then, you are arguing that there is no special difference
between oxygen and arsenic. I'm just prejudiced against arsenic
because I don't like it.

I see.

What are you afraid of? That the Arsenic people steals our jobs, or what?




So yes. The carbon did have some advantage in the molecular evolution
of universal beings, but now we see that, perhaps thanks to the human,
the silicon can also drive universal beings, and you just say "no"
because, by definition, they don't have carbon.

I'm not opposed to humans making living organisms out of silicon, I'm
only saying that if they aren't living organisms, they are not likely
to be able to feel like a living organism.

Then we agree. the whole point is that comp says that we can make living people from silicon, metallic clocks, even stones and toilet paper (if you are patient enough to play a very long game).




There's no reason why it couldn't have been silicon instead of carbon
from a mathematical perspective, because math could not predict
cellular elaboration in the first place without being able to reverse
engineer it from the a posteriori knowledge and existence of living
cells.

You can derive from QM why carbon was advantage in the wet environment
of the planet. You can derive the existence of the carbon of
symmetries and stars, you can derive stars from gas and gravitation.
Physics can derive a lot, and physics itself (that the old news) is
derivable from addition and multiplication, and this by given both the
qualia and the quanta and a justification why they look different.

I don't buy it because it's all reverse engineered. If it were true,
again, we should have no trouble predicting the colors of the
invisible spectrum or the meaning of words that don't yet exist.

The theory explains what we can't.



It
implies a fixed, forward running logos in which the formality of
experience would be superfluous and nonsensical.

On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding up), rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal entity, not all being machines, BTW.



At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like the
EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong
somewhere 'course.

Matter is just the rear end of mind,

OK. With comp, we can said that matter is somehow the border of the
universal mind, where God loses control, somehow.

Right. Teleology yields to teleonomy as the condition of becoming
finite, but it doesn't go quietly. It tries to gain control by
figuring out a way of tricking the teleonomy (a-signifying side of
mind we know as physical matter as objects in space) into serving it's
purposes. But to the other side of that teleonomy, it makes sense that
the experience would be one of being forced into an incomprehensible
mold - that the most subjective part of it's awareness is being
orchestrated incomprehensibly by supra-conscious forces. When we
dream, we may be doing the computing for something else.

?

Something
like the solar system or DNA. That doesn't mean that those things are
experiencing our lives or that what we understand of them is what they
are, because the two topologies are existentially divided, even though
they are essentially the same.

?




but it needs that tangible
incongruity to manifest as stuffy.

No. It don't. I mean we don't have to postulate it, the tangible
incongruity is just logically unavoidable for the universal number
looking at themselves (which they do by Turing-universality virtue of
number relations).

If it's all done on the single
topology of a chip, the stuffy dimension is too thin to accommodate
the bandwidth of post-biological qualia.

You feel superior?

Depends in what way. In the ability to feel and understand zoological
and metaphorical realities, yes. In the ability to rapidly calculate
logical functions quantitatively no.

It is a cliché. It is an overgeneralization from a contingent cluster of machines, which exists since some years. I am ataliking about all machines. Church thesis makes the concept solid and mathematical.



It's not a matter of superior,
it's a matter of appropriate skill sets. By projecting superiority on
me personally though, you distract from the issue and make it just a
challenge on the ego level.

It's only pretending to
matter, and that difference, insignificant on a microelectronic scale
makes for an exponentially greater difference when scaled up to the
level of a massively sophisticated machine. An organism is organized,
but an organization by itself is not automatically an organism.

OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the substitution
infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate some
twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for making
us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.

I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex machine
that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as drawing a
straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky.

The reasoning works just from the truth of the comp hypothesis, not its practical possibility.



We have to explain the cells
and the organs first. Experience itself. We can't just assume 'If we
build it out of equations, beings will come through the solutions'.
It's possible that they will, but I think it's wildly overconfident to
assume that the chemical, genetic, biological, and somatic levels can
be skipped without loss of their contributions to human consciousness.

I have never said that.

This means only that you bet that our comp level of substitution is low. UDA works even if you ask the digitalist doctor to copy the entire observable universe at the Planck level, or even below (in some physics).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to