On Aug 15, 3:46 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska,
> > I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly
> > imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's
> > because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic
> > incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get
> > from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that
> > your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more
> > precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the
> > self projected outward onto the 'other'.
> That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being
> embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture.

Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a
reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar
the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of
imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target

> That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision.

Haha, excellent. Although you could also say that adding irrelevant
precision can communicate the irrelevance OF precision in the
particular case it's being used.
> > I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence,
> Nice.

> > but I'm trying to
> > use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how
> > perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other.
> Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the
> contrary.

Polarization seems simple to me compared to multi-sense perceptual

> > When
> > you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other
> > polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter.
> > Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the
> > tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful,
> > misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The
> > increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my
> > guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a
> > molecule very well.
> ?

The interference pattern between our PRIF and the target PRIF can be
an irrelevant obstacle to our understanding of the contents of the
target PRIF.

> > Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are
> > physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo-
> > physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the
> > outside
> In the physical description. But do you take that description as
> basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be
> justified by a non physicalist theory?

It's not ultimate, but it is the public description that we can
access. The private side of each level is presumably different from
our own, and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, but we can
only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start
connecting things to our brain tissue directly.

> > and sensori-motive on the inside,
> Which is poetry, according to you.

Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar.

> > but they exist and insist on
> > different PRIF scales.
> You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK
> with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would
> contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution
> level *very* low.

I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a
substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality.
They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking
at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there
substitution in one respect is almost possible, but in the opposite
respect is almost impossible. Where one point on the loop represents
maximum dimorphism between quality and quantity (such as mind and
matter: concrete multiplicities) the opposite point (such as I Ching
vs binary code: monastic abstractions) represents minimum dimorphism.

> > It's a holarchy, so that organisms include
> > physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena,
> > but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level
> > awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step
> > further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content
> > of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing
> > teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions.
> I don't see any problem with this view in the comp theory, unless you
> reify matter, mind and the link between, which is a way to create a
> magical sort of mind body problem, and solving with magic, not just
> poetical, links.

Mind and matter are just categories of sense. Sense is the link
between them, however there are many categories of sense, only some of
which can be described quantitatively.

> > I'm not saying that objects have no soul, I'm saying that 'soul' is a
> > figment of comparability itself. The more something seems to look like
> > you, act like you, think like you,  the more you think it has a soul.
> > That doesn't mean that the thing actually does have a soul like yours
> > though. I think that your position is that of a de Sepulveda
> > equivalent - to say that we are no better than a robot is a baseless
> > elevation of mechanism at the expense of human sovereignty,
> I can understand that if you believe that machines are irremediably
> stupid, you don't like the idea that you might be one of them. But let
> us assume that you are self-confident. In that case you can take this
> as a good news: the news that a machine can be as much nice as you.

I'm fine with being a machine, but I'm also an anti-machine made of
psychic sugar meat. A computer in my image is the same machine (or
nearly so) but it's corresponding anti-machine is logic electronic
glass. The glass could very well be superior to sugar in many
respects, but it's never going to be better at being sugar.

> > plus it's
> > incredibly premature given that we have no reason to believe that any
> > electronic device has any more feeling than a doorknob so far.
> If you do a computer with doorknob, it might implement a dream that he
> is a human. It is not the doorknob which thinks, nor the brain, nor
> the electronic device, but the person emulated by such device.

I don't think the device emulates a person, I think the person is just
the 1p experience of the device.

> You are the one introducing implicitly infinities and non Turing
> emulability in he picture, where, using comp, you could get the same
> picture that you intuit by making the substitution level very low.

I don't think it can have a substitution level because physics cannot
be located within mathematics, it can only be described, partially, by
mathematics. There is no mathematics for the experience of physics.

> > If we
> > had discovered a continent of robots with their own culture, then I
> > would agree, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Since we
> > are creating machines from components known to be unconscious which
> > show no signs of autopoietic development, I don't see why I would want
> > to dismiss the differences between living organisms and such organized
> > inorganisms.
> The discovery of the universal machine is, imo, a profound conceptual
> reason to do so.
> But all the evidences from biology and neurophysiology not only are in
> favor of comp, but even for a rather high substitution level.
> And the evidences from physics is that it might not be that high.

So you don't see a significant epistemological difference between
design and discovery?

> But you make a strong statement: there is no level at.

Not just that there is no level, but that 'level' itself is a
quantitative framing of the problem. I'm stating that I think there is
an overlapping range where substitution is most feasible (through
music or language for example), but that is the opposite range that
can be addressed mathematically.

>We are not
> duplicable, at any level. And the evidence you give are just providing
> fuel to the idea that the level is low, or based on the counter-
> intuitive nature of mechanism, which is indeed, as I said just to
> Benjayk, hard to believe ... by machine. So I expect them, and
> illustrate that they confirm mechanism more than they refute it.

> > I don't say 'don't try to understand', I say 'render unto existence
> > what is quantifiable, and render unto qualia what is essential'.
> You talk like Aristotle.

I was going for Jesus?

> > What makes someone a guru? I'm not claiming to know anything special,
> You did once actually.

I did? Not sure in what context, but I'll take your word for it.

> > I'm just presenting ideas that seem to make sense of the mind body
> > problem to me.
> >> Too bad my job consists to kill all gurus.
> > Hah, Now who is calling the kettle intolerantly ethnocentric?
> ?
> I kill all guru independently of sex, race, religion, origin. The
> immaterial and the material one.

I'm sure de Sepulveda would find the killing of all heathens
acceptable, not just native Americans.

> OK, I am 'poetical too', and alluding to the buddhist motto that you
> have to kill all the buddhas when on the spiritual path. It is a way
> to say that I try to dismiss all argument by authority. Even nature's
> one.

How is the illusion of authority to be accounted for then? And the
passion to dismiss it? Does arithmetic generate authority or destroy

> >> You are no doing science, but promoting a personal opinion.
> > The science of consciousness cannot exclude the personal, or else it's
> > not being scientific. To disqualify the personal from the cosmos is to
> > disown the very asker of the questions of science.
> You make a confusion of levels. You can assume subjects and develop
> theory on their experiences, and eventually confront them with
> experience reports, even with your own. But you cannot use your own in
> the presentation of your idea. You can't use expression "because I
> feel so". Especially in the mind body problem, where, beyond being
> invalid, it makes things pretty obscure.

But 'I feel so' is the whole basis of the mind body problem. You can't
just say 'you cannot use'... the sine qua non evidence of the problem.
How is disqualifying that not an argument from authority?

> >> It is
> >> problematic because it excludes entities from the club of conscious
> >> entities from appearances.
> > It's not just appearances. Again, if we land on the planet of the
> > robots, I'm all in favor of giving them the benefit of the doubt. If I
> > make a device specifically to impersonate a human-like intelligence
> > out of refined minerals and petrochemicals, why would I assume that at
> > some point they might become something else?
> Because you get the bill of the hospital and discover that those
> bastard doctors put your a petrochemicals brain in the skull, and you
> did not notice. Now you noticed it just by seeing the exorbitant bill.
> Doctor, why don't I feel like being a petrochemical being?
> Because you feel to be the person executed by the computer, you don't
> feel the matter which constitute that computer. There are no nerves in
> the petrochemical product.

I think it depends upon what nerves have been replaced. If It's
cerebellum - maybe I don't notice much except that I have an easier
time balancing. If it's the prefrontal cortex, maybe I never notice
being alive again, and my body languishes in a walking zombie coma.

> > What is the difference between the mathematical reality that you are
> > saying does not exist and the arithmetical reality that you do
> > 'believe in'? What is an example of each?
> Arithmetical truth concerns the sentence involving natural numbers,
> and addition and multiplication, + the logical symbols.
> I do intuit that all such sentence is either true or false. Even
> complex one like the twin prime conjecture, or any statement about
> what do, or don't, a machine.
> Set theoretical truth concerns the sentence involving sets and
> appartenance, with basic law of union, intersection, power set,
> comprehension. I don't intuit them aswell, especially for big infinite
> sets. So it makes no sense for me to believe that the continuum
> hypothesis (a typical complex statement in set theory) is true of
> false. There are too much different sort of models (structures
> satisfying the axiom).
> For arithmetic we have a reasonable notion of standard model.

Hmm. I sort of get that. Arithmetic truth = invariances behind
mathematical systems? Could these be feelings? What of addition and
multiplication are just abstract representations of the universal
sensorimotive qualia of 'more'. + = more and more, x = more (mores)

> >> A universal machine can emulate a pair of
> >> universal machine, without the need to twist itself.
> > That's the problem. If it can twist itself, it can untwist itself,
> > whereas the mind cannot untwist the body into mind.
> Have you a proof of this? But "twist" is too metaphorical to ask for a
> proof, I guess.

I don't think I'm a proof guy, but I can give examples. Like how we
can move our arm voluntarily without literally thinking a verbal
command to our arm to move. If we worked like a comp machine, the
instruction to move would be the same as the feeling of moving our
arm. We would be able to control what people think about by moving
their body.

> > I have seen
> > concrete early warnings of this in server virtualization. In theory
> > each server is an identical, isolated partition within a larger
> > hardware node. It works ok most of the time, but sometimes there are
> > corruptions of the logic underlying the partitions so that the entire
> > node needs to be reboot. There is no way to recover from within the
> > system or to save a particular partition, you have to physically power
> > the whole thing down and restart it. Restarting devices is by far the
> > most effective way of fixing computer problems. Error messages are
> > generally not helpful, and self-monitoring in general is less reliable
> > than the system it is monitoring.
> With PC. Not with Mac :)

That could be true, but I don't have first hand experience with anyone
using datacenters full of Macs.

> >> You begin to look like a program failing to succeed a Turing test.
> >> I wrote generators of sentence like that in my youth.
> > See, this is what I'm talking about with degenerating into ad hominem
> > or condescending arguments.
> OK. Apology for that. But it was a way to tell you it looks like jargon.

No problem, and I apologize for it looking like jargon, I just don't
always know how to say it in a more parsimonious way. I just want to
point out that the jargon-ness doesn't diminish the argument. It just
makes it more annoying to figure out.

> > I'm not offended, but I don't focus on my
> > difficulties in understanding your writing, even though it is a
> > significant barrier at times. It doesn't really help either of us to
> > define the debate in terms of how well we like each others style of
> > communication or attitude or personality.
> I don't want to be hominem, but we are not on the same length wave.
> You argue for he truth of something, where I propose assumption and
> reasoning.
> What you do looks like continental philosophy, and this seems to me to
> lead to arbitrary segregation, that you show up indeed by asserting
> that humans cannot survive with digital brain, that machine cannot
> think, etc.
> > Shouldn't it just be about
> > figuring out the best truths?
> I think the best way to get close to truth consists in making clear
> what we are willing to assume, and to develop reasoning and submitting
> them to others.
> Even, perhaps especially in a field which concerns personal experience
> and their relations with what is or might be.

I think that approach has a particular limit in this case, namely that
it restricts all findings to being 'conventional'. There is no
possibility of getting behind reason itself, which is a problem
because I think it's clear that sense precedes reason.

> > From an perspective outside of our own. The noumenal 3p view of the
> > phenomena which we experience subjectively as 1p.
> Well, comp makes the 3p-physics a 1p plural view. That shocks myself a
> little bit.

That sounds promising. There's still something wrong with the
plurality I think. There's only relativism pretending at reality
without any sense of weight and significance embodied amongst the
plural 1p views. There is no difference between hypnopompic and
hypnogogic transitions.
> > What is required to refute comp?
> An observable phenomenon which contradict our self-finiteness/Turing
> emulability.


> A physical phenomenon which contradicts the physics derived from
> arithmetic and some reasonable theory of knowledge.
> Or the discovery of the brain of a very special type of non Turing
> emulable process + an argument that it plays a role in our
> consciousness.


> I assure you that there is a theory of qualia (and quanta) for (ideal)
> machine. And the theory fits with both the neuro-theories, and the
> religious or philosophical theories, especially with the non-
> reductionist one. There is only a pedagogical problem, which is that
> it relies on theoretical computer science, which is not astonishing,
> given the comp hypothesis. It relies specifically on the discovery of
> arithmetical self-reference (Post, Kleene, Gödel, Tarski, ... Solovay).
> It fits well with Maturana and Varella autopoesis, but perhaps at a
> more abstract level than biologist are used too.

Does the theory of qualia claim that it is necessary and inevitable
consequence of function?

> > I can see clearly why the subjective psyche that we are would be able
> > to assign agency to a computer process, since our awareness runs on
> > figurative sense-making by analogy, but I can't see my a computer
> > process would assign anything figurative to it's own computation.
> > Metaphor can be work on a literal level, but from where would literal
> > quantitative functions infer non-literal associations?
> Excellent question. When a machine (quantitive relations) looks
> inward, its faces non-literal association, because they are there.
> Numbers cannot put numbers on most on the views on their intrinsic
> ignorance. It would also cost a lot to enumerate the names to find
> their quantitative quality so that the soul (an ultra non quantitative
> being) and consciousness (the instinctive bet that there is a reality,
> perhaps an invariant reality) provides tremendous self-speeding up
> ability (common, I bet, on all self-moving entities).

I'm not sure I understand. I think of numerology as an interiority of
numbers, but what would a non-literal association of purely
quantitative relation be?

> The soul of the Turing machine has no part. It is the first person. It
> is not a material entity, nor even a number from the view of the
> machine. The math is given by defining knowledge of the machine simply
> by its true beliefs, and "believe" is defined, for ideally correct
> machine (well defined mathematical object) by a machine's assertion.
> take a look perhaps on the second part of the sane04 where I explain
> this.

But what is the view of the Turing machine? What does it care about?
What does it struggle with?

> Note that there is a recreative introduction by Raymond Smullyan on
> the self-reference logic G. "Forever Undecided". It might help, and in
> sane04 I have been inspired by its pedagogy.
> > Is it the tape, the read head, the chip, the marker?
> It is not even the program. It is a person emulated by a program. We
> might call it an engram, because it is not a program programmed by
> someone, but a program selected by billions years of evolution.

Evolution of what?

> > Is it an
> > invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
> > remains locally constrained?
> Yes.

You don't think that could just be projection of our own 1p naive
realism view?

> > To me it makes sense that the only thing experiencing the Turing
> > Machine as a machine is us. The machine itself is not a machine in
> > it's own experience,
> OK.
> > it is different isolated materials with common
> > sense only on a physical and chemical level, not on a semantic level.
> I don't understand your sentence.

I think the machine doesn't understand the sentence either. We read
words as a sentence, but the words don't read themselves even as words
or letters. There isn't even an objective pattern there, just ink on
paper or pixels on a screen. The patterns of letters the meanings of
words are our patterns which insist on a semantic level. On the
physical or chemical level there are no patterns that relate to our
interpretations. A machine works the same way. It has no interiority
related to the function we have imposed on it, it's just a
'collection' of discrete physical and chemical bodies bound together
with our motives.

> > My point is that physics cannot be entirely enveloped by number
> > theology. If that means that comp is false, then comp is certainly
> > false.
> Well, the point is that it can be tested. Up to now, thanks to the
> quantum, it does fit rather well.

So you say. Does it matter whether quantum is a misinterpretation or

> You cannot demolish a (sufficiently precise theory) by a philosophical
> prejudice.

Isn't that a philosophical prejudice?

> >> I define, roughly, the theology of a number by all what is true about
> >> that number, and I define the science of the number by all what that
> >> number can prove.
> >> Incompleteness then associated a theology to each number, and the
> >> self-
> >> referentially correct numbers share all the same abstract theology
> >> (but different from inside). But the fundamental laws are the same
> >> for
> >> all, and they contain and justify the way the physical laws appear
> >> and
> >> get stable in some first person plural point of views.
> > I think you're saying here that what physical is can be described by
> > numbers because what is true about the physical can be enumerated.
> Not at all. And most things that machine can discover looking inward
> are not enumerable. The whole recursion theory (theoretical computer
> science) study the degrees on non-mechanicalness of what machine can
> discover inside its head (figuratively speaking). Big features of
> physicalness are not enumerable.

At what point does a machine look inward? Does LET X=X+1 discover non-
mechanical enumerables?

> > If
> > so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,
> It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved,
> inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I
> can see what that means.

Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish
to be what it is not.

> > it is also
> > what might be true, and what can be made true through motive action.
> Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all the
> "might be true". (Assuming comp).

If there is something that arithmetic reality is not rich enough to
internalize, then reality cannot be reduced to arithmetic. If there is
nothing that cannot be reduced to arithmetic then the label arithmetic
is a 1004. That's why I like sense better than arithmetic. It
specifies that the universe is about sense (in every sense), and what
is beyond it is non-sense.

> >>> We can't take the mathematical
> >>> modeling of the visible electromagnetic spectrum to make concrete an
> >>> expectation of the color of gamma rays.
> >> We can make that, by using that mathematical modelling and interface
> >> it to a mathematical modelling done at the right substitution level
> >> of
> >> a human brain, and then using the mathematical modelling of the vocal
> >> cords to translate and hear a guy saying "oh! yes, I distinctively
> >> see
> >> something".
> > Would he say that what he sees is a warm color? A cool color? Is it
> > bold or shy? Is it very similar to other visible colors or is it as
> > different from RGB as salty is to dizzy? Would his answers be random
> > or if we asked enough questions could we get a sense of what the
> > actual color of gamma rays looks like?
> Here the theory says that you have to ask this to him. It might be
> difficult, but not much more to figure out what might sounds look  for
> bat.

Interesting. So the theory is that the theory itself cannot make a
concrete expectation, but that a machine can be designed which can.
Hence private 1p plural realities.

> >> But here you will say that the guy is just a zombie, where
> >> the correct computationalist will say that the experience itself is
> >> in
> >> Platonia, and the modeling being done by the equation's solution or
> >> by
> >> the physical universe just changes probabilities of the relative
> >> manifestation of that consciousness.
> > Sounds like obfuscation to me.
> I have to refer to a work. Sorry. But I refer to a precise couple of
> theories which are standard: comp and arithmetic (including its meta-
> arithmetic which is not added, but really part of arithmetic).
> > Seeing a color is a simple thing if you
> > can see in color.
> Well, it is 1-simple, but 3-complex.

I don't think it's 3-accessible at all. Color is 1p or 0p.

> > I don't know it, but i have a hard time believing that gold is
> > intrinsically 79-like in all possible universes. It doesn't follow
> > logically. I think that 79 is only gold if you are calculating protons
> > in a nucleus, and not ping pong balls in a bag or pixels on a screen.
> Particles comes from symmetries for group transformation, but we don't
> know really where the parameters come from. Physics has not yet
> anwered, but has put a lot of light. is gold a geographical object or
> a physical object? That is obviously a complex open problem in the
> machine physics.

I think gold is a semantic subject with a physical-quantitative

> > In that case then, you are arguing that there is no special difference
> > between oxygen and arsenic. I'm just prejudiced against arsenic
> > because I don't like it.
> I see.
> What are you afraid of? That the Arsenic people steals our jobs, or
> what?

Haha.  No, I'm arguing that there is a difference between oxygen and
arsenic that matters to us. The difference between life and death. To
arithmetic, it's just the difference between 8 and 33.

> >> So yes. The carbon did have some advantage in the molecular evolution
> >> of universal beings, but now we see that, perhaps thanks to the
> >> human,
> >> the silicon can also drive universal beings, and you just say "no"
> >> because, by definition, they don't have carbon.
> > I'm not opposed to humans making living organisms out of silicon, I'm
> > only saying that if they aren't living organisms, they are not likely
> > to be able to feel like a living organism.
> Then we agree. the whole point is that comp says that we can make
> living people from silicon, metallic clocks, even stones and toilet
> paper (if you are patient enough to play a very long game).

How does comp know that they are alive without just defining life as a
kind of mathematically animated death?

> On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in
> arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding up),
> rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal
> entity, not all being machines, BTW.

Who is a person that has been discovered in arithmetic?

> >>>> At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like
> >>>> the
> >>>> EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong
> >>>> somewhere 'course.
> >>> Matter is just the rear end of mind,
> >> OK. With comp, we can said that matter is somehow the border of the
> >> universal mind, where God loses control, somehow.
> > Right. Teleology yields to teleonomy as the condition of becoming
> > finite, but it doesn't go quietly. It tries to gain control by
> > figuring out a way of tricking the teleonomy (a-signifying side of
> > mind we know as physical matter as objects in space) into serving it's
> > purposes. But to the other side of that teleonomy, it makes sense that
> > the experience would be one of being forced into an incomprehensible
> > mold - that the most subjective part of it's awareness is being
> > orchestrated incomprehensibly by supra-conscious forces. When we
> > dream, we may be doing the computing for something else.

I'm describing how 'God loses control'. By turning it's back on

> > Something
> > like the solar system or DNA. That doesn't mean that those things are
> > experiencing our lives or that what we understand of them is what they
> > are, because the two topologies are existentially divided, even though
> > they are essentially the same.

I'm saying that the landlord may be renting rooms out in our psyche
behind our backs to other entities (macrocosmic? microcosmic?) who may
have no idea we exist.

> >> You feel superior?
> > Depends in what way. In the ability to feel and understand zoological
> > and metaphorical realities, yes. In the ability to rapidly calculate
> > logical functions quantitatively no.
> It is a cliché. It is an overgeneralization from a contingent cluster
> of machines, which exists since some years. I am ataliking about all
> machines. Church thesis makes the concept solid and mathematical.

But metaphorical and zoological is the antithesis of solid and
mathematical. That's the point. If you are doing metaphor literally,
you're doing it wrong. It's like saying Church thesis makes limb
amputation desirable.

> > It's not a matter of superior,
> > it's a matter of appropriate skill sets. By projecting superiority on
> > me personally though, you distract from the issue and make it just a
> > challenge on the ego level.
> >>> It's only pretending to
> >>> matter, and that difference, insignificant on a microelectronic
> >>> scale
> >>> makes for an exponentially greater difference when scaled up to the
> >>> level of a massively sophisticated machine. An organism is
> >>> organized,
> >>> but an organization by itself is not automatically an organism.
> >> OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the substitution
> >> infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate some
> >> twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for
> >> making
> >> us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.
> > I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
> > attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
> > nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex machine
> > that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as drawing a
> > straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky.
> The reasoning works just from the truth of the comp hypothesis, not
> its practical possibility.

That's the problem. It is impossible to implement practically because
it disqualifies everything besides hypothetical function.

> > We have to explain the cells
> > and the organs first. Experience itself. We can't just assume 'If we
> > build it out of equations, beings will come through the solutions'.
> > It's possible that they will, but I think it's wildly overconfident to
> > assume that the chemical, genetic, biological, and somatic levels can
> > be skipped without loss of their contributions to human consciousness.
> I have never said that.
> This means only that you bet that our comp  level of substitution is
> low.  UDA works even if you ask the digitalist doctor to copy the
> entire observable universe at the Planck level, or even below (in some
> physics).

If there are 1p realities that exist only through the execution of the
machine (like the experience of the color of Gamma Rays), how do you
know that our phenomena won't encounter the same barrier in being
translated from our reality to theory as they would be from theory to
machine reality? Why can't the machine hack into our reality and give
us the color of Gamma Rays?


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to