On Aug 14, 12:05 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 13 Aug 2011, at 21:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> The further our imaginary reality is from our own
> >>> PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences
> >>> that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically.
>
> >> How would you justify that?
>
> > Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more
> > morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the
> > bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal
> > attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of
> > like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple
> > privacies.
>
> That does not justify it.

Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska,
I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly
imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's
because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic
incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get
from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that
your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more
precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the
self projected outward onto the 'other'.

>You just repeat it in a more complex way,
> with even more assumptions, and when you say "sort of like perceptual
> polarization by interference between multiple privacie", you are the
> 1004 wonderland.

What's 1004? I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence, but I'm trying to
use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how
perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other. When
you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other
polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter.
Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the
tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful,
misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The
increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my
guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a
molecule very well.

> But I not saying you don't intuit something, because it does makes
> sense in AUDA, except for his reification of a concrete reality, at
> least if your answer, which does more use the term "physical" is
> supposed to answer my question.
>
>
>
> >>>> What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in
> >>>> front
> >>>> of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a
> >>>> reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive
> >>>> belief in
> >>>> a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief
> >>>> in
> >>>> a separation between the believer and the believed.
>
> >>> I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as
> >>> to
> >>> what they will be able to believe or develop.
>
> >> What do you mean by "physically"?
>
> > What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells,
> > organisms, etc.
>
> Organism are physical?
> Are you assuming physicalism?

Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are
physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo-
physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the
outside and sensori-motive on the inside, but they exist and insist on
different PRIF scales. It's a holarchy, so that organisms include
physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena,
but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level
awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step
further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content
of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing
teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions.

> >>> If you execute the
> >>> machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of
> >>> belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief.
>
> >> So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable.
>
> > It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical.
>
> That's follows from the comp hypothesis. In the sense that the first
> person is distributed on a non computable structure on which its
> bodies will rely. It is simpler to say that the mind is 3-Turing
> emulable, and that 3-matter is not. Well, at least this can be
> explained to anybody, when we assume that we can survive at some level
> of digital emulation.
>
> > The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies.
>
> For a mathematician the term "topology" has precise technical meaning,
> making such sentence looking weird.

Sorry. I just think of a topology as an ideal surface that can me
mapped in consistent terms. In this case it could be the intersection
of two sets, but set seems abstract to me, whereas a topology implies
a concrete fabric. The point being that outside of the overlap, the
two sets are truly incompatible and unknowable to each other. Within
the overlap each side can be fully known, but not in the same terms.
Matter must be understood as a-signifying, generic, quantitative
processes, and Mind must be understood as signifying, proprietary,
qualitative experiences.

> >> But we don't
> >> know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or
> >> recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition).
> >> So,
> >> to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is
> >> already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call
> >> that a "fuite en avant" (forward-escape).
>
> > It's not the topology of the physical objects which we can encounter
> > externally which is non Turing emulable, it's the private interior
> > which we can only guess at through out own imagination. It's not a
> > cypher though, it's just metaphorical. Objects cannot tell us what
> > they mean, but through our understanding of what they mean to us,
>
> replace "objects" by "south americans", and you will see your sentence
> already asserts by de Sepulveda for arguing that they have no soul
> comparable to ours.

I'm not saying that objects have no soul, I'm saying that 'soul' is a
figment of comparability itself. The more something seems to look like
you, act like you, think like you,  the more you think it has a soul.
That doesn't mean that the thing actually does have a soul like yours
though. I think that your position is that of a de Sepulveda
equivalent - to say that we are no better than a robot is a baseless
elevation of mechanism at the expense of human sovereignty, plus it's
incredibly premature given that we have no reason to believe that any
electronic device has any more feeling than a doorknob so far. If we
had discovered a continent of robots with their own culture, then I
would agree, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Since we
are creating machines from components known to be unconscious which
show no signs of autopoietic development, I don't see why I would want
to dismiss the differences between living organisms and such organized
inorganisms.

> > personally and collectively, we can get a reading through the
> > alchemical prism that may partially correlate to external emulables.
> > It's not necessary to solve the mystery but to acknowledge that
> > mystery is a legitimate primitive phenomena of the cosmos.
>
> To make a mystery primitive is automatically an authoritative move. It
> is like saying "dont try to understand".

I don't say 'don't try to understand', I say 'render unto existence
what is quantifiable, and render unto qualia what is essential'.

> You are a guru, after all.

What makes someone a guru? I'm not claiming to know anything special,
I'm just presenting ideas that seem to make sense of the mind body
problem to me.

> Too bad my job consists to kill all gurus.

Hah, Now who is calling the kettle intolerantly ethnocentric?

> You are no doing science, but promoting a personal opinion.

The science of consciousness cannot exclude the personal, or else it's
not being scientific. To disqualify the personal from the cosmos is to
disown the very asker of the questions of science.

>It is
> problematic because it excludes entities from the club of conscious
> entities from appearances.

It's not just appearances. Again, if we land on the planet of the
robots, I'm all in favor of giving them the benefit of the doubt. If I
make a device specifically to impersonate a human-like intelligence
out of refined minerals and petrochemicals, why would I assume that at
some point they might become something else?


> >>> The math alone can
> >>> create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics
>
> >> With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of
> >> numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at
> >> least not in a primitively grounded way.
>
> > It can still be an emerging pattern in the mind, but the experience of
> > it goes beyond what could be achieved or anticipated through pure
> > mathematics.
>
> Agree for "anticipate", not for "achieved".
>
> Also you confuse the mathematical reality, and the mathematical tools
> to explore that reality. It is as different as a finger pointing to
> the moon and the moon.
> I am not saying there is a mathematical reality, just that it is
> different from the mathematical theories.
> I do believe in the arithmetical reality, to be precise.

What is the difference between the mathematical reality that you are
saying does not exist and the arithmetical reality that you do
'believe in'? What is an example of each?
>
> > It's a pattern with one side as quantitative sequential
> > sophistication and the other as qualitative simultaneous simplicity.
>
> >>> can
> >>> create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic,
> >>> which is what gives the believer not only separation but something
> >>> of
> >>> a trump-card privilege over the believed.
>
> >> I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical.
>
> > It's not magical but it explains the existence of the feeling of, or
> > desire for magical. It's the potential of teleology to actualize
> > itself, defined by and in contradistinction to, the inertial of
> > teleonomy to limit teleological actualization.
>
> >>> In a contest of math v
> >>> physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of
> >>> math,
>
> >> But what is the physical?
>
> > Physical is the tails side of the coin of awareness.
>
> Not bad.
>
> > Awareness and
> > experience inside out. It's like your two universal machines except
> > that they are the same machine twisted into a Mobius strip,
>
> Why not a Klein Bottle?

Yeah I was thinking Klein Bottle also, but I like the strip metaphor
because it emphasizes the set complimentary, opposite relationship of
one side of the strip to the other. A Klein bottle juxtaposes the
interior and exterior surfaces in a less polarized way.

>A universal machine can emulate a pair of
> universal machine, without the need to twist itself.

That's the problem. If it can twist itself, it can untwist itself,
whereas the mind cannot untwist the body into mind. I have seen
concrete early warnings of this in server virtualization. In theory
each server is an identical, isolated partition within a larger
hardware node. It works ok most of the time, but sometimes there are
corruptions of the logic underlying the partitions so that the entire
node needs to be reboot. There is no way to recover from within the
system or to save a particular partition, you have to physically power
the whole thing down and restart it. Restarting devices is by far the
most effective way of fixing computer problems. Error messages are
generally not helpful, and self-monitoring in general is less reliable
than the system it is monitoring.

>The doing of the
> mind lives in other sort of topologies. You tell me you don't do math,
> so each of your use of mathematical term are 1004 fallacies (to be
> over-precise with respect to what we try to understand).

I don't know 1004.

> > meeting
> > itself through the mutual ignorance of objectification rather than
> > through mathematical correspondence - scrambled through the maximal
> > decoherence
>
> You begin to look like a program failing to succeed a Turing test.
> I wrote generators of sentence like that in my youth.

See, this is what I'm talking about with degenerating into ad hominem
or condescending arguments. I'm not offended, but I don't focus on my
difficulties in understanding your writing, even though it is a
significant barrier at times. It doesn't really help either of us to
define the debate in terms of how well we like each others style of
communication or attitude or personality. Shouldn't it just be about
figuring out the best truths?
>
> > and mystery to slow down the inevitable rush toward re-
> > singularity so that every part must fight to find it's place in the
> > whole.
>
> Well if that is what "physical is", I will contend myself with 1g.

1g?

> >>> so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought.
>
> >> How to explain that the physical obeys to the arithmetical? How will
> >> you explain the role of math in physics?
>
> > Our perception obeys mathematical laws when it examines physical
> > external phenomena. That is how physical objects are rendered as
> > separate from hallucinations which are dynamic, fluid, self
> > referential, metaphorical, and non-mathematical. Physics is
> > mathematical...to us.
>
> Who us?

Us capable of understanding physics in mathematical terms.

> > Our experiences may very well be mathematical to
> > the universe (which is a comp friendly thought, right?)
>
> I cannot say. What to you mean by "mathematical to the universe"?

>From an perspective outside of our own. The noumenal 3p view of the
phenomena which we experience subjectively as 1p.

> > but to try to
> > execute our own mathematical sense as if it were universally
> > mathematical I think fails because we are missing the perspectives
> > outside of our minds.
>
> Sure. But this can only be true in case comp is not just false, but
> refuted.

What is required to refute comp?

> > We need help from the work that has already been
> > done by our cells and genes to prop up a true artificial
> > consciousness, or else settle for the more useful option of developing
> > an unconscious but highly sophisticated intelliform machine in
> > microelectronics.
>
> But this has nothing to do with the weak comp thesis I used as tools.
> It means that you put the comp level low. For, without evidence,
> nothing prevent the biochemical law to be Turing emulable. So with
> comp, you can survive with a silicon-laser super computer simulating
> your brain at the level of the basic quantum field. You can some of
> joint and you will have the effect of the tobacco and marijuana in the
> brain.
>
> I am with you on this. I have evidences that pour level might be
> exactly the classical electron level at the Heisenberg uncertainties.
> IF QM is a consequence of DM as it seems, and should be assuming comp
> in the cognitive/theological science, THEN the Heisenberg
> uncertainties might be the whole from which we get the trace of the
> "other computations, by other universal machines" takes it places.
> Neurons, like amoebas, are probably less dumbs than most humans would
> thought.

cool.

> >>> Physics
> >>> cannot be anticipated from the math alone,
>
> >> Why?

Exactly, why? If it were all math, then two billiard balls should
behave just like two hydrogen atoms. There should be no illusion or
appearances, no simplifications or transductions. It should be numbers
all the way up and down the cosmos. Why the puppet show? Why the
flavors and colors? The fact that there is anything other than math
requires an explanation before the idea that everything should be
reducible to mathematics demands support.

> > Because no equation feels like a supernova or smells like bacon.
>
> If the equation describe a Turing universal numbers running relatively
> to another universal number, as many equations in physics can do (even
> just the one describing the open billiard ball) what you say is just,
> again, an affirmation that comp is false.

I can see clearly why the subjective psyche that we are would be able
to assign agency to a computer process, since our awareness runs on
figurative sense-making by analogy, but I can't see my a computer
process would assign anything figurative to it's own computation.
Metaphor can be work on a literal level, but from where would literal
quantitative functions infer non-literal associations?

> It is not the equation which feels something, it is the being
> appearing in the solution of the equation who makes the thinking. This
> is true even for physicalist, nor just for number theorist or computer
> scientists.

That doesn't sound metaphysical and guru-esque to you? A being appears
in the solution of the equation? Like  X=\cup_{s\in S} f_s(X) = Fred
the Malevolent? What part of the Turing machine is experiencing being?
Is it the tape, the read head, the chip, the marker? Is it an
invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
remains locally constrained?

To me it makes sense that the only thing experiencing the Turing
Machine as a machine is us. The machine itself is not a machine in
it's own experience, it is different isolated materials with common
sense only on a physical and chemical level, not on a semantic level.

> >> I can understand that is true for geography, but why to assert this
> >> for physics? What is physics?
>
> > I'm using physics here as distinct from math in the sense of relating
> > to physical bodies themselves rather than our understanding of the
> > principles governing physical bodies. Once we observe the body, it's
> > motion and changes, we can abstract an arithmetic description, but it
> > doesn't work the other way around.
>
> We might agree. All my point is that if COMP is TRUE, then PHYSICS is
> a branch of number theology.

My point is that physics cannot be entirely enveloped by number
theology. If that means that comp is false, then comp is certainly
false.

> I define, roughly, the theology of a number by all what is true about
> that number, and I define the science of the number by all what that
> number can prove.
> Incompleteness then associated a theology to each number, and the self-
> referentially correct numbers share all the same abstract theology
> (but different from inside). But the fundamental laws are the same for
> all, and they contain and justify the way the physical laws appear and
> get stable in some first person plural point of views.

I think you're saying here that what physical is can be described by
numbers because what is true about the physical can be enumerated. If
so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true, it is also
what might be true, and what can be made true through motive action.

> > We can't take the mathematical
> > modeling of the visible electromagnetic spectrum to make concrete an
> > expectation of the color of gamma rays.
>
> We can make that, by using that mathematical modelling and interface
> it to a mathematical modelling done at the right substitution level of
> a human brain, and then using the mathematical modelling of the vocal
> cords to translate and hear a guy saying "oh! yes, I distinctively see
> something".

Would he say that what he sees is a warm color? A cool color? Is it
bold or shy? Is it very similar to other visible colors or is it as
different from RGB as salty is to dizzy? Would his answers be random
or if we asked enough questions could we get a sense of what the
actual color of gamma rays looks like?

>But here you will say that the guy is just a zombie, where
> the correct computationalist will say that the experience itself is in
> Platonia, and the modeling being done by the equation's solution or by
> the physical universe just changes probabilities of the relative
> manifestation of that consciousness.

Sounds like obfuscation to me. Seeing a color is a simple thing if you
can see in color. Whether the experience is in Platonia or not, the
logic of the visible spectrum is as convincingly primitive as that of
numbers to me without being reducible to numbers. If it could be,
there would be no debate, we would both be able to agree 'oh yes,
because blue is so much more yellow than red, then we can know
precisely how much more blue gamma rays would be and therefore can
easily describe that color in terms others will understand.' It
doesn't work that way though.

> >>> it can only be reverse
> >>> engineered from factual physical observations.
>
> >> But what is that?
>
> > Intersubjective sensorimotive experiences. Synchronized perceptions
> > which extend to the secondhand 'perceptions' of objects relating to
> > other objects. Measurement.
>
> >>> Math can of course be
> >>> used to build on physics as well (nuclear fission, etc) but it still
> >>> requires a priori indexes of atomic behaviors which are independent
> >>> from pure arithmetic.
>
> >> Why? I mean, even if comp is false, why would we a priori reject an
> >> explanation, if the goal was not for justifying that sort of silicon
> >> racism. It seems to me that you make matter, mind, the relation
> >> between awfully mysterious just to justify a segregation among
> >> possible entities for personhood.
>
> > I'm just saying that like the color of gamma rays, math would never
> > have been able to conceive of the properties of atoms were it not for
> > having those properties already available for justification.
>
> How could you know that? You talk like if you knew the arithmetical
> reality.

I don't know it, but i have a hard time believing that gold is
intrinsically 79-like in all possible universes. It doesn't follow
logically. I think that 79 is only gold if you are calculating protons
in a nucleus, and not ping pong balls in a bag or pixels on a screen.

> > It's not
> > me that's silicon racist, it's the universe for excluding it and the
> > other inorganic atoms from participating in cellular elaboration.
>
> Again de Sepulveda. It's not me which is "indian" racist, it is Jesus
> itself for excluding the Indians for the truth.

In that case then, you are arguing that there is no special difference
between oxygen and arsenic. I'm just prejudiced against arsenic
because I don't like it.

> So yes. The carbon did have some advantage in the molecular evolution
> of universal beings, but now we see that, perhaps thanks to the human,
> the silicon can also drive universal beings, and you just say "no"
> because, by definition, they don't have carbon.

I'm not opposed to humans making living organisms out of silicon, I'm
only saying that if they aren't living organisms, they are not likely
to be able to feel like a living organism.

> > There's no reason why it couldn't have been silicon instead of carbon
> > from a mathematical perspective, because math could not predict
> > cellular elaboration in the first place without being able to reverse
> > engineer it from the a posteriori knowledge and existence of living
> > cells.
>
> You can derive from QM why carbon was advantage in the wet environment
> of the planet. You can derive the existence of the carbon of
> symmetries and stars, you can derive stars from gas and gravitation.
> Physics can derive a lot, and physics itself (that the old news) is
> derivable from addition and multiplication, and this by given both the
> qualia and the quanta and a justification why they look different.

I don't buy it because it's all reverse engineered. If it were true,
again, we should have no trouble predicting the colors of the
invisible spectrum or the meaning of words that don't yet exist. It
implies a fixed, forward running logos in which the formality of
experience would be superfluous and nonsensical.

> >> At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like the
> >> EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong
> >> somewhere 'course.
>
> > Matter is just the rear end of mind,
>
> OK. With comp, we can said that matter is somehow the border of the
> universal mind, where God loses control, somehow.

Right. Teleology yields to teleonomy as the condition of becoming
finite, but it doesn't go quietly. It tries to gain control by
figuring out a way of tricking the teleonomy (a-signifying side of
mind we know as physical matter as objects in space) into serving it's
purposes. But to the other side of that teleonomy, it makes sense that
the experience would be one of being forced into an incomprehensible
mold - that the most subjective part of it's awareness is being
orchestrated incomprehensibly by supra-conscious forces. When we
dream, we may be doing the computing for something else. Something
like the solar system or DNA. That doesn't mean that those things are
experiencing our lives or that what we understand of them is what they
are, because the two topologies are existentially divided, even though
they are essentially the same.

> > but it needs that tangible
> > incongruity to manifest as stuffy.
>
> No. It don't. I mean we don't have to postulate it, the tangible
> incongruity is just logically unavoidable for the universal number
> looking at themselves (which they do by Turing-universality virtue of
> number relations).
>
> > If it's all done on the single
> > topology of a chip, the stuffy dimension is too thin to accommodate
> > the bandwidth of post-biological qualia.
>
> You feel superior?

Depends in what way. In the ability to feel and understand zoological
and metaphorical realities, yes. In the ability to rapidly calculate
logical functions quantitatively no. It's not a matter of superior,
it's a matter of appropriate skill sets. By projecting superiority on
me personally though, you distract from the issue and make it just a
challenge on the ego level.

> > It's only pretending to
> > matter, and that difference, insignificant on a microelectronic scale
> > makes for an exponentially greater difference when scaled up to the
> > level of a massively sophisticated machine. An organism is organized,
> > but an organization by itself is not automatically an organism.
>
> OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the substitution
> infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate some
> twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for making
> us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.

I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex machine
that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as drawing a
straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky. We have to explain the cells
and the organs first. Experience itself. We can't just assume 'If we
build it out of equations, beings will come through the solutions'.
It's possible that they will, but I think it's wildly overconfident to
assume that the chemical, genetic, biological, and somatic levels can
be skipped without loss of their contributions to human consciousness.

Craig

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