On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> >> On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
> >>> exists to me in a solipsistic way?
> >> I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are
> >> true for sure about anything, except your consciousness.
> >> Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply.
> > OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create
> > reality'.
> Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what
> that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the
> explanation.

Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just
talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're
in it. Part of us and whatever it is that we experience as physically
real are mathematically agreeing to treat the relationship as if it
were physically real. If that's what you're saying there, then I
completely get that, and I'm not saying that that is not true. My view
adds to that two, I think revolutionary ideas.:

1.  The relationships that make up that matrix are comp arithmetic on
one side (literally on one side, like a Klein Bottle which is
invisible on the interior...sort of like one way matter) and
sensorimotive perception on the other (the invisible side is feeling,
participation, being). I would call the arithmetic side
'electromagnetism' and 'relativity'.

2. The arithmetic side runs on agreement between numbers -
synchronization. The sensorimotive side runs on gaps between
agreements. It is already synchronized because is is the vector of
orientation (local singularity/monad) for time (change), so it runs on
induction. Jumping gaps. Pulling wholes through holes. It's non-comp
guesswork, interpretation, and pantomime that changes and evolves. The
importance of imitation in learning should strike a chord here.

> Then, if you identify your little ego with your higher self (which is
> not usually done in science), you can identify the whole reality as
> the (internal) thought of God (Arithmetical truth).

That's pretty basic, but sure. I think that 'thought' is pretty narrow
though. I like 'sense' better because I see thought as a rather recent
human development that took off symbiotically with the invention of
language and writing. Writing makes one kind of sense, thought another
similar one, hearing and seeing, feeling and tasting, knowing and
sensing, emotions, etc, all different embodied experiences of order or
pattern. I would not limit it to any one of those or even all of those
channels. I would not underestimate the power of order to transcend
any previous definition of it.

> >>> That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in
> >>> reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which
> >>> they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc.
> >>> The
> >>> actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling.
> >> Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-mind
> >> identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that "seeing a
> >> needle" is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when
> >> comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain,
> >> and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic.
> > I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle,
> > one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and
> > an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the
> > person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long
> > they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention,
> > etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or
> > visualization of a needle.
> That is the relative needle, and is one 1-p construct. But the "real
> needle" emerges from an infinity of 1-p view of an infinity of such
> relative 3-p views. This extends Everett in arithmetic.

To me those are special infinities arising from the exclusion of the
input/output of Sense. You don't need to spin off every possible 1p
and 3p universe just to be able to perceive a needle. It's very
straight forward; in a universe of nothing but two things (physical or
ideal), they each can tell that the other exists. It's a primitive of
existence. When you scale that up, you get triangulation, where each
1p is informed by the exterior of the other 2p's and is then able to
infer it's own existence as the dynamically modulating gap between the
other two.

When you have that kind of an exponential explosion of information
within the social network, you also get a rapid decompensation of
sense outside of the network. As the nodes become enmeshed in their
mutual overlap and underlap, the enmeshment itself casts a shadow that
attenuates sensitivity and identification outside of the shared

This is the Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame or PRIF. A de facto
frame of localized coherence which itself takes on a second order
nested or holarchic 1p coherence. We are members of a very very very
specific club that is exclusive to entities on several different
scales (which look to us, from the penthouse view of the clubhouse,
like 3p species, genus, family, order, class, order, phylum, kingdom,
organism, molecule, atom, physical existence).

 From the 1p view it's all about us, our friends, families, opinions,
careers, health, etc. The 3p frames (ecology-biology-chemistry-
physics) are our external frames of Relativity, while the self-others-
community-civilization frames are 1p Perception. Of course they are
not isolated - your brain chemistry affects your psychology and your
sociology affects your ecology, etc so they are all parts of our
typically human PRIF.

> > Switching the 1p and 3p, An actual titanium-steel needle is not going
> > to see a human being but it may have it's own interiority
> IF mechanism is true, there is no titanium needle, still less an
> interiority. Only person have interiority views, and person lives in
> Platonia.

Why can't persons live in bodies/houses/cities? All that's missing is
to let go of the illusion that 1p is an illusion and take it at face
value as a legitimate physical phenomenon rather than banished to
Platonia. We are right here, right now - a cumulative entanglement of
particular teleonomic consequences and teleological sequences which is
neither a flickering simulation nor a collection of substantial stuff,
but with pretensions toward both. Matter as the apotheosis of
arithmetic pantomime, and psyche as the life of matter (ie division of
the singularity, and that whole prospect of killing-to-eat, and the
birth-death-decay-birth cycle).

> > that is
> > either isomorphic to our image; a metallic alloy sense that greets
> > centuries like weeks and knows things like temperature and pressure -
> > or it could be some crazy 1p reality conjoined with all iron atoms in
> > the cosmos as a single resonant alien contelligence for billions of
> > years. Or door number three..
> >>>> But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down.
> >>>> (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA)
> >>>> So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The
> >>>> measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality
> >>>> iceberg.
> >>> It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more
> >>> outward
> >>> facing activities.
> >> This, for a mechanist just means the level has not been correctly
> >> chosen.
> > What if it's not a level, but an evanescent wave of diminishing
> > returns?
> ?

I mean I don't like 'levels'. I like fadeouts. I don't see a
substitution level, but a range within which isomorphism degenerates
and novelty arises as simulacra.

> >>> Thanks. LUMs are Lobian Universal Machines?
> >> Yes. In honor to Martin Löb, who discovered the placebo phenomena of
> >> the LUMs: called Löb's theorem. At the modal level, it is the main
> >> axiom of the logique of self-reference. It says that if you can
> >> convince a LUM that if [believes in Santa Klaus implies the existence
> >> of santa Klaus] then, amazingly enough, she will believe in Santa
> >> Klaus.
> >> If the machine can prove Bp -> p, then she can prove p. or, in the
> >> language of the machine: B(Bp-> p) -> Bp.
> > Hmm. I don't know enough about it. Why does a LUM have to be
> > convinced?
> She does not need. But the theorem says that if she convinced (has a
> proof) then the theorem of Löb applies.
> That theorem is amazing. Usually we think that proof entails truth,
> but Löbian machine are so modest that proof (by them) entails truth
> only for those proposition that they can prove. (in which case # -> p,
> by classical logic, so that Bp -> p follows).

It sounds like the essence of entropy. Absolute skepticism. The soul
of the Cantor Set. Although.. if you start from non-comp proof and
derive comp truths after, you are maybe going in the right direction
after all. The machine is the soul of matter, but if this machine is
the soul of anti-matter, then, hmm.

> > 'Sensation' as opposed to 'detection' doesn't necessarily appear at
> > any particular level, it's more like a continuum. Think of the
> > relation of thought to emotion. Sensation and detection are like that.
> > I'm just giving a general guide to the spectrum of qualitative tone
> > tied to physical characteristics.
> OK, but with comp you cannot tied qualia to physical things. The
> contrary happens, as in step seven of the UDA.

I don't need to tie qualia to specific physical things. Synesthesia
reminds us that color could just as easily be a flavor or a sound.
*But* they are all tied to the physical brain and eyes. I have read
that people who have gained sight later after being born blind did not
experience visual qualia before having sight. Not in dreams or
visualization, etc. It appears that vision is not free floating in the
comsos to us in Platonia, but must be physically conjured through the
nervous system. Likewise people who lost their sight early in life
lose their memories of vision - the ability to describe what people
look like, etc, as they get older but those who are blinded later on
retain the capacity to visualize and dream in visual  images.

> > I'm
> > open to being wrong, but someone has to show me why.
> Then you have to be *much* precise.
> I guess you have seen that you are precise enough for being wrong with
> respect to comp (but then you almost assume non-comp at the start, so
> that does not say a lot).

I think I'm being as precise as you can be to have a truly universal

> >>> It's only a problem
> >>> when the mindbody fails to recognize the relation to bodymind and to
> >>> honor it's essential unity as well as it's existential polarity and
> >>> the involuted continuum topology between them.
> >> Even if that were true (which I doubt as far as I can put sense on
> >> this) that would solve nothing. On the contrary it seems to me, with
> >> all my respect, that you put the problem under the rug of very
> >> special
> >> infinities in both mind and matter. It does not solve the hard
> >> problem
> >> of matter (what it is, why does it seem to exist) and the hard
> >> problem
> >> of mind (mainly its relation with matter).
> > I don't understand what the special infinities you are talking about
> > are.
> It is what you need to be sure that you can't survive with a silicon
> machine, or a with a chinese people computer, or with arithmetical
> relations.

I would call those things more of a common sense intuition. If silicon
machines or crowds of people could spontaneously generate a
consciousness, I would think that we would see instances of that. I'm
not ruling it out, because of course we can't tell 1p consciousness
from 3p completely, but, the sense of things being more like us and
less like us demands more of an explanation. Why the big threshold
between what we think is alive and what isn't? Why do we care so much
about not being dead ourselves?

> > How can there be a mind/body problem if we understand that the
> > mind and the body are just the anthropological scale manifestation of
> > the singularity relating the opposite of itself.
> That's too much fuzzy.

To me it seems a little verbally cumbersome but not unclear. We are a
gigantic entangled experience of 1s and 0s becoming each other. Oops.
Did I just cross over to the Dark Side? But no - not the 1 and 0, but
the feeling behind the motion of 1-0-1. Respiration. Tension and
relaxation. Motive and sense. Right? C'mon Bruno, ya gotta be on board
with that?

> > Because it's the other way just goes deeper into recursion. Observing
> > our observation of our observation of our observation...
> But this kind of regress have solution in computer science. I explain
> this in many papers, notably "amoeba, planaria and dreaming machine".
> I have explain this more than once on this list, and will not attempt
> to do so right now.

Ok, I'll take a look. Unless I'm too lazy. I will try to try though.

> >> As far as I get your intuition, even on matter, it seems to me to fit
> >> just quite well with comp, and the LUMs are *already* saying.
> > You can model the universe with 3p comp as primitive, just as you can
> > model space and time as spacetime, it just turns the whole thing
> > inside out. Incredibly useful from an engineering perspective, but it
> > privileges the computational shadow of consciousness over the semantic
> > sensorimotive cause of consciousness. I can't blame you if you like
> > the inside out model better, I'm just saying that it actually is
> > inside out from a more scientific, impartial point of view.
> >> What does not fit is your idea that there is some matter (like
> >> electromagnetism)
> > electromagnetism is just 3p sensorimotive.
> ?
> What is the relation with Maxwell equation? With electricity and
> magnetism?

This is the big frontier. I think that what has to be done to
understand the relation between electomagnetism and sensorimotive
experience is to realize that one is not the literal mirror of the
other (even though there may be some interesting things we could find
if we played with swapping space with time and energy with matter in
the equations) but that they are metaphorical mirrors of one another.
It's a different topology all together. In electromagnetism and
relativity we deal with quantitative strengths of forces and fields
and their relation in space, literal up and down mechanical wave

In sensorimotive perception its about qualitative magnitudes of
fullness and emptiness, figurative highs and lows of 1p experiences.
It has similar rules about closeness and distance, influence,
attraction, but they are much more interpretive and ambiguous,
especially on the level of a human nervous system.  We can't compare
apples to apples because we only have access to one example of 1p
sensorimotive perception, and that is our own, which is not a good
example with which to try to figure out the universe. We have lots of
examples of electromagnetism (everything besides ourselves) to choose
from, but the only one that comes close to parity with our own scale
would be a living brain. With a lot of work it seems possible to
gradually correlate 1p experiences with neurology of living subjects
and begin to crack the code of 1p-3p sensorimotive-electromagnetism.
> > It's both finite and infinite, mind and matter. The twist is both
> > literal and metaphorical.
> Sentences like that will not help people for showing you wrong. Or it
> will help them a lot, because if your theory implies that something is
> finite and infinite, a scientist will say that this is a reductio ad
> absurdo of your approach.

What if it also happens to be the inevitable truth of the cosmos as a

> > UMs and LUMs, if I understand them, only add
> > to the party. I think comp assumes that it is their party and that we
> > are merely guests.
> That's paranoid.

I don't think it's paranoid, I think it's a consequence of believing
that numbers are primitive and persons arise purely from numbers.

> > That to me is sad. If we are going to put up with
> > all this crap, we at least should be friends with the host. Of course
> > silicon could host beautiful molecular level experiences that
> > transcend our own, just not in an animal-feeling way. More in it's own
> > smooth as telflon grease CGI animation way.
> With comp the notion of molecules has to be explained from a theory of
> mind, not the contrary.
> But even without comp, what you say does not make sense to me.

I think that both can be explained from a theory of sense. You can
have a pseudoexplanation which turns it inside out in favor of mind,
which helps us connect to our wholeness, or you can have a
pseudoexplanation which turns it inside out in favor of molecules,
which is very useful in the 3p world of our bodies and planet, but the
genuine explanation appeals to neither us nor our reflection as
matter, it just locates them in their proper relation. Sense is the
humblest of all, as it needs to give away all of it's glory to it's
altar egos, 1p essence and 1p existence.

> > I haven't really seen that though. I see no indication of artificial
> > life transcending our expectations of what is logically possible, let
> > alone physically possible.
> Neither humans nor LUMs have any idea of what is logically possible
> once we accept addition and multiplication.

That sounds very mad scientist to me, but I don't mind.

> > Patterns can become more complex, but that
> > complexity is in the eye of the beholder. I don't think a Mandelbrot
> > set feels like what it looks like to us. It's just one of our
> > interesting designs.
> It is a discovery. No humans can invent the Mandebrot set. Mandelbrot
> discovered it, because he was fond of clouds, and on many shapes
> occurring in nature, so that he did not put his discovery in the trash.

The conscious human mind discovers it from the human interiority -
it's PRIF where clouds live instead of atomic lattices of H2O crystals
or volcanic boiling bubbles from volcanic vents under the sea floor.
The Mandelbrot set is a human cognitive distillation of a human
perceptual privilege. Most things in the cosmos have no capacity to
discover it.

> > Walking is simple - to us. Making something robotic act like it's
> > walking is very difficult, because that's not how we walk. We walk by
> > sensorimotive participation, not by detached computation.
> ?

When we walk, we do not tell our legs when to bend and how far to move
each foot. We just feel what needs to be done in order to maintain our
balance and go where we want to go. It's a completely different
phenomenon than reverse engineering it from 3p mechanics.
> >>>> A brain, or even a cell is already betting implicitly (by
> >>>> nature) on a quantitative framing. You can't avoid that without
> >>>> introducing special infinities in the picture.
> >>> Only the exterior of the brain or cell appears quantitative. It is
> >>> quantitative to us because it's not us.
> >> Exactly. That is whay I will say that I have a brain, like I have a
> >> heart? Not that I am a brain nor I am a heart.
> > agreed.
> That is weird. If you agree that you have a brain, then what are you?

I'm the interior of my brain, and, by extension, the interior of my
body, and the interior of our life together.

> I thought that in your "theory" you need to attach your identity to
> some matter. With comp "I have a brain" is made clear by the fact that
> every morning I can use a different body, made into different matter,
> according to the mission of the day.

But it doesn't honor the other side of the equation. The fact is, that
despite our knowledge of cellular replacement and continuous molecular
churn, our PRIF insists upon presenting us with the same body, or more
accurately, a body of samenesses which gradually evacuates themselves
semantically. What I was saying about sensorimotive qualities -
fullness and emptiness, highs and lows. Aging is a winding down of our
1p body, not the material body because we know that's just a
relatively meaningless change in chemistry, but of the body we live
with and identify with. We don't wake up with a different body of that
kind. It insists that it is the same for our entire lives.
> > I want science to consider not fictional content (poetry, fairy
> > tales), but the phenomenology of fiction itself (sensorimotive
> > perception) as a primitive topology of the cosmos. The cosmos is both
> > a storyteller and a story that has no teller.
> Then try to explain your theory in terms understandable by a great
> number of people.

I will if I can. Maybe it's not for great numbers of people?

> I know only the gnostics from the time of Plotinus. They believed that
> the universe is a torture instrument due to a malevolent God.

I knew I liked the Gnostics for some reason. I'm partial to more of a
cabal of extraterrestrial speculators that have human suffering
harvested remotely to feed their obscene and insatiable cravings.

> >> Those who separate religion and science transform religion in a
> >> mixture of superstition and authoritative arguments, and they
> >> transform science itself into another pseudo-religion.
> > agreed.
> OK. But it might mean nothing if we differ too much about science.
> Science for me is a quasi synomyne of modesty+ attempt toward clarity.
> WE can do science about 1-p, but not with 1-p public assertions.

We don't need to assert 1-p contents, but we can assert 1-p
topological dynamics. Names not numbers. Qualities not quantities.
Feeling and doing, not electrical and magnetic. Etc.

> >>>>> Hmm. I sort of get that. Arithmetic truth = invariances behind
> >>>>> mathematical systems? Could these be feelings? What of addition
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> multiplication are just abstract representations of the universal
> >>>>> sensorimotive qualia of 'more'. + = more and more, x = more
> >>>>> (mores)
> >>>> Numbers are simpler to understand than universal sensorimotive
> >>>> qualia.
> >>> Right, because understanding is the long way around. Qualia are
> >>> supposed to be experienced first, understood later - if at all.
> >>>> And those qualia light just decribe the human experience of
> >>>> numbers,
> >>>> not the numbers.
> >>>> If your child asks why is 6 even, you will seek an explanation
> >>>> along
> >>>> the lines of 3+3, not along the line of neurophysiology.
> >>> But if your child asks what is 'even', you can make a gesture like
> >>> one
> >>> hand weighing something and then the other hand weighing something.
> >>> 'Even' you can say. And they get that. The idea of being divisible
> >>> by
> >>> two or any other formal definition of even is language.
> >> No. It use language to convey an idea. What if your child ask you
> >> that
> >> question through a phone?
> > I'm not saying that the child can only learn through non-verbal
> > gesture, but they are at a disadvantage if they can't be present in
> > the room with their teacher, and especially if they can't see them.
> > Explaining 'even' over the phone has to be encoded and decoded into a
> > second layer of verbal language.
> OK. But my point was that 3 and 6 are easier concepts than the
> electromagnetic field.

Electromagnetism yes, but sensorimotive no. It's oriented to a single
vector: I, me, or you or it. Pronouns. That's what the sensorimotive
correlate is to 3p nouns. It's not complex 'fields' and forces, it's
the feeling of pushing and pulling, rising and falling. These are our
human versions of what all things might experience in their own way.

> >>> The qualia of
> >>> even is more primitive. Parity. Rounded rhythm or cyclic
> >>> complementarity to what is 'odd'. The oddest of the odd are 'prime'.
> >>> It's a sense we can identify with and use to make sense of other
> >>> things. It's just that after we learn the numerical symbols, it's
> >>> difficult to get underneath them and remember what they were
> >>> before we
> >>> named them.
> >> Don't tell me. I am (also) a math teacher. But then it is up to me to
> >> find exercise forcing them to get the idea lying beyond the symbol.
> > And in doing that, don't you rely upon metaphor of sense/motive
> > experience?
> I rely on everything. My point was just that the meaning of symbols is
> not in the symbols (but with comp, in the relation that symbol has
> with the rest of the (arithmetical) reality.

Right, but I'm pointing out how sensorimotive techniques - metaphor,
movement, imitation... these are the concrete underpinnings of
> >>> What is it about numbers that makes them appear easy?
> >> That is a mystery. Probably because they are so deep and common in
> >> all
> >> reasonable living circumstances. The number 2 incarnates himself in
> >> so
> >> many thing father/mother, moon/sun, true/false, up/down, left/right,
> >> east/west, ... my 2 cents!
> > That's numerology :)
> Come on! That was just counting!

It's counting but it's what happens when you stop counting at two and
dive into the 1p 'it'-ness of it. What IS two? What it two like? How
is it different from three, etc. What are it's qualities? Numerology.
Absolutely fascinating, and my first introduction to contemplating
consciousness in a scientific (thought many will say pseudoscientific)

> > I'm suspicious of MWI. I think that it works in a sense but the fact
> > that you already know why someone would find MWI unsatisfying on the
> > face of it is a bit of a yellow flag.
> Then "the earth is flat" also. "Gödel's theorem" too, and the quantum
> facts also.
> But QM predicts that if I look at a superposition state, I become
> superposed myself. Anyone pretending the contrary have to postulate
> that QM is wrong on the system (me + the particle).

That's the inside out description of sense. If you can't tell whether
a person is smiling at you or faking it, you don't know yourself
whether you feel like smiling or not. It can be broken out
mechanistically as 'superposition' because we are looking at the most
literal and instrumental layers of reality that we can get our hands
on, so we have no intention of projecting a touchy feely semantic
reality upon their transactions. I'm not saying that we should ascribe
anthropomorphic qualites to quantum state, but I think that we should
consider them sensorimotive states that can be described in quantum
terms from our PRIF.

> > I think that one of the things
> > that significance does is to collapse redundancy. Perhaps in so doing,
> > we arrive at a single universe which is multiply coherent, rather than
> > multiple worlds which have no significance relative to each other.
> That's 1004 jargon. You just put a leave on the sex of angels.

Again, it's just what sense literally does. It makes everything both
literal and interpretive. You want another universe? Just take a look
around you and make up a story. We do this as kids instinctively. An
old dishwasher becomes a time machine, etc. Then you don't need all
those special infinities of alternate spacetimes since spacetime isn't
objectively real anyhow. It's like a computer in that if you need a
variable, you can name it in memory. No need to create all possible
variables in separate universes for each possible combination. Just do
it as you go along.

> >>> The brain is a set of images and
> >>> concepts in our minds and experiences. Our experiences are phenomena
> >>> facilitated by the brain. Both levels are real and neither is
> >>> completely a construction of the other.
> >> That is correct. What you might not appreciate is that both are still
> >> an *emanation* of just the number relation. It makes Pythagoras
> >> literally true. That is made possible by Church thesis. It is a bit
> >> technical, but fundamental.
> > No, I do appreciate that view, and I used to have that view myself,
> > but lately it seems to me that that the number relation and the sense
> > relation must be a shared emanation...that is the emanation is the
> > sharing between those two opposites. If anything, the sense relation
> > is more primitive. It is not necessary to have any contact with number
> > to participate in the experience of the cosmos, but it is necessary
> > for number to make sense to something non-computable for it to be
> > experienced.
> Yes, but there is enough non-computable thing in comp and in
> arithmetic that I find suspect when it is introduced in the ontology.

Is the non-comp in arithmetic truly non-comp, like jellyfish is to
irony, or is it just incompatible arithmetic sets?

> > Oracles are quite interesting, and the voices that they reveal are
> > somewhat orthogonal to human consciousness. Such a thing would have
> > interesting things to say, I'm sure, but I don't think they can be
> > held responsible for what they are saying. I think that they present
> > non-random refractions of the total psyche, such that precognitive
> > advice and other kinds of trans-personal information can be acquired,
> > but I would be very surprised if this information, like all prophetic
> > divination, is not contaminated with shadow advice.
> In which theory? I can make sense of what you say, but it would
> contradict other things you say.

What does it contradict?

> > Just because
> > something can tell the truth doesn't mean that it has to or wants to.
> Well ideally correct machine have to say the truth, by definition.
> "wanting" has not yet been arithmetized, so I can say nothing, but you
> are plausibly correct.

If it has no choice but to tell the truth then I don't think it can be
said to be conscious.

> > So if we don't know about neurons, and the computer doesn't know about
> > semiconductors, then what does?
> The neurologists, and the computer scientists.

Mmm. I don't like it. The neuron needs a neurologist to know what it's
doing? Obviously if you look through a microscope there is a lot going
on down there. Nothing experiences that? It's just a show for us?

> > Why doesn't the mechanics of the
> > machine itself have a soul and a life?
> It might, but it is not related with the consciousness of the machine
> it bears.

Aha. So you are introducing a whole other ontology. Now we have the
machine consciousness (C), and the mechanical consciousness of the
machine (B), and the machine itself from 3-p (A). I think that if you
think about it, it doesn't work because now B needs a separate
arithmetic truth, which begets another recursive level of
consciousness, and then you're in Horton Hears A Who. If you just
place C as the interior of A, then you avoid that mess completely.
Topologicalism > Functionalism.

>By definition of the comp substitution level. If the
> consciousness of my neurons does interfere or participate in my
> consciousness, it means that my subst. level is lower than the
> functionning of neurons. I think in practice that the glial cells are
> needed (notably for the chronic pains).

Or it means that there is no substitution level and you are the
functioning of your neurons (some of them anyhow), but not just as a
machine but as an aggregate sense organ (sense in every sense). We are
the experiential throughput of our bodies, but it extends beyond that
as our bodies are an event in the solar system, galaxy, etc.

PART II tomorrow. Or soon.

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