On 22.08.2011 09:14 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
On Sat, Aug 20, 2011 at 4:51 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi<[email protected]>
wrote:
In my view, any experiment is based on some assumptions (a world
view). To this end, it would be nice to understand what a world
view would be necessary to state that "the thermostat feels cold".
I guess it is certainly possible to introduce new definitions under
which such a statement would make sense. Yet, someone must first do
it.
Let me give one example. Dick and Natalie are writing a book
"Embryogenesis explained" and in in the first chapter they use an
expression "bacteria can perceive". To understand the meaning of
such a statement I have chosen a ballcock
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/01/perception-feedback-and-qualia.html
It might be also a good example to ask if a toilette with a
ballcock has consciousness or not, I believe that even a nice
example as a thermostat. Yet, if we are back to the discussion
about "bacteria can perceive", then the answer was that yes,
perceive was considered at the level of an automatic door. In the
sense that an automatic door also perceives. Then I have nothing
against, it is matter of a definition.
Maybe the ballcock, automatic door and thermostat have feelings like
you and I do when we experience cold, pain and so on. Sure, they
don't have high level information processing but how do you know
that prevents them having such experiences? There is no test you can
do, since qualia are necessarily private.
I would agree that we cannot exclude it. After all if we take qualia
ontologically, then it is hard to escape panpsychism. Let me quote Gray
in this respect (he was not aware of Bruno's theory):
p. 321. "Alternatively, no such new arrangement of the existing laws of
physics and chemistry will turn out to be possible. The fundamental laws
of physics themselves will need supplementation. It is difficult to see
how new fundamental laws could come into play only during biological
evolution, or they would not be fundamental. So it is probably
inevitable that any theory which seeks to account for consciousness in
terms of fundamental physical processes will involve 'panpsychism'. That
is to say, it will be a theory in which the elements of conscious
experience are to be found pretty well in everything, animate or
inanimate, large or small. TO most people this prospect will seem even
less palatable that that of consciousness in computers or brain slices.
But the state of our ignorance in this daunting field is so profound
that we should rule out nothing a priori on the grounds absurdity alone.
Bear in mind the absurdity of quantum mechanics!"
The question is here than to develop some theory, that is, to add some
new governing equations for qualia in comp, for example that in some
processes far from equilibrium good qualia will be maximized.
To this respect, I like a quote from Strugatskii (Monday Begins on
Saturday):
"People are only an intermediate chain required by the Nature to achieve
the crown of creation, the glass of brandy with a lemon slice."
Well, from the qualia viewpoint, people are also necessary to enjoy that
creation but it well might be that required qualia could be produced
even without people. It would be a pity but who knows.
Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru
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