On 16 Aug 2011, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Suppose a teacher is in front of his classroom answering questions of the
Then at time t, his brain stops completely to function, but a cosmic
explosion, happening ten years before, sent, by pure chance, a flux of cosmic rays which supplies correctly the inputs to its muscle (but NOT inside its brain), so that his behavior remains unchanged for the time of
the student lesson. Then he dies.

Was the guy a zombie?

If the cosmic rays do not lead to a partial zombie when part of the
brain is replaced, they will not result in a full zombie if the rest
of the brain is replaced in a similar way. It's no different if it's
the cosmic rays or a computer animating the muscles.

You miss my point. the brain is not replaced. It is just not functionning at all. The cosmic rays supplies only the motor control ouputs. It is much less information than a supply of the whole brain. Yet he answers the student correctly, and has the right behavior. *we* know he is just lucky. is there consciousness? The question is tricky. Eventually consciousness is just not attached to moving bodies at all. Eventually the bodies does not "really" exists outside consciousness.

Imagine that the student don't ask any question. Then the cosmic rays needs only to make it looks just quiet behind its desk. No neurons works at all, and the cosmic rays supplies very little information in its cerebral stem so
that he does not fall. Is the guy a zombie?

Yes, but he could be unconscious and propped up at his desk with a
normal brain as well.

But in this experience, it did not.

Look we both agree that comp makes sense, and that there is no partial zombie. This is enough for showing that comp entails the 323 principle, but that let no choice: we have to attribute consciousness to the logico-arithmetical relations emulating computations, and physics eventually is reduced into machine's bio-psych-theo-logy, part of arithmetic and the inside points of view of arithmetic (like Bp, Bp & p, etc...).

I am no more sure you still see that comp implies the reversal physics/ arithmetic, which would mean you change your mind since the last exposition of the Movie Graph. We might need to come back on this (many others still dont' see the point, I think).

Of course, we have perhaps to cope first with that recent invasion of non-comp people : )
I am thinking to Craig, and Benjayk now, apparently.
But not Colin, he pretends that his approach is not comp, but it is clearly in comp, from his last post (which I commented). he clearly believe he can build an inorganic brain, and he does not refer to anything non computable.


I would say it is. But now, the very fact that I do not think that a partial zombie is possible makes me abandon the idea that consciousness is related
to the physical activity of the brain. The consciousness of the guy
supervenes on all computations (in a continuum of digital computations (as viewed from inside from a first person perspective). It does not supervene on a physical body, because a physical body does not exist, it is only part
of coherent mind projections.

In a sense, we, as we see ourselves as bodies, *are* zombies (total zombie). But this is misleading, because this makes sense only when we understand
that the bodies are already creation of the mind, in the way computer
science can explain with the UD  (the sigma_1 sentences), and the
self-reference logics.

Could you be a partial zombie now; for example, could
you be blind or unable to understand language but just not realise it?

I could suffer an agnosologia which makes me blind and amnesic on anything related to vision, so that personally I don't see the difference. But I will have to infer that there is some kind of problem about finding objects and walking without bumping into the furniture. But in that case I would not say
that I am a partial zombie. I am fully conscious, but handicapped and
amnesic. I don't believe the notion partial zombie make sense in the

There is in fact a condition called Anton's Syndrome where some
patients with lesions in their occipital cortex are blind but
insightless into their condition. They walk around into things and
confabulate as to why this happens. However, this is unlike a partial
zombie since for a start behaviour is different.

We agree on this.

Total zombie can make sense, in a partial sense different from above, like a fake policeman on the road, which behave like a policeman in the eyes of the
drivers, but has presumably no consciousness.

Incidentally, I don't understand why philosophers and contributors to
this list are affronted by the idea that a random device or a
recording could sustain consciousness. There seems to be no logical
contradiction or empirical problem with the idea, but people just
don't like it.

With comp consciousness is associated with a computation, and then with an infinity of them. Something random can only be a first person geographical
or contingent type of experience, like in the iteration of the WM
duplications. So indeed, I think it does not make sense to attribute neither consciousness, nor even a computation to something random.The comp idea is
that a computation makes sense, and, for animals, reflects some
self-referential abilities needed for surviving.

If a random device generates by chance a correct computation, you might or
not attribute to it consciousness, because, in *all* cases, the
consciousness itself is related to infinities of computation in the tiny
sigma_1 complete platonia.

I would not attribute consciousness to the teacher above, because the rays does not even emulate its brain, just a minimal number of inputs. If I attribute him consciousness, then I can attribute Einstein's or anyone's consciousness to a thermostat, and all supervenience theses (the phys or comp one) get trivial. You would not say "yes" to a doctor who proposes to
substitute your brain for a thermostat, all right?

The thermostat can't talk, for a start.

In order for your theory to go through, functionalism has to be true.
The only proof of functionalism that I am aware of is the Chalmers
fading qualia argument. But that argument goes through for any brain
component no matter its mechanism of action - computation, random or

The argument certainly goes through, in case we add the proviso that it must reflect the counterfactuals. In the case of one single computation, it becomes ambiguous. A form of the argument goes through, and leads to the abandon of the physical supervenience thesis and to immateriality (which simplifies the MB problem given that computation is, like consciousness, a non material notion). But the appearance of physics must in that case be explained by computer science/arithmetic. (Then the logic of self-reference does this, and separate the quanta and the qualia).

Comp is not compatible with the physical supervenience thesis, nor with any single universal machine-supervenience thesis. below our level of substitution, an infinity of UMs play some role in the physical appearances.



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