On 16 Aug 2011, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
Suppose a teacher is in front of his classroom answering questions
of the
student.
Then at time t, his brain stops completely to function, but a cosmic
explosion, happening ten years before, sent, by pure chance, a flux
of
cosmic rays which supplies correctly the inputs to its muscle (but
NOT
inside its brain), so that his behavior remains unchanged for the
time of
the student lesson. Then he dies.
Was the guy a zombie?
If the cosmic rays do not lead to a partial zombie when part of the
brain is replaced, they will not result in a full zombie if the rest
of the brain is replaced in a similar way. It's no different if it's
the cosmic rays or a computer animating the muscles.
You miss my point. the brain is not replaced. It is just not
functionning at all. The cosmic rays supplies only the motor control
ouputs. It is much less information than a supply of the whole brain.
Yet he answers the student correctly, and has the right behavior. *we*
know he is just lucky. is there consciousness?
The question is tricky. Eventually consciousness is just not attached
to moving bodies at all. Eventually the bodies does not "really"
exists outside consciousness.
Imagine that the student don't ask any question. Then the cosmic
rays needs
only to make it looks just quiet behind its desk. No neurons works
at all,
and the cosmic rays supplies very little information in its
cerebral stem so
that he does not fall. Is the guy a zombie?
Yes, but he could be unconscious and propped up at his desk with a
normal brain as well.
But in this experience, it did not.
Look we both agree that comp makes sense, and that there is no partial
zombie. This is enough for showing that comp entails the 323
principle, but that let no choice: we have to attribute consciousness
to the logico-arithmetical relations emulating computations, and
physics eventually is reduced into machine's bio-psych-theo-logy, part
of arithmetic and the inside points of view of arithmetic (like Bp, Bp
& p, etc...).
I am no more sure you still see that comp implies the reversal physics/
arithmetic, which would mean you change your mind since the last
exposition of the Movie Graph. We might need to come back on this
(many others still dont' see the point, I think).
Of course, we have perhaps to cope first with that recent invasion of
non-comp people : )
I am thinking to Craig, and Benjayk now, apparently.
But not Colin, he pretends that his approach is not comp, but it is
clearly in comp, from his last post (which I commented). he clearly
believe he can build an inorganic brain, and he does not refer to
anything non computable.
Bruno
I would say it is. But now, the very fact that I do not think that
a partial
zombie is possible makes me abandon the idea that consciousness is
related
to the physical activity of the brain. The consciousness of the guy
supervenes on all computations (in a continuum of digital
computations (as
viewed from inside from a first person perspective). It does not
supervene
on a physical body, because a physical body does not exist, it is
only part
of coherent mind projections.
In a sense, we, as we see ourselves as bodies, *are* zombies (total
zombie).
But this is misleading, because this makes sense only when we
understand
that the bodies are already creation of the mind, in the way computer
science can explain with the UD (the sigma_1 sentences), and the
self-reference logics.
Could you be a partial zombie now; for example, could
you be blind or unable to understand language but just not realise
it?
I could suffer an agnosologia which makes me blind and amnesic on
anything
related to vision, so that personally I don't see the difference.
But I will
have to infer that there is some kind of problem about finding
objects and
walking without bumping into the furniture. But in that case I
would not say
that I am a partial zombie. I am fully conscious, but handicapped and
amnesic. I don't believe the notion partial zombie make sense in the
absolute.
There is in fact a condition called Anton's Syndrome where some
patients with lesions in their occipital cortex are blind but
insightless into their condition. They walk around into things and
confabulate as to why this happens. However, this is unlike a partial
zombie since for a start behaviour is different.
We agree on this.
Total zombie can make sense, in a partial sense different from
above, like a
fake policeman on the road, which behave like a policeman in the
eyes of the
drivers, but has presumably no consciousness.
Incidentally, I don't understand why philosophers and contributors
to
this list are affronted by the idea that a random device or a
recording could sustain consciousness. There seems to be no logical
contradiction or empirical problem with the idea, but people just
don't like it.
With comp consciousness is associated with a computation, and then
with an
infinity of them. Something random can only be a first person
geographical
or contingent type of experience, like in the iteration of the WM
duplications. So indeed, I think it does not make sense to
attribute neither
consciousness, nor even a computation to something random.The comp
idea is
that a computation makes sense, and, for animals, reflects some
self-referential abilities needed for surviving.
If a random device generates by chance a correct computation, you
might or
not attribute to it consciousness, because, in *all* cases, the
consciousness itself is related to infinities of computation in the
tiny
sigma_1 complete platonia.
I would not attribute consciousness to the teacher above, because
the rays
does not even emulate its brain, just a minimal number of inputs.
If I
attribute him consciousness, then I can attribute Einstein's or
anyone's
consciousness to a thermostat, and all supervenience theses (the
phys or
comp one) get trivial. You would not say "yes" to a doctor who
proposes to
substitute your brain for a thermostat, all right?
The thermostat can't talk, for a start.
In order for your theory to go through, functionalism has to be true.
The only proof of functionalism that I am aware of is the Chalmers
fading qualia argument. But that argument goes through for any brain
component no matter its mechanism of action - computation, random or
recording.
The argument certainly goes through, in case we add the proviso that
it must reflect the counterfactuals. In the case of one single
computation, it becomes ambiguous. A form of the argument goes
through, and leads to the abandon of the physical supervenience thesis
and to immateriality (which simplifies the MB problem given that
computation is, like consciousness, a non material notion). But the
appearance of physics must in that case be explained by computer
science/arithmetic. (Then the logic of self-reference does this, and
separate the quanta and the qualia).
Comp is not compatible with the physical supervenience thesis, nor
with any single universal machine-supervenience thesis. below our
level of substitution, an infinity of UMs play some role in the
physical appearances.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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