On 31 Aug 2011, at 05:12, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/30/2011 11:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2011, at 14:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 30, 4:06 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 Aug 2011, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Definitely, but the reasons that we have for causing those
the semiconductor material are not semiconductor logics. They use
hardware logic to to get the hardware to do software logic, just
the mind uses the brain's hardware to remember, imagine, plan, or
execute what the mind wants it to. What the mind wants is
by the brain, but the brain is also influenced directly by the
A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming
universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on
level universal bearer.
Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine?
This is meaningless.
Are *all* phenomena subject to representation in terms of
Not at all. Only a tiny fragment of arithmetical phenomena can be.
I said "meaningless" for asking a machine to emulate a non machine. I
was not saying that everything is computable, because if "WE" are
computable, then "WE" face an uncomputable reality.
The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory
something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it?
Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness.
If you mean by this, 1-awareness, comp explains its existence and
its non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing
emulable beings in our physical neighborhood. This is enough
precise to be tested, and we can argue that some non computable
quantum weirdness, like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The
simple self-duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible
to experience non computable facts without introducing anything non
computable in the third person picture.
qualitatively distinct from detection.
Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a
person, which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference
It would be nice to have a better explanation of how person-hood
= Löb-ness, if that is what you are implying. Personhood seems to
involve a form of regress that we do not ordinarily see in Löbian
logics. The fact that we can think about thinking about our
I don't understand. Löbianity and Gödel's predicate is at the start a
"thinking about thinking". Bp is "I think that p" thought by the
machine. The theory of self-reference made this clear, I thought.
Not to disqualify machines
implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk bottles,
whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those
substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want to
assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like
dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing
HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia
If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the
of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To
physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a
relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you
cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the
But we can emulate a brain with milk bottles, so you agree that
there is zombie in your theory. Above you say that awareness is not
Turing emulable, but my question was: do you know what in the brain
is not Turing emulable? You cannot answer by some 1-notion, because
comp explains why they exist, and why they are not Turing emulable,
(albeit manifestable by Turing emulation with some probability with
respect to you). To negate comp, you have to show something,
different than matter and consciousness, which necessitates an
actual infinite amount of bits.
The only problem that I see in your reasoning, Bruno, is that
you fail to allow for the possibility that the mind is not 'just'
that which is Turing emulable.
I don't understand. I insist all the time that IF 3-we are machine
("yes doctor") then neither matter nor consciousness are computable/
Turing emulable. The 1-p is not even representable, although it is
meta-representable (by Bp & p, for example).
Turing emulable is a very narrow category
Here I disagree. It is the only effective notion close for
diagnolization. This entails that from inside, if we are machine,
reality escape all attempt to be entirely definable, even with high
cardinals, and powerful set theories/mathematics.
and it may be just a special case of information transformation. The
unitary transformation of QM is another form of information
transformation! It can be easily shown that it takes an infinite
number of bits for a Boolean logic to emulate the logic of a QM
system (that has more dimensions than 2).
I disagree. Quantum computation is completely Turing emulable. Not in
"real time" but that is a relative notion. The UD does emulate all
quantum computation. This fails for analog computation, but it fails
also for classical analog computation.
The fact that an orthocomplete algebra can be said to contain
multiple Boolean logics is another example of this idea.
1) The classical self-reference logic leads to orthocomplete algebra
(the Z1* and X1* logics, S4Grz1 also)
2) This means only "many-worlds". It does not mean that the quantum
adds new possible computations or phenomena, except those driven by
the first person indeterminacy (like DM-non-locality, DM-entanglement,
DM-non cloning, DM-possible phase, etc.)
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