On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations.

I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory.

Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory.

Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics".

Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most scientist).





What has been thought to be the "whole of physics" has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics.

OK, I just answered this above.



So which "whole of physics" does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the "physics" of computer games?

It is has to be consistent with the physics of "all computer games played at once", as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of average.


What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A modified gravity?

This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. To use mechanism to solve the "dark matter problem" is like to use string theory to prepare tea.




We have already the logic of measure one.

I don't understand what measure there is on logics.

There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs.
There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it is (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp & p (& Dt). The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and is arithmetical (by AUDA).




If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already.

How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world?

With a newtonian world the logic of observable proposition is boolean. It is already proved that the logic of the observable proposition invariant for all UMs and LUMs cannot be boolean (and is already proved to be a variant of von Neumann quantum logic).

Bruno




Brent


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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