In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I agree with BrentM. Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable. The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory Procrustean bed for those partly (maybe at all?) understood phenomena that transpired (BY OBSERVATION - Bruno) till 'yesterday into our knowledge-base (forget about oomniscient Comp). It works "almost well" in circumstances we realize today. (Consider some mishaps that occur,,,) "Whole Physics" IMO is the conventional science we carry as of yesterday. It includes the ancient 'facts' (measurements?) ad their refutations by fantasy-land theories (Q-chapters) as well as the modifications by math (another fantasy-land IMO.) Granted: we travel in space, predict genetics, screw-up economics, have societal predictions and ruin our environment very successfully. We don't understand anything. Comp does (if it exists) but it is not understandable to us. Logic? which one? the Zarathustrian octimality(8)? or the equation of opposites? (which is btw. a true outcome of the infinite everything). I THINK (not sure!) self-reference is anchoring ourselves into our ignorance. Unfortunately we have no better means to contemplate with than our material infested brain-function, a poor excuse for mentality. Even the R.Rosen version infinite complexity worldview (with a base of unknowable everything) is restricted to our models made up of human-mind approved topics and features, processes and happenings - an array of conventional thinking. (I have no proof that the 'model-content' indeed represents anything from the infinite complexity and its relations.) BTW there is no proof at all. Only in a restricted limitational view. Evidence: ditto. So what do we have? a thinking agnosticism - acknowleged ignorance, but we use it very skillfully.

Sorry to blunderize the holly Grail of science thinking. John Mikes On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the >>>>> problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, >>>>> contradicting the observations. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can >>>> prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be >>>> extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. >>>> >>> >>> Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which >>> does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or >>> relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different >>> for a repeatable experience. >>> If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. >>> Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is >>> hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. >>> >> >> Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics". >> > > Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no > conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy > level of generality. > But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and > physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the > material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such > would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the > logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why > there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to > many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most > scientist). > > > > > > What has been thought to be the "whole of physics" has been refuted. >> Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General >> relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. >> > > OK, I just answered this above. > > > > So which "whole of physics" does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the >> "physics" of computer games? >> > > It is has to be consistent with the physics of "all computer games played > at once", as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of > average. > > > What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A >> modified gravity? >> > > This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume > mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. > To use mechanism to solve the "dark matter problem" is like to use string > theory to prepare tea. > > > > >> We have already the logic of measure one. >>> >> >> I don't understand what measure there is on logics. >> > > There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs. > There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it is > (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp & p (& Dt). > The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and is arithmetical (by > AUDA). > > > > >> If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already. >>> >> >> How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world? >> > > With a newtonian world the logic of observable proposition is boolean. It > is already proved that the logic of the observable proposition invariant for > all UMs and LUMs cannot be boolean (and is already proved to be a variant of > von Neumann quantum logic). > > Bruno > > > > >> Brent >> >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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