On 09 Oct 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Depends on what you mean by "the whole of physics".

Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical.

But it seems that everything theories and the string theory landscape and Tegmark's all of mathematics threaten to do exactly that - make of all of physics geographical, an accident of where you find yourself with the anthropic principle as the all-purpose explanation.

here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark which I have done when entering in this list discussion. This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute and the relative Self-Sampling-Assumption).

DM, or comp, does not work with the ASSA, which indeed would make the physical as a sort of geographical. In a sense, comp rescues physics from such approaches, and it introduces a new invariant (the change of the phi_i, or the change for the initial ontic theory). But comp also rescues consciousness and persons from the materialist tendency to eliminate them.

Anthropic principles are not completely evacuated, some defense of them and variants are still possible, especially for the cosmological history and for some explanation of geography. But the laws of physics are not anthropic. They might be said in a loose sense to be universal machine-thropic, or Löbian-Thropic, but not in the Bayesian sense. The probabilities and their rôle are derived from the first person indeterminacy.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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