On 2/10/2012 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 February 2012 14:08, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net>  wrote:

No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from matter.
His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the content of
a "simulation".
I disagree with this assessment, I think.  ISTM that equating
consciousness with other physical properties inevitably puts one in
the position of having to "build up" composite entities from the
properties of their components - hence the notorious "grain" and
"binding" problems.  The "theology" of comp, on the other hand, seems
to imply that at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric
unity, but that this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of
comp, into an infinity of views.  Of course, this latter idea can only
make sense in terms of 1p; from the 3p perspective, all that exists is
computation.

David

Hi David,

I don't disagree with your remark but you are addressing a different but related issue from Craig's. The idea of Chalmer's claim is that consciousness is not an emergent property, like temperature for example, but this is not in principle incompatible with the idea that "at some "ultimate" level consciousness is a symmetric unity, but that this symmetry is broken, by the internal logic of comp, into an infinity of views" except that at the level of "symmetric unity" consciousness per se vanishes as the distinctions of and between the infinity of "views" (those are the 1p!) disappears. This is the idea of neutrality that I have been discussing, as in "neutral monism". The idea of vacuum gauge symmetry as it is used in physics is analogous. There was a fellow that published a paper a similar idea to this and chatted with us for a bit early last year, if I recall correctly. Russell Standish had some interesting comments on this. My difficulty is that at the level of the unbroken symmetry we have to be careful that we do not consider implications that are only meaningful in the broken or fragmented perspective.

Onward!

Stephen

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