On Feb 10, 9:08 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of
> Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the
> physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from
> matter. His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the
> content of a "simulation".
Right. I pick up where Chalmers leaves off:
1. It is not a fundamental property of the physical exactly but
rather, the physical and the experiential are the fundamental
modalities of 'sense'.
2. The modalities are necessarily symmetric but anomalous, so that
mind is not the opposite of brain directly, but that both mind and
brain are opposite modalities of sense
3. Sense is anomalous symmetry itself: sameness on one level,
difference on another, and a third invariance (self) that straddles
There are emergent properties in matter and emergent properties in
awareness, but they develop out of their own momentum. When we tell a
story, the plot of the story builds the experience, not the ambivalent
activities of our neurotransmitters. Changes on the neurotransmitter
level can inspire certain kinds of thoughts or stories too, and the
literal and figurative influences can play off of each other too, but
the neither physical nor experiential supervene fully and completely
on the other.
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