On Feb 10, 9:08 am, "Stephen P. King" <[email protected]> wrote:
> No. Craig can be considered to be exploring the implications of > Chalmer's claim that consciousness is a fundamental property of the > physical, like mass, spin and charge, i.e. it is not emergent from > matter. His concept of "sense" is not much different from your 1p or the > content of a "simulation". Right. I pick up where Chalmers leaves off: 1. It is not a fundamental property of the physical exactly but rather, the physical and the experiential are the fundamental modalities of 'sense'. 2. The modalities are necessarily symmetric but anomalous, so that mind is not the opposite of brain directly, but that both mind and brain are opposite modalities of sense 3. Sense is anomalous symmetry itself: sameness on one level, difference on another, and a third invariance (self) that straddles the 'levels'. There are emergent properties in matter and emergent properties in awareness, but they develop out of their own momentum. When we tell a story, the plot of the story builds the experience, not the ambivalent activities of our neurotransmitters. Changes on the neurotransmitter level can inspire certain kinds of thoughts or stories too, and the literal and figurative influences can play off of each other too, but the neither physical nor experiential supervene fully and completely on the other. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
