On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >> Comp says that any UM's
> >> experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?
> > Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?
> We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
> hypothesis than most forms of CTM,
> given that comp allows the
> substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
> of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically
> lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.
> Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.
That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM, and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.
> Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
> materialism (weak materialism).
According to a string of controversial arguments. Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.
>We could say that comp makes the
> notion of primitive matter supernatural.
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