On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> Comp says that any UM's > >> experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right? > > > Computaionalism or Bruno's comp? > > We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker > hypothesis than most forms of CTM,
!!!! > given that comp allows the > substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion > of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are automatically > lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level. > > Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical. That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not one physics for each UTM, and there is a physical hardware platform at level 0. > Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with > materialism (weak materialism). According to a string of controversial arguments. Not according to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers and brains are made of matter. >We could say that comp makes the > notion of primitive matter supernatural. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.