On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:











On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Comp says that any UM's
experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?

Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?

We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
hypothesis than most forms of CTM,

!!!!

?



given that comp allows the
substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
automatically
lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.

Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.

That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
one physics for each UTM,

?
That's exactly what I am saying above.


No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.

I show that the CTM theory entais that physics is the same for all Löbian entity (machine or not), so that we canb derive physics from machine's introspection. The general shape is given by a relative sum on all computations. It depends for each machine to the competition between infinities of machines. Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p->[]<>p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). Without this I would have already conclude that comp and/or the classical theory of knowledge is refuted.


Does this introspection manifest all possible means of generating the appearance of other minds?



and
there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.

A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
physics.

Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.

Occam razor says that we must not assume ontologicaly what we can explain phenomenologically.
That why QM + Occam = MWI = QM without collapse.
With CTM, we have that the theory of everything is arithmetic, for it explains why and how numbers, relatively to other numbers develop stable and persistent beliefs and knowledge about quanta and qualia.




And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
fundamental cognitive science.



Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
materialism (weak materialism).

According to a string of controversial arguments.

You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,

I never said anything of the kind.

I asked you, after a summing up of the argument, and we got into a long conversation on step 8 only. I debunked earlier critics of the step 0 (the definition of comp) because you asserted it was platonist, when I insist that it is only realist on arithmetic, and this means that we just agree with the validity of (A V ~A) for arithmetical sentences.




and
when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.

Not according
to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
and brains are
made of matter.

Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
for marrying GR and QM.

Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.

I am OK with this. For example consciousness, reality, truth, etc. are all concept which are intuitively not definable, and have been proved to be not definable in the comp (meta) theory, and in the machines' discourse (that is formally). But "primitive matter" is different. Not only we cannot define it, but we cannot experiment with it, we cannot experience it, nor find any use of the notion in physics, nor even mention of it. It is only a vague everyday-like extrapolation from our animal experience. In occident, science is born from taking some distance from such kind of idea. Given more than 2000 years of not being able to solve the mind body problem, we should not take it for granted, at the least.




It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
reasoning.

Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism.

Oh no! You are coming back with this?
I already answer this by asking you to prove this. To show me where in the paper I assume Platonism. The Platonism comes from the conclusion. I use only the minimal amount of arithmetical realism to give sense to Church thesis. Nothing else.



Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it
as a reductio of Platonism.

This is philosophical nonsense.
COMP + the usual occam used in any applied field makes some Platonism obligatory. Just show us what you think to be a flaw (I ask again, but you have already failed to do that).





They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is
itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated
naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.

Whatever.

Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.

The majority get to define meanings. What they mean by
computationalism
is 180 degrees aways from what your mean. You should choose another
word.

Well, if your conception of science and meaning is the belief of the majority, then I understand better your difficulties.





It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define
matter, I think.

1)  a little does not equal none

I don't use this. In MGA I use the fact that Physical Supervenience Thesis (PST) entails that consciousness need to be attributed to *arbitrary" physical activity, including none, and that is absurd for comp+PS. If you don't see this, quote the passage, and let us discuss it really in detail.

Could it be that the "no physical activity" mode of computational implementation is some kind of "at infinity" extrapolation, i.e. it is in principle achievable but only in some infinite limit? If this is true that we might have a chance of capturing a Gaussian measure in the finite approximation of this limit, otherwise the measure would vanish as one would have to included the non-constructable cases of computation.


2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be causally
connected.

define "causally", and tell me in which theory you work. Usually, when we implement a computation physically, or in any UMs, we just manage to implement the arithmetical "causality" in terms of the UMs capacity to link the computational states. Without this, the concept of implementation would not make sense.

This is very weak reasoning as the notion of causation that you are using, based of the truth of Sigma_1 sentences, is contingent on the mathematical axioms that are chosen.


3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la
Maudlin.

[CTM implies ~MAT] is equivalent with [MAT implies ~CTM]. You are not giving a refutation, but a rephrasing of a (partial) result.

-----------

I comment some other posts by you:

Shouldn't we open up our mind?

John Mikes

Maybe all multiversal theories are wrong and there is one univese. Is
your mind
open to that?


Sure. But then QM and CTM are both false. The point is a point of reasoning, validity, not of conviction or truth.

We know that QM is true modulo the experiments done so far. Testing CTM is difficult as we would have to show a non-computable physical process to falsify it. Consideration of computational intractability, e.g. the NP-Complete problem is a hint but you do not seem to be interested in looking there. :-(



On Feb 20, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2012, at 14:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:


How do you know? Comp says we can't know whether we are artificial
simulation or not.

I am sorry, but I think this is false. I would say that comp says that
we are in infinitely many simulations at once, from a third person
point of view on the first person points of view. This leads to
verifiable (empirically) constraints.

With comp we are in a complex "matrix" whose existence is deducible
from the existence of universal numbers, whose existence is deducible
from numbers and their two fist basic simple laws of + and *.

Of course, Platonism/AR cannot be deduced mathematically: it is
ontology.

We can do a theory for the ontology, then we can make ontological deduction, and epistemological deduction for some notion of reasoners or observers. That's the best we can do if we want to keep the scientific modesty.

We can find as many theories as we can define axioms, the limit is conceivability which is a weak constraint.


Both. What would be the meaning of any form of computationalism
without the notion of computational realism?

Peter alludes to the fact that most materialist ignores the
incompatibility between comp and weak materialism, including
physicalism.

There is no such incompatibility. It is mutual redundancy, not  mutual
contradiction. What BM calls incompatibility actually
hinges on Occams Razor, and O's R cuts both ways: AR/Platonism is
redundant
given materialism.

No. If you keep materialism *and* CTM, the reasoning shows that you need to eliminate person or consciousness.

Materialism fails on its own as it reduces our 1p to epiphenomena, so why this statement?



On Feb 20, 6:37 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:


Right, but true = a true reflection of the simulation.

No. True = true of unsimulated reality.

Right. And with CTM, reality = (sigma_1) Arithmetical Truth. But physical reality is a complex structure emerging in first person plural way in collection of UMs.

Mere plurality does not solve the concurrency problem which is what CTM must explain to derive physics. This needs more work before we are making such bold statements.


No but you have to agree that it is possible to believe that it is a
Pegasus

The ability to beieve falsehoods has no interesting implications.

It has. Like it is a key of mathematical logic that rich and sound (Löbian) theories cannot prove that they do not prove falsehoods. The possibility of believing falsehoods is also a key in the dream metaphysical argument, which steps six gives again in a modern "Turing" form.

Perhaps you tell us that you have some direct access to reality, in which case you behave as a pseudo-mystic, I am afraid.

How are we any different from you, Bruno, you seem to imply that you have " some direct access to reality" !!!


Bruno;s theory or the Computational Theory of Mind.

Both.

Nonsense. CTM is a scientific theory.

I agree, despite it is also religion/theology (the belief in a form of possible in principle reincarnation). But computer science (with Church thesis) made if scientific. Comp is a weaker version of the usual version of CTM, so what you derive from comp remains valid for all form of CTMs.

False, false, false , false false!!!! Standard CTM has nothing
to do with Dreaming Machines in Platonia, or any other fanciful
notion Bruno has come up with.

You have always failed to make this precise. It is not a question of agreeing with philosophical principles, but of valid deduction in a theoretical framework.

You are claiming that the lack of a formal model of his idea is a falsification of his ideas.



The opinion of the programmer *is* truth to the programmed.

It still isn't truth. As soon as you add a "to" or "for" clause,
you are actually talking about opinion, even if you are using the
*word* truth.

I agree. Craig seems to confuse belief and knowledge, which in comp are distinct, from the points of view of the correct machine. They obeys to different logics, even if G* knows they have the same arithmetical extension (for each correct machine).

I do agree that Craig should explain his notions of belief and knowledge.


The matter doesn't matter. What matters is that there is always
some matter. I have never seen a simulation run on arithmetic.

Read any (good) textbooks in computer science. Computations have been discovered in arithmetic, or equivalent. See the book of Matiyasevich for a proof than even a very tiny part of arithmetic already emulates all computations. It is standard material.

Which of these do you recommend? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Matiyasevich#Book


That is the way you define "god". That is both an argument from
authority and a straw man.

It is the way god *is* defined, which makes the argument valid
analytical apriori, not from authority.

Of course if you use the term God as presented by those who redefine it for a clear political purpose! Better to use the larger concept introduced by the original founders, or crystalizers, of the notion.

By using the confessional notion of God, you just agree that they continue to have credit on God, like if such fairy tales have not been debunked. You are defending fake theology and pseudo-science, in doing so. And you ask us to accept a new fake theology, with a metaphysical notion of primitive matter, which is already shown meaningless with comp, because we cannot relate consciousness with it.

What about a theology where we are all actually God but have just forgotten that we are?



My point is that that argument requires the meaning of "god" to
change, and, since language us public, you don't get to change it
unilaterally.

Ah! But then why do you keep the definition given by the romans, who changed it unilaterally for what we can understand today was pseudo-political criminal reasons, despite a preceding millennium of fruitful scientific (dialog, critics, modesty) studies of the concept, which indeed has led to current sciences (but not yet current theological studies, except in the dark).

Someone send me recently a PDF of "God and Golem", by Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics/IA. He can be considered as a father of comp, (with many others from different periods, to be sure).

We can get that pdf here <http:luisguillermo.com/diosygolem/god_and_golem_inc.pdf>.


I read it in my youth, and I cite it in "Conscience & Mécanisme" (or elsewhere?), but by rereading it, I realize that it is *very* good, and relevant for the "GOD/mechanism" question. The subtitle of "God and Golem" is "A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion".

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



    Good stuff indeed!

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to