On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > >>>> On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >>>> Comp says that any UM's > >>>> experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right? > > >>> Computaionalism or Bruno's comp? > > >> We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker > >> hypothesis than most forms of CTM, > > > !!!! > > ? > > > > >> given that comp allows the > >> substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion > >> of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are > >> automatically > >> lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level. > > >> Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical. > > > That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not > > one physics for each UTM, > > ? > That's exactly what I am saying above.
No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology than multiple solipsistic physicses. > > and > > there is a physical hardware platform at level 0. > > A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in > physics. Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0. > And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in > fundamental cognitive science. > >> Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with > >> materialism (weak materialism). > > > According to a string of controversial arguments. > > You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7, I never said anything of the kind. > and > when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error, > but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I > asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense. > > > Not according > > to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers > > and brains are > > made of matter. > > Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of > the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate > for marrying GR and QM. Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two very different issues. > It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in > matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA > reasoning. Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Non Patonists are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it as a reductio of Platonism. > They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is > itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated > naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams. Whatever. > Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science. The majority get to define meanings. What they mean by computationalism is 180 degrees aways from what your mean. You should choose another word. > It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define > matter, I think. 1) a little does not equal none 2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be causally connected. 3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la Maudlin. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
