On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Feb 2012, at 09:59, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 20, 6:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 20 Feb 2012, at 05:20, 1Z wrote:
> >>> On Feb 20, 4:10 am, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>> On Feb 19, 10:57 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >>>> Comp says that any UM's
> >>>> experience is indistinguishable from primitive physics, right?
> >>> Computaionalism or Bruno's comp?
> >> We have already discussed this. Comp, as I use it, is a much weaker
> >> hypothesis than most forms of CTM,
> > !!!!
> ?
> >> given that comp allows the
> >> substitution level to be arbitrarily low, and is based on the notion
> >> of generalized brain. So comp's logical consequences are
> >> automatically
> >> lifted on all forms of CTM, which presuppose some high subst. level.
> >> Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical.
> > That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is just physics, not
> > one physics for each UTM,
> ?
> That's exactly what I am saying above.

No it's the opposite. One global physics is a weaker, simpler ontology
than multiple solipsistic physicses.

> > and
> > there is a physical hardware platform at level 0.
> A level 0 that nobody has ever seen, nor even defined or use in
> physics.

Occam;s razor says we should assume what we see is level 0.

> And which comp shows to be the bullet preventing progress in
> fundamental cognitive science.

> >> Computationalism is just epistemologically incompatible with
> >> materialism (weak materialism).
> > According to a string of controversial arguments.
> You have already acknowledge that there is no error in UDA1-7,

I never said anything of the kind.

> and
> when I asked you about the UDA-8 (MGA), you did not mention an error,
> but make a confession of faith in Primitive Matter instead. Then I
> asked you to define it, and I am still waiting for a reply making sense.
> > Not according
> > to computationalists, 99% of whom have have never questioned computers
> > and brains are
> > made of matter.
> Give me definition and proof. Physicists acknowledge the fuzziness of
> the notion of matter, even with the MWI, even more with any candidate
> for marrying GR and QM.

Not being able to define matter and disbelieving in it are two
very different issues.

> It is true that almost all computationalist philosophers believe in
> matter, but they are unaware of both computer science and of the UDA
> reasoning.

Lucky them. The UDA argument rests on Platonism. Non Patonists
are fully entitled to disregard it. Others might wish to treat it
as a reductio of Platonism.

> They are just following Aristotle metaphysics, which is
> itself a regression to the pre-platonist time, which extrapolated
> naturally from our animal sensations and survival programs or engrams.


> Anyway, argument of majority have zero value in science.

The majority get to define meanings. What they mean by
is 180 degrees aways from what your mean. You should choose another

> It will be simpler for you to find a flaw in MGA than trying to define
> matter, I think.

1)  a little does not equal none
2) redefine computation so that comptuational states must be causally
3) Given a choice between materalism and CTM, keep materialism, a la

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