On 21 Feb 2012, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/21/2012 8:16 AM, John Clark wrote:

> it is important to conceive that comp might be false.
Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, and as we can not function unless we assume it's true it would seem pointless to worry about it. I mean it's not as if there were not other important things to think about.

I have the impression that John and Bruno are using two different meanings of "comp".

I agree. I have no clue why and how John Clark relates ~comp with solipsism, notably.

Maybe they could explicate.

OK. Comp is the (theological) doctrine that if my brain is copy at some level of description, and reconstituted with digital devices equivalent with the elementary parts of my brain at that level, then my consciousness still exist and remains unchanged.

It is a strong weakening of CTM, for it does not ask that the elementary parts are the neurons (high level). It might be that the correct level is the strings and branes (low level). Also, the brain might be any portion of the physical universe, observable or not (even the whole physical universe).

Contrarily to what Peter Jones (1Z) asserts frequently, we don't suppose Platonism, nor immateriality, we just suppose that we can use the excluded middle principle for the Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences. Put in another way, we suppose that for all i and j, we have that either phi_i(j) is defined or that it is not defined.



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