On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
the you
before is no more.
That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.
Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.
Disembodied consciousness is silly.
I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment...
Wait, so we actually agree on something?
I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,
though.
without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
something
about disembodiment.
Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.
By the MGA.
But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?
The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
which silicon are observed.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
