On 16 March 2012 05:57, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person are no >> > duplicable from their first person point of view. > > To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you can't > explain to me what's so original about the original, it's not the atoms in > the person's body and it's not the information on how those atoms are > arranged, and you can't clearly explain what's left that could possibly > cause this ENORMOUS subjective difference; whenever you try to justify it > you just wave your hands around and get all vague and mystical on me. I've > got to tell you that mystical does not cut much ice with me, I like clarity > and I'm not impressed with arm waving.
John, your comment above is just more evidence that you are continuing to dispute a straw man of your own devising, not Bruno's actual claim, or its point. What is intended by "the first person are no duplicable from their first person point of view" is just the mundane assumption that any subjective point of view is always limited to that of a single, localised individual. This is very far from being any kind of "mystical" claim - it's just a statement about the limitations of ordinary experience. What makes it relevant in context is its implication for scenarios where a single body could have more than one surviving successor with a claim on the same history. Under such circumstances, since by assumption each successor must be restricted to a single, localised experience, each is forced to concede that he would have been unable to predict with certainty his current individualised situation. As has been mentioned before, a similar assumption is implicitly made use of in the Everett interpretation. That's the whole point of this step in the UDA reasoning. Can we accept it and move on? David > Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> > You learn that you cannot predict your future subjective experience in >> > all circumstances. > > > Yes, but tell me something new that everybody didn't already know. > > >>> >> You say the consciousness or the one view of the two view of the 3 >>> >> view or whatever the hell you call it can not be duplicated, >> >> >> > I say that, yes. > > > It would certainly be nice if you could explain why it can't be duplicated. > > >> > If it was duplicated, then the diary or memory of the subject would >> > mention it. > > > If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't neither > would. > > >> > It is just not understandable that u-you agree with Everett that we >> > don't feel the split/differentiation, > > > Yes. They don't feel the split and their consciousness will not split until > there is something that makes them feel differently, it's not important what > that something is only that they feel differently. Until there is a > difference there are 2 bodies but one consciousness. > >> > and yet disagree with this. > > > I don't know if I disagree or not, it depends on what "this" is. It might > take a little longer to write but I humbly suggest you use fewer pronouns if > you wish to make yourself clear. > > >>> >> you say it can only be associated with one unique chunk of matter (a >>> >> body) >> >> >> > I have never say that. > > > You didn't? Well then destroying the Helsinki man's body is of trivial > importance to the Helsinki man because his consciousness is already > associated with chunks of matter in Washington and Moscow, and it's true, > the Helsinki man does see Washington AND Moscow. > > >> > On the contrary, it will be part of the consequence of comp that this is >> > just impossible. > > > As my symmetrical room thought experiment clearly shows you can associated > many chunks of matter with the same consciousness, but you'd need very > advanced technology to do it, more advanced than we have today, that's why > it all seems odd, not illogical, not inconsistent, just odd > >>> >> They are so identical that even the 2 consciousness's can't tell >>> >> themselves apart, we know this because when we exchange the two bodies >>> >> neither consciousness can tell that anything has happened, so that means >>> >> there are not 2 consciousness's in that symmetrical room but only one, >> >> >> > OK. But then you confirm what I said. You have not duplicated the >> > 1-person. > > > By "duplicated" I mean if you destroy one the thing still remains; your post > is on your computer and mine and is identical on both, it's the same post > because it has been duplicated without error, if I erase it on my computer > your post has not been destroyed because it still exists unharmed on another > machine. Well, bodies have been duplicated in that duplicating chamber so if > I destroyed one body the consciousness or the 1-person (a clunky name for > the same thing) has not been damaged and will not in principle even be > detectable by that consciousness or any other. If you're trying to say that > the duplicating chamber can't duplicate adjectives then I agree, it can't > make 2 reds or 2 bigs, but it can make 2 red cars or 2 big cars or 2 chunks > of matter that behave in a Brunomarchalian way. > > >> > I never localize consciousness. Only persons. > > > So you distinguish between a person and a consciousness, and you seem to be > saying when a human walks into a duplicating chamber a person is duplicated > but not his consciousness so there is still only one consciousness not 2, > but you also seem to say that the copy is not a zombie, therefore the copy > must have the exact same first personal perspective of the original from the > first second third or ANY point of view, therefore to be consistent you must > admit that identity CAN be duplicated and this 1-person 2-person 3-person > distinction is worthless. > >> > it is pretty obvious that person can locate themselves in a local >> > relative way, like saying that yesterday I was in Tokyo, today in I am in >> > Helsinki and tomorrow I will be in Moscow, > > > It's is pretty obvious that person can tell the difference between a > collection of external stimuli given the general name "Moscow" and a > collection of external stimuli given the general name "Washington", although > the source of that sensory information may originate a great distance from > the person's brain. > > >> > it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person are no >> > duplicable from their first person point of view. > > > To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you can't > explain to me what's so original about the original, it's not the atoms in > the person's body and it's not the information on how those atoms are > arranged, and you can't clearly explain what's left that could possibly > cause this ENORMOUS subjective difference; whenever you try to justify it > you just wave your hands around and get all vague and mystical on me. I've > got to tell you that mystical does not cut much ice with me, I like clarity > and I'm not impressed with arm waving. > >>> >> it's [from any point of view from ANY perspective including their >>> own perspective there is no difference between them, even the original and >>> the copy] in my original thought experiment, in other ones other things >>> would happen, but I'm talking about this one and it's not illogical, it's >>> not self contradictory and it doesn't even violate the known laws of >>> physics, to turn my thought experiment into a actual real concrete >>> experiment you'd just need hyper advanced technology, new science is not >>> required. >> >> >> > But step three require the differentiation, > > > Then you're dead in the water, you crashed and burned and we'll never get to > step three. > >> > like Everett requires differentiation. > > > In Everett things don't differentiate until something changes, in my > symmetrical room the two people do not change, they remain identical, they > are so identical even they can't tell themselves apart, or to put it another > way there is only one consciousness. > >> > you cannot use what you say to avoid the uncertainty lived by the guy in >> > Helsinki in the WM duplication. > > > I have no duty to prove the Helsinki guy can avoid uncertainty, but you DO > have a duty to explain a claimed additional uncertainty that is new and is > unlike the uncertainty in physics and arithmetic that was discovered over 80 > years ago. You have not done your duty. > > >> > he believes in comp, so he knows that he will survive. > > > It doesn't matter what he believes it only matters what is true. > > >> > *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one >> > city*. > > > Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has > survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both > cities*. > > >> > if you deny the 1-indeterminacy, > > > I see no difference from this "1-indeterminacy" thing of yours and plain old > fashioned indeterminacy, either way you can't always know what you will see > until you see it and you can't always know what you will do until you do it, > this "1-indeterminacy" brings nothing new to the table. > > >> > you are assuming something very strange and absurd, > > > I am not assuming, I would never dream of assuming something so strange, and > yes it might even be bit absurd too, but that doesn't make it untrue. > > >> > So, do you agree that you will see either Washington or Moscow, when >> > read and cut in Helsinki and pasted at both W and M places? > > > I can not answer yes or no because it isn't clear who "you" is. Use fewer > pronouns! I will say that the Washington man will see Washington only and > the Moscow man will see Moscow only and the Helsinki man will see Washington > AND Moscow. How can I tell if my prediction was correct? Just ask them. Ask > the Washington man if he remembers being the Helsinki man and he will say > yes, ask the Moscow man if he remembers being the Helsinki man and he will > say yes too. Game over as far as I can tell. > > >>> >> you keep asking me "what is the probability that X will see..." but >>> >> you don't seem to feel the need to clearly explain just who "X" is in >>> >> your >>> >> elaborate storylines. >> >> >> > It is the owner of the personal diaries, which by comp, are considered >> > all as being the original person. > > > But there are now 2 identical personal diaries and 2 identical owner's of > them, so the question "what is the probability "he" will see Moscow?" has no > answer because it's not a complete question, it's like asking "how long is a > piece of string?". > >>> >>But no matter how elaborate your scenario if you discount real world >>> >> indeterminacy this "first person determinacy" invention of yours always >>> >> yields probabilities of 0% or 100% ; in other words it's perfectly >>> >> deterministic. >> >> >> > this has already been criticized, > > > Unsuccessfully. > >> > and it contradict the fact that you have agreed that you don't know what >> > you will see when opening the door. > > > That is just run of the mill indeterminacy, you claim to have found > something new. You haven't. And I made no contradiction, what I said was > "the probabilities always reduce to 0% or 100% in all your first person > determinacy stuff, plus regular old indeterminacy of course". Indeterminacy > is always with us but none of your complications add one iota of additional > Indeterminacy, all your pointless elaborations reduce out to probabilities > of 0% or 100%. > >>>> >>> you forget that for Einstein "God does not play dice". >>> >>> >>> >> And it seems that Einstein was wrong about that. >> >> >> >> > So you reject Everett QM? > > > No. > > >> > In the MWI there is no indeterminacy in Reality (Everett's universal >> > wave). > > > I know. I like Everett's theory a lot and hope it is true but the evidence > for it is not exactly overwhelming and wishing does not make it so. Is it > true? I don't know, but even if it is from out point of view there is still > indeterminacy because there is vital information forever denied us. > > >>> >> Considering the existence of Black Holes Stephen Hawking said "God not >>> >> only plays dice but sometimes he throws the dice where they can't be >>> >> seen". >> >> >> > And I think he admitted having been wrong on this, > > > You're right, Hawking once thought that information could be destroyed in a > Black Hole but he recently changed his mind about that. > > >> > like the guy in W will write a true statement= "I am here and now in >> > Washington" in his diary. > > > And the guy in Moscow will write a true statement= "I am here now in Moscow" > in his diary. Those two actions are different, so the two are not each other > but both are the Helsinki man, in one the Helsinki man is in Washington and > so for convenience we now call him the Washington man for short, and the > Helsinki man is in Moscow and so for convenience we now call him the Moscow > man for short. > > >> > You cannot duplicate it because it is a construct of your brain, > > > Then duplicating your brain should do the trick, there are plenty of atoms > around and one is as good as another, you just need information on how to > arrange them. > > >> > in the form of a a feeling of unique relation it has with itself. > > > And duplicate that feeling of being unique should be easy now that we have > a duplicate brain of you. So now we have lots of identical people all > feeling unique, a odd situation certainly but not self contradictory. > >> > if you duplicate the brain, you duplicate that feeling of uniqueness, > > > Exactly. > > >> > so that from the first person view, they have not been duplicated. > > > So you have not been duplicated because you have been duplicated. WHAT?! > > >> > I have no clue why this seems so difficult for you. > > > My difficulty is that you say the copy and the original are not the same > because the duplication process was too good therefore they are different > because they are the same. And my difficulty is that you can't explain > exactly what the one has that the other lacks. > > >> > you continue to oscillate between "trivial-or-already-discovered" and >> > "non-sense-it is 0% or 100%". > > > Yes, and you continue to oscillate between various different types of > errors. > > >> > when I decide the jet for M or for W, would think that the indeterminacy >> > here is just lack of information, and that with enough data on me you can >> > in >> > principle predict where you will wake up. >> That is not the case with the duplication, where no one can assure you >> where you will feel to be. > > > I don't want to mention it because it would strengthen your case and weaken > mine a little, but if I were you right about now I'd make an analogy between > a quantum bit of information, a qbit, and the fact that from the no cloning > theorem we know that although you can teleport a qbit you can not duplicate > it. However I'm not you so I won't mention it. > > >> > When I throw a coin, I expect tail OR head, not tail and head. > > > The person named "I" expects that because "I" has not run across many > duplicating chambers, but if there are 2 I's, as there are in many of these > thought experiments, then although odd it is entirely logical that the > person named "I" will see heads AND tails. > > >> > To make sense of what you are saying, you should say that you die in the >> > process, because the you in Helsinki has died. > > > If someone remembers being the Helsinki man then is makes no sense to say he > is dead, and in this case 2 different people remember being him so in a way > you could almost say the Helsinki man is more alive than ever regardless of > what happened to his Helsinki body. > >> > But then you have to say "no" to step one, and step zero. So you don't >> > believe in comp, > > > I've lost track of what your step one is and I didn't even know there was a > step zero, and I most certainly do believe comp is true. > > >> > Frankly most people get easily the seven first steps. > > > Then most people are far too naive and accept common sense everyday notions > without detailed logical examination, and that is the kiss of death for good > philosophy. > >>> >> you asked me what the probability is that the Helsinki guy, that's the >>> >> guy who gets no tea, will get tea, and I can say without fear of >>> >> contradiction that the probability the guy who gets no tea will get tea >>> >> is >>> >> zero. >> >> >> > But then he died. > > > How in the world does not drinking tea kill you?? I haven't had any tea all > day and I'm not dead, if Many Worlds is correct then there are lots of John > K Clark's who guzzled tea all day long today but that's of no concern of > me, I had no tea and I feel fine. > >>> >> the problem is that before probability can be used it must be clear >>> >> who "I" is, >> >> >> > But that is impossible > > > Then when there are lots of I's running around it is meaningless to ask what > is the probability that "I" will see this or that. > > >> > The "I" is you usual "I". > > > That is just not good enough, not NEARLY good enough! > > >> > I will make you asleep. I will throw a coin. If I get head, I will, >> > while asleep, duplicate you in M and W, where you will slowly wake up in >> > some hostel. If I get tail, I will send you by plane to W, or to M, after >> > sending again a coin. Do you agree that anyone waking up in a hostel, >> > cannot >> > know if I got tail or head after the first throw of the coin? > > > Anyone waking up in a hostel after a coma is not going to know a great many > things, the question is not if there is indeterminacy in your example, there > is as there is in everything, but is it some new type of indeterminacy? No, > it's just run of the mill indeterminacy. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. 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