On 16 Mar 2012, at 07:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/15/2012 10:57 PM, John Clark wrote:
> if you deny the 1-indeterminacy,
I see no difference from this "1-indeterminacy" thing of yours and
plain old fashioned indeterminacy, either way you can't always know
what you will see until you see it and you can't always know what
you will do until you do it, this "1-indeterminacy" brings nothing
new to the table.
And given that you will be duplicated you don't know who you are
talking about when you say "I will see Moscow and I will see
Washington". This formulation relies on the usual situation in
which 'I' refers to a body that has continuity in spacetime and
corollary memories; but this situation doesn't hold, ex hypothesi.
So the new indeterminacy is that there are two bodies that have
equally valid claims to be John Clark. The referent of "John Clark"
I can agree. Still, if we distinguish the 1-John Clarks, from the 3-
John Clarks, we might say that the referent to the 1-John Clark makes
sense, like in "Oh I am the one copied in Moscow".
It is precisely the referent made by the 1-John Clark to the 3-John
Clark which becomes uncertain, and that is indeed the 1-indeterminacy,
which grew along the step of the reasoning.
By moving on the next steps, John will perhaps see the point eventually.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at