Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
You learn that you cannot predict your future subjective
Yes, but tell me something new that everybody didn't already know.
You say the consciousness or the one view of the two view of
view or whatever the hell you call it can not be duplicated,
I say that, yes.
It would certainly be nice if you could explain why it can't be
If it was duplicated, then the diary or memory of the subject would
If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't
It is just not understandable that u-you agree with Everett that we
don't feel the split/differentiation,
Yes. They don't feel the split and their consciousness will not
there is something that makes them feel differently, it's not
that something is only that they feel differently. Until there is a
difference there are 2 bodies but one consciousness.
and yet disagree with this.
I don't know if I disagree or not, it depends on what "this" is. It
take a little longer to write but I humbly suggest you use fewer
you wish to make yourself clear.
you say it can only be associated with one unique chunk of
I have never say that.
You didn't? Well then destroying the Helsinki man's body is of
importance to the Helsinki man because his consciousness is already
associated with chunks of matter in Washington and Moscow, and it's
the Helsinki man does see Washington AND Moscow.
On the contrary, it will be part of the consequence of comp that
As my symmetrical room thought experiment clearly shows you can
many chunks of matter with the same consciousness, but you'd need
advanced technology to do it, more advanced than we have today,
it all seems odd, not illogical, not inconsistent, just odd
They are so identical that even the 2 consciousness's can't tell
themselves apart, we know this because when we exchange the two
neither consciousness can tell that anything has happened, so
there are not 2 consciousness's in that symmetrical room but
OK. But then you confirm what I said. You have not duplicated the
By "duplicated" I mean if you destroy one the thing still remains;
is on your computer and mine and is identical on both, it's the
because it has been duplicated without error, if I erase it on my
your post has not been destroyed because it still exists unharmed
machine. Well, bodies have been duplicated in that duplicating
chamber so if
I destroyed one body the consciousness or the 1-person (a clunky
the same thing) has not been damaged and will not in principle even
detectable by that consciousness or any other. If you're trying to
the duplicating chamber can't duplicate adjectives then I agree, it
make 2 reds or 2 bigs, but it can make 2 red cars or 2 big cars or
of matter that behave in a Brunomarchalian way.
I never localize consciousness. Only persons.
So you distinguish between a person and a consciousness, and you
seem to be
saying when a human walks into a duplicating chamber a person is
but not his consciousness so there is still only one consciousness
but you also seem to say that the copy is not a zombie, therefore
must have the exact same first personal perspective of the original
first second third or ANY point of view, therefore to be consistent
admit that identity CAN be duplicated and this 1-person 2-person 3-
distinction is worthless.
it is pretty obvious that person can locate themselves in a local
relative way, like saying that yesterday I was in Tokyo, today in
I am in
Helsinki and tomorrow I will be in Moscow,
It's is pretty obvious that person can tell the difference between a
collection of external stimuli given the general name "Moscow" and a
collection of external stimuli given the general name "Washington",
the source of that sensory information may originate a great
the person's brain.
it is obvious that you have seen the point that the first person
duplicable from their first person point of view.
To me that is about as far from "obvious" as you can get! And you
explain to me what's so original about the original, it's not the
the person's body and it's not the information on how those atoms are
arranged, and you can't clearly explain what's left that could
cause this ENORMOUS subjective difference; whenever you try to
you just wave your hands around and get all vague and mystical on
got to tell you that mystical does not cut much ice with me, I like
and I'm not impressed with arm waving.
>> it's [from any point of view from ANY perspective including
own perspective there is no difference between them, even the
the copy] in my original thought experiment, in other ones other
would happen, but I'm talking about this one and it's not
not self contradictory and it doesn't even violate the known laws
physics, to turn my thought experiment into a actual real concrete
experiment you'd just need hyper advanced technology, new science
But step three require the differentiation,
Then you're dead in the water, you crashed and burned and we'll
never get to
like Everett requires differentiation.
In Everett things don't differentiate until something changes, in my
symmetrical room the two people do not change, they remain
are so identical even they can't tell themselves apart, or to put
way there is only one consciousness.
you cannot use what you say to avoid the uncertainty lived by the
Helsinki in the WM duplication.
I have no duty to prove the Helsinki guy can avoid uncertainty, but
have a duty to explain a claimed additional uncertainty that is new
unlike the uncertainty in physics and arithmetic that was
discovered over 80
years ago. You have not done your duty.
he believes in comp, so he knows that he will survive.
It doesn't matter what he believes it only matters what is true.
*in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only
Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel
survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now
if you deny the 1-indeterminacy,
I see no difference from this "1-indeterminacy" thing of yours and
fashioned indeterminacy, either way you can't always know what you
until you see it and you can't always know what you will do until
you do it,
this "1-indeterminacy" brings nothing new to the table.
you are assuming something very strange and absurd,
I am not assuming, I would never dream of assuming something so
yes it might even be bit absurd too, but that doesn't make it untrue.
So, do you agree that you will see either Washington or Moscow,
read and cut in Helsinki and pasted at both W and M places?
I can not answer yes or no because it isn't clear who "you" is. Use
pronouns! I will say that the Washington man will see Washington
the Moscow man will see Moscow only and the Helsinki man will see
AND Moscow. How can I tell if my prediction was correct? Just ask
the Washington man if he remembers being the Helsinki man and he
yes, ask the Moscow man if he remembers being the Helsinki man and
say yes too. Game over as far as I can tell.
you keep asking me "what is the probability that X will see..."
you don't seem to feel the need to clearly explain just who "X"
is in your
It is the owner of the personal diaries, which by comp, are
all as being the original person.
But there are now 2 identical personal diaries and 2 identical
them, so the question "what is the probability "he" will see
Moscow?" has no
answer because it's not a complete question, it's like asking "how
long is a
piece of string?".
But no matter how elaborate your scenario if you discount real
indeterminacy this "first person determinacy" invention of
yields probabilities of 0% or 100% ; in other words it's
this has already been criticized,
and it contradict the fact that you have agreed that you don't
you will see when opening the door.
That is just run of the mill indeterminacy, you claim to have found
something new. You haven't. And I made no contradiction, what I
"the probabilities always reduce to 0% or 100% in all your first
determinacy stuff, plus regular old indeterminacy of course".
is always with us but none of your complications add one iota of
Indeterminacy, all your pointless elaborations reduce out to
of 0% or 100%.
you forget that for Einstein "God does not play dice".
And it seems that Einstein was wrong about that.
So you reject Everett QM?
In the MWI there is no indeterminacy in Reality (Everett's
I know. I like Everett's theory a lot and hope it is true but the
for it is not exactly overwhelming and wishing does not make it so.
true? I don't know, but even if it is from out point of view there
indeterminacy because there is vital information forever denied us.
Considering the existence of Black Holes Stephen Hawking said
only plays dice but sometimes he throws the dice where they
can't be seen".
And I think he admitted having been wrong on this,
You're right, Hawking once thought that information could be
destroyed in a
Black Hole but he recently changed his mind about that.
like the guy in W will write a true statement= "I am here and now
Washington" in his diary.
And the guy in Moscow will write a true statement= "I am here now
in his diary. Those two actions are different, so the two are not
but both are the Helsinki man, in one the Helsinki man is in
so for convenience we now call him the Washington man for short,
Helsinki man is in Moscow and so for convenience we now call him
man for short.
You cannot duplicate it because it is a construct of your brain,
Then duplicating your brain should do the trick, there are plenty
around and one is as good as another, you just need information on
in the form of a a feeling of unique relation it has with itself.
And duplicate that feeling of being unique should be easy now that
a duplicate brain of you. So now we have lots of identical people all
feeling unique, a odd situation certainly but not self contradictory.
if you duplicate the brain, you duplicate that feeling of
so that from the first person view, they have not been duplicated.
So you have not been duplicated because you have been duplicated.
I have no clue why this seems so difficult for you.
My difficulty is that you say the copy and the original are not the
because the duplication process was too good therefore they are
because they are the same. And my difficulty is that you can't
exactly what the one has that the other lacks.
you continue to oscillate between "trivial-or-already-discovered"
"non-sense-it is 0% or 100%".
Yes, and you continue to oscillate between various different types of
when I decide the jet for M or for W, would think that the
here is just lack of information, and that with enough data on me
you can in
That is not the case with the duplication, where no one can assure
principle predict where you will wake up.
where you will feel to be.
I don't want to mention it because it would strengthen your case
mine a little, but if I were you right about now I'd make an
a quantum bit of information, a qbit, and the fact that from the no
theorem we know that although you can teleport a qbit you can not
it. However I'm not you so I won't mention it.
When I throw a coin, I expect tail OR head, not tail and head.
The person named "I" expects that because "I" has not run across many
duplicating chambers, but if there are 2 I's, as there are in many
thought experiments, then although odd it is entirely logical that
person named "I" will see heads AND tails.
To make sense of what you are saying, you should say that you die
process, because the you in Helsinki has died.
If someone remembers being the Helsinki man then is makes no sense
to say he
is dead, and in this case 2 different people remember being him so
in a way
you could almost say the Helsinki man is more alive than ever
what happened to his Helsinki body.
But then you have to say "no" to step one, and step zero. So you
believe in comp,
I've lost track of what your step one is and I didn't even know
there was a
step zero, and I most certainly do believe comp is true.
Frankly most people get easily the seven first steps.
Then most people are far too naive and accept common sense everyday
without detailed logical examination, and that is the kiss of death
you asked me what the probability is that the Helsinki guy,
guy who gets no tea, will get tea, and I can say without fear of
contradiction that the probability the guy who gets no tea will
get tea is
But then he died.
How in the world does not drinking tea kill you?? I haven't had any
day and I'm not dead, if Many Worlds is correct then there are lots
K Clark's who guzzled tea all day long today but that's of no
me, I had no tea and I feel fine.
the problem is that before probability can be used it must be
who "I" is,
But that is impossible
Then when there are lots of I's running around it is meaningless to
is the probability that "I" will see this or that.
The "I" is you usual "I".
That is just not good enough, not NEARLY good enough!
I will make you asleep. I will throw a coin. If I get head, I will,
while asleep, duplicate you in M and W, where you will slowly
wake up in
some hostel. If I get tail, I will send you by plane to W, or to
sending again a coin. Do you agree that anyone waking up in a
know if I got tail or head after the first throw of the coin?
Anyone waking up in a hostel after a coma is not going to know a
things, the question is not if there is indeterminacy in your
is as there is in everything, but is it some new type of
it's just run of the mill indeterminacy.
John K Clark
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