On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote:
But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than
of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components
(e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings. So the
inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply you
can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.
for
example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
was blind.
There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind but behaved
normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's impossible.
If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
zombies.
Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of light? We
don't behave as if we can see it.
Brent
If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.
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