On 05.04.2012 21:39 David Nyman said the following:
On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>  wrote:

Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.

Sure, if it is there, it could indeed be advantageous, if not
indispensable.  But such notions of course do not avoid the Hard
Problem.  Many independent considerations converge to suggest that -
as it bears on macroscopic physical evolution - consciousness in the
Hard sense will always be externally indistinguishable from
sufficiently intelligent behaviour, as Brent argues.  The problem with
"display" ideas about consciousness (compare, for example, Johnjoe
McFadden's EM theory) is that they must, in the end, be fully
justified in impersonal terms, and hence once again appeals to the
additional hypothesis of consciousness, at the relevant level of
description, will be redundant.

I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.  It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
  But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives, but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).


Gray's book is not a theory of consciousness, this is rather an empirical research with an outcome that the modern science cannot explain observation in that research. Gray also confesses that

“There are no behavioral tests by which we can distinguish whether a computer, a robot or a Martian possesses qualia.”

At the same time, he shows how to bring consciousness into the lab:

“These experiments demonstrate yet again, by the way, that the ‘privacy’ of conscious experience offers no barrier to good science. Synaesthetes claim a form of experience that is, from the point of view of most people, idiosyncratic in the extreme. Yet it can be successfully brought into the laboratory.”


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