On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:

> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.

Sure, if it is there, it could indeed be advantageous, if not
indispensable.  But such notions of course do not avoid the Hard
Problem.  Many independent considerations converge to suggest that -
as it bears on macroscopic physical evolution - consciousness in the
Hard sense will always be externally indistinguishable from
sufficiently intelligent behaviour, as Brent argues.  The problem with
"display" ideas about consciousness (compare, for example, Johnjoe
McFadden's EM theory) is that they must, in the end, be fully
justified in impersonal terms, and hence once again appeals to the
additional hypothesis of consciousness, at the relevant level of
description, will be redundant.

I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.  It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
 But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives, but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).

David

> On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
>
>> On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>  wrote:
>>
>>>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>>>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>>>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>>>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>>>> of consciousness.
>>>>
>>>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical
>>> studies.
>>> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy
>>> philosophers,
>>> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
>>
>>
>> I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
>> nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
>> physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
>> pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
>> assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
>> complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
>> without reference to any putative conscious states
>>
>> The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
>> actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
>> our theories of how things are.  Hence, in the case that either option
>> a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
>> neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
>> the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.
>>
>> David
>
>
> In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In his
> book, Jeffery Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be explained by
> the current science. According to him, a new science is required.
>
> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.
>
>
> Evgenii
>
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