2012/4/8 meekerdb <[email protected]> > On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb<[email protected]> wrote: >> >> But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to >>> find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some >>> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any >>> physical >>> cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find >>> that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed >>> understanding >>> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a >>> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie >>> probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly >>> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the >>> difference >>> was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for >>> example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with >>> colors - >>> but this would show up in the zombies actions too. >>> >> It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it >> isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached >> analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components >> would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it >> would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie; >> > > That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of > components rather than of their functional organization. There can > obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons) > which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.
I could only say you're right and you're wrong. Consciousness and being is "lived" as a whole. From your own POV, you can't say "zombieness is an attribute of components rather than of their functional organization", because you feel it. Whenever you say such thing, you can't be honest with yourself... that's not an argument. It's just proper English > So the inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie > components doesn't imply you can make a zombie, partial or otherwise. > > > for >> example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it >> was blind. >> > > There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind > but behaved normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's > impossible. > > > If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial >> zombies. >> > > Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of > light? We don't behave as if we can see it. > > Brent > > > If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental >> distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know >> if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies >> are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence, >> either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible. >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
