On Apr 25, 1:02 pm, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 21, 2012 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I see clearly that causality arises out of feeling
> That's a rather odd way of looking at it, but if so then you can clearly
> see that when billiard ball X hits ball Y ball X has a sudden change in
> feeling and decides to stop while ball Y feels like moving and does so;
> what arises from all this we call "causality". I would use different words
> but if that helps you to see clearly so be it.

Yes, although I think that what 'feels' and 'decides' is not the ball
of X, but the interior experience of X. X itself is the symmetry or
sense which separates the object-energy-space topology from the
subject-motive-time topology. What appears as causality from the
outside in seems like choice from the inside out. Neither are correct
or incorrect, but rather are a consequence of the perspective. Without
participation, there is no causality. Without causality there is
nothing to participate in.

Of course, if we are talking about billiard balls, we have no idea
what the subjective experience is like. It could be an experience that
only happens when something important happens to the ball, and only
for a second. It could be a generalized experience of all similar
inorganic materials everywhere in the universe. My guess is that it is
very far removed from the kinds of experiences human beings could
relate to. The sounds and sights of billiard balls are our only clues
but such clues aren't very helpful when it comes to brains.

> > and free will.
> Yes, noise can cause things to happen and deterministic events can cause
> all sorts of noises, including the "free will" noise.

I don't understand how you won't see that would mean that your opinion
about free will is also noise? Without free will, arguing with you
would be like arguing with someone about what color their own eyes
seem to them. If there is no choosing what you believe, then what
could possibly be the point of 'debating' anything?

> >What could make a brain state cause a feeling?
> Brains are in the state they are in because of causality, if you can "see
> clearly that causality arises out of feeling" then I don't see your
> problem. If billiard balls can have feelings why not brain states?

Because a billiard ball is an actual thing and a brain state is an
abstract idea about patterns we detect in the brain. The brain is the
spacetime-matter-energy container of X, the person is the timespace-
sense-motive experience of X. Neither one causes the other, they are
both symmetric expressions of X. We can only be on the inside of X, so
our own experience ranges from free will to automatism and our
experience of the outside of X ranges from determinism to randomness.

> > You are the only one defining free will in terms of an absence of
> > causality.
> There are after all only 2 alternatives, the absence of causality or its
> presents, you can be a Cuckoo Clock or a Roulette Wheel, take your pick.

The whole idea of 'picking' clearly, obviously, relies on a third
alternative of intentional choice. Does a Cuckoo Clock pick? Does a
Roulette Wheel? Which one reasons and has a preference?

> > > you are required to demonstrate that logic somehow applies to feeling,
> > which it doesn't.
> It most certainly does! I use logic to deduce that if I throw a baseball at
> your head your feelings will change, if we actually perform this experiment
> I would bet money my deduction will prove to be correct.

I'm talking about the existence of feeling as a phenomenon in the
universe. It makes no sense logically.

>  >You can have data compression and caching without inventing poetry.
> But poetry can be cached, and it can be compressed too just like any other
> form of information, except white noise.

Sure, but it doesn't need to exist in the first place. You can't
justify the existence of poetry by information theory alone.

> > It is a standard use of language to say that people are responsible in
> > varying degrees for their actions.
> People are always responsible for their actions.

Why would they be? Are cuckoo clocks or roulette wheels responsible
for their actions?

> > When we talk about someone being guilty of a crime, that quality of guilt
> > makes no sense in terms of being passively caused or randomly uncaused.
> It makes all the sense in the world provided you stop and ask yourself,
> what is the purpose for punishing anybody for anything? The answer is to
> stop them from doing similar things in the future and as a deterrent to
> stop others from committing crimes of that sort.

It can't be a deterrent to anyone if nobody has the free will to
control their own behavior.

> > I don't find it mysterious at all that consciousness could come from
> > configurations
> > of objects, I find it impossible,
> Impossible or not the rock solid FACT remains that changes in the
> configurations of objects (like atoms or molecules or cells or baseballs or
> brains) changes consciousness and changes in consciousness can change
> objects (such as what happens to billiard balls in every game ever played).

Of course matter and mind can change each other. That doesn't mean
that mind is a product of matter. The TV show isn't a product of the
TV set.

> So apparently the Universe does not care if Craig Weinberg believes
> something is possible or impossible.

I am the universe. Whatever I believe is what the universe believes
local to me.

> > as do most people.
> And it is well known that the naive philosophical beliefs of most people
> are always correct.

Have sophisticated theories of established authorities fared much
better in history?


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