On 26 Apr 2012, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 25, 11:44 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

This means only that you have a reductionist conception of machine.

I think that reductionism is mechanistic by definition.

I guess you mean mechanism is reductionist by definition. But that is the old pregodelian conception of mechanism. Today we know more. we know that we can only scratch the surface of the machine's possibilities. And if we assume mechanism, we know, for all machine looking inward can know (bt not necessarily) that she can only scratch the subject.


What does it mean to behave like a machine or to be robotic? Why
should it mean that? This doesn't prove that all machines must all
behave like early machines that we have manufactured thus far, but I
think that taken with the other clues that we have about
inauthenticity in digital simulation, trouble with speech synthesis
and emotion with AI, symbol grounding problem, etc.. I think there is
a clear basis to presume that in fact there is something fundamentally
different about assembled machines and autopoietic living organisms
which may in fact limit their potential.


Then you have to find something non-Turing emulable, and non "first person indeterminacy Turing recoverable" in Nature. But you might also have to explain why such feature would be better to explain emotion, speech, etc. It really looks like explaining the difficult by adding more difficulties.

What you take as evidence is what the theory already explain. The theory of machine (computer science) already explain why a machine cannot feel to be machine, and indeed cannot even know which machines she is.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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