David, IZ, Brent:
do you have some fairly acceptable (for whom?) ID about that darn 'vita'?
That would ease the problem to accept or reject EV. Some people 'ride' the
Terrestrial Biosphere churning of C-based molecules (some add: M&R =
metabolism and repair) but there may be more to it. And if there IS more to
it, there may be special circumstances (even qualia?) to get *into* it
(EV?)
It does not hurt if one is clear about the topic. Semantics is a big trap.
JM

On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 8:26 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> On 27 April 2012 21:16, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > And the EV is supposed to be analgous to qualia? But that paralell
> > doens;t work. The EV is dismissable
> > because there was never prima facie evidence for it.
> >
> >
> > Then why was it widely believed to exist?...because somethings were alive
> > and other seemingly identical things weren't.
>
> Peter and I are of course making the same point.  I agree that, at the
> outset, "life" and "consciousness" display an appealing explanatory
> symmetry, in that we can seek an reductive account of both in terms of
> constituent processes.  But that apparent symmetry fractures on closer
> analysis.  The more that putatively "conscious processes" can be shown
> to be so reducible, the more this highlights the explanatory
> redundancy of the entire class of first-person phenomena.  In the case
> of "life", it is surely obvious that we need anticipate no conceptual
> residue after explanatory reduction. But the troublesome resistance of
> first-personal phenomena to such reductive elimination is equally
> manifest to all who can suppress the urge to bolt for the denialist
> exit.
>
> Precisely because this point is indeed so obvious, and because I've
> never felt that you are personally of the eliminativist persuasion, I
> fail to understand why you persist in presenting the putative
> equivalence of these two concepts as though it were unproblematic.
> I'm puzzled as to exactly what is your point.  Is it your hope that a
> sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the physical correlates of
> conscious behaviour will somehow dissolve the presently intractable
> distinction between third and first-personal accounts of consciousness
> in some conceptually utterly novel way?  Or do you anticipate that we
> might just settle for a sufficiently rich articulation of "conscious
> behaviours" as a closing of the conceptual account?
>
> David
>
> > On 4/27/2012 12:00 PM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > On Apr 27, 7:13 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >   We never explained where the elan vital was or where it came
> >
> > from.  We just came up with a different kind of 'explanation'.
> >
> > And the EV is supposed to be analgous to qualia? But that paralell
> > doens;t work. The EV is dismissable
> > because there was never prima facie evidence for it.
> >
> >
> > Then why was it widely believed to exist?...because somethings were alive
> > and other seemingly identical things weren't.
> >
> >
> > However, qualia
> > are prima facie evidence for everything
> > else. I can;t just pretend that my pains don't hurt, etc.
> >
> >
> > We don't pretend things aren't alive either.
> >
> > Brent
> >
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