On 6/22/2012 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jun 2012, at 21:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

What does first person indeterminacy show other than the independence of the process that generates the 1p from any particular case of physical system?

You don't need 1p-indeterminacy for this. The independance requires only that if a brain support consciousness in a particular computation not using neuron 323, and if physical supervenience is true, then consciousness can be said to be supported by the same brain, doing the same computation with the neuron 323 being eliminated. Do you agree with this?

It is a known fact that the brain is a "connection" machine. We do not fully understand how it works and many people are only assuming (based on a cartoon of a proof by Tegmark) that it is just a classical machine. If there is any dependence on quantum entanglement at all involved in the "generation" of the physical correlate of consciousness then the elimination of neural 323 will make a difference. We simply are entertaining conjectures at this point with COMP.

I cannot comprehend how you minimize the role of the physical in computations to the point of irrelevance and ignore the consequences of this. I see your result as an important part of the overall advancement of our understanding of consciousness, but I simply do not see the idea that Integers and arithmetic (assuming a particular set of axioms) is primitive ontologically. I suspect that we will merely have to agree to disagree on this.



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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