On 19 Jun 2012, at 08:01, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/18/2012 5:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Brent, Stephen, On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduceda separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below mysubstitution level get stable and persistent by the statisticalinterference between the infinitely many computations leading tomy first person actual state.How does on computation interfere with another? and how does thatdefine a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreementwith other streams of thought?BrentThey interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy onUD* (or arithmetic).Hi Bruno,You seem to have an exact metric for this "measure" of "thefirst person indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic)".

`Not at all. I only reduce the mind-body problem (including the body`

`problem) into the problem of finding that metric. UDA must be seen as`

`a proof of existence of that "metric" from the comp hypothesis. Then`

`AUDA gives the logic of observable which is a step toward that metric`

`isolation.`

What I need to understand is the reasoning behind your choice of settheory and arithmetic axioms;

`I don't use set theory. Only elementary arithmetic. At the ontological`

`level.`

`At the meta-level I use all the math I need, like any scientist in any`

`part of science.`

after all there are many mutually-exclusive and yet self-consistentchoices that can be made. Do you see a 1p feature that would allowyou to known that preference is not biased?

`As I said, I use arithmetic because natiural numbers are taught in`

`high school, but any (Turing) universal will do. the point is that`

`neither the laws of consciousness, nor the laws of matter depend on`

`the choice of the basic initial system, so I use the one that`

`everybody knows. Sometimes I use the combinators or the lambda`

`algebra. I don't use geometrical or physical system because that would`

`be both a treachery, in our setting, and it would also be confusing`

`for the complete derivation of the physical laws.`

And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream ofthought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.If it does not have "subjective argeement" with other mutuallyexclusive then there would be a big problem. No?

`No. It would be a refutation of comp+classical theory of knowledge (by`

`UDA). That would be a formidable result.`

`But the evidences available now, is that the physics derived from`

`arithmetic, through comp+ usual definition of knowledge, is similar to`

`the empirical physics (AUDA).`

Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same questionhere that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly howdo computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each otherwithin an immaterialist scheme?By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computerscience in arithmetic.What "part" is not embedded?

`The non elementary, second order, or analytical part. It is not`

`embedded in the number relations, but it appears in the mind of the`

`universal numbers as tool to accelerate the self-study. It is`

`epistemological.`

There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more onthis on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, youget them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with thenotion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relationimplements all the possible relations between all possibleuniversal machine.Universality (of computations) requires the existence of anequivalence class (modulo diffeomorphisms) of physical systems overwhich that computation is functionally equivalent. No?

?

If not, how is universality defined? Over a purely abstract set?What defines the axioms for that set?

`You don't need set. You can define "universal" in arithmetic. I am`

`starting an explanation of this on the FOAR list.`

You have to study the detail of GĂ¶del's proof, or study Kleene'spredicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For thenon materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, theproblem is not having too much of them.Correct! You get an infinite regress of "interactions"! Way toomany! In fact, I bet that you get at least a aleph_1 cardinalinfinity. But what about the continuum hypothesis? Do you take it astrue or false in your sets?

I don't care at all.

If you take it as false then you obtain a very interesting thing inthe number theory; it looks like all arithmetics are non-standard insome infinite limit! You have to have a means to necessitate a limitto finite sets. The requirement of Boolean satisfyability exactlygives us this "rule".

? (unclear).

Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not asolution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmeticalquantization to test test the quantum tautologies.We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantumcomputer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside allcomputations.What physical experiment will measure this effect?

`Well, here the physical events is the discovery of quantum`

`computations in nature. That is what remain to be seen in the`

`arithmetical physics. But we have already the quantization and a`

`quantum logic.`

If there is no physical effect correlated with the difference, thenthis idea is literally a figment of someone's imagination andnothing more. The physical implementation of a quantum computer is aphysical event. I thought that your idea that computations areindependent of all physicality was completely and causallyindependent from such. =-OMy argument is that a computational simulation is nothing morethan "vaporware" (a figment of someone's imagination) until andunless there exists a plenum of physical systems that all canimplement the "best possible version" of that simulation.

`Arithmetic implements all computations already. And UDA explain that`

`the physical emerges from that, and evidence are that the comp`

`arithmetical physics can implement the quantum computations. They are`

`just not primitive.`

When we recall that Wolfram defines the "real thing" as the "bestpossible simulation, we reach a conclusion. This "plenum" is thetrace or action (???I am not sure???) of (on?) an equivalence classof spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under someordering*. I am not certain of the wording of the first part ofthis, but I am absolutely certain of the latter part, "anequivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *otherunder some ordering*" I am unassailably certain of.

Wolfralm is unaware of consciousness and first person indeterminacy. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.