On 19 Jun 2012, at 08:01, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/18/2012 5:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced
a separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my
substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical
interference between the infinitely many computations leading to
my first person actual state.
How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that
define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement
with other streams of thought?
They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on
UD* (or arithmetic).
You seem to have an exact metric for this "measure" of "the
first person indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic)".
Not at all. I only reduce the mind-body problem (including the body
problem) into the problem of finding that metric. UDA must be seen as
a proof of existence of that "metric" from the comp hypothesis. Then
AUDA gives the logic of observable which is a step toward that metric
What I need to understand is the reasoning behind your choice of set
theory and arithmetic axioms;
I don't use set theory. Only elementary arithmetic. At the ontological
At the meta-level I use all the math I need, like any scientist in any
part of science.
after all there are many mutually-exclusive and yet self-consistent
choices that can be made. Do you see a 1p feature that would allow
you to known that preference is not biased?
As I said, I use arithmetic because natiural numbers are taught in
high school, but any (Turing) universal will do. the point is that
neither the laws of consciousness, nor the laws of matter depend on
the choice of the basic initial system, so I use the one that
everybody knows. Sometimes I use the combinators or the lambda
algebra. I don't use geometrical or physical system because that would
be both a treachery, in our setting, and it would also be confusing
for the complete derivation of the physical laws.
And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of
thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.
If it does not have "subjective argeement" with other mutually
exclusive then there would be a big problem. No?
No. It would be a refutation of comp+classical theory of knowledge (by
UDA). That would be a formidable result.
But the evidences available now, is that the physics derived from
arithmetic, through comp+ usual definition of knowledge, is similar to
the empirical physics (AUDA).
Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question
here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how
do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other
within an immaterialist scheme?
By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer
science in arithmetic.
What "part" is not embedded?
The non elementary, second order, or analytical part. It is not
embedded in the number relations, but it appears in the mind of the
universal numbers as tool to accelerate the self-study. It is
There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on
this on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you
get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with the
notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relation
implements all the possible relations between all possible
Universality (of computations) requires the existence of an
equivalence class (modulo diffeomorphisms) of physical systems over
which that computation is functionally equivalent. No?
If not, how is universality defined? Over a purely abstract set?
What defines the axioms for that set?
You don't need set. You can define "universal" in arithmetic. I am
starting an explanation of this on the FOAR list.
You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's
predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For the
non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the
problem is not having too much of them.
Correct! You get an infinite regress of "interactions"! Way too
many! In fact, I bet that you get at least a aleph_1 cardinal
infinity. But what about the continuum hypothesis? Do you take it as
true or false in your sets?
I don't care at all.
If you take it as false then you obtain a very interesting thing in
the number theory; it looks like all arithmetics are non-standard in
some infinite limit! You have to have a means to necessitate a limit
to finite sets. The requirement of Boolean satisfyability exactly
gives us this "rule".
Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a
solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical
quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.
We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum
computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all
What physical experiment will measure this effect?
Well, here the physical events is the discovery of quantum
computations in nature. That is what remain to be seen in the
arithmetical physics. But we have already the quantization and a
If there is no physical effect correlated with the difference, then
this idea is literally a figment of someone's imagination and
nothing more. The physical implementation of a quantum computer is a
physical event. I thought that your idea that computations are
independent of all physicality was completely and causally
independent from such. =-O
My argument is that a computational simulation is nothing more
than "vaporware" (a figment of someone's imagination) until and
unless there exists a plenum of physical systems that all can
implement the "best possible version" of that simulation.
Arithmetic implements all computations already. And UDA explain that
the physical emerges from that, and evidence are that the comp
arithmetical physics can implement the quantum computations. They are
just not primitive.
When we recall that Wolfram defines the "real thing" as the "best
possible simulation, we reach a conclusion. This "plenum" is the
trace or action (???I am not sure???) of (on?) an equivalence class
of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under some
ordering*. I am not certain of the wording of the first part of
this, but I am absolutely certain of the latter part, "an
equivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other
under some ordering*" I am unassailably certain of.
Wolfralm is unaware of consciousness and first person indeterminacy.
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