On 19 Jun 2012, at 17:00, meekerdb wrote:

## Advertising

On 6/19/2012 12:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 19 Jun 2012, at 00:08, meekerdb wrote:On 6/18/2012 2:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Brent, Stephen, On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable,introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "notme" below my substitution level get stable and persistent bythe statistical interference between the infinitely manycomputations leading to my first person actual state.How does on computation interfere with another? and how doesthat define a conscious stream of thought that is subjectiveagreement with other streams of thought?BrentThey interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy onUD* (or arithmetic).That still seems very vague. I can suppose that many computationsgo thru the same or similar sequences which later branch and sohave indeterminant futures. But is that 'interference'?Sure. Of course a priori it is not wave like, for the probabilitiesadd only, untilm you take the self-reference constraint intoaccount, which leads to the arithmetical quantization, whichimposes a quantum logic on the consistent extensions.To quick for me. Is this spelled out somewhere.

`In most of my papers. I think I describe the quantization in sane04.`

`You have to study a bit of mathematical logic. The quantization of p`

`is given mainly by [] <> p, with the [] p = Bp & Dt, and B Gödel's`

`provability predicate. You have to restrict p to the sigma_1`

`propositions. We can come back on this.`

And why should it produce any "me", "not me" boundary?It does not. "personal identity" is an illusion due to disconnectedmemories,But they are not 'disconnected'. It's their connectedness that isessential to the 'illusion'.

I was talking about the memories of different individuals.

and correct self-reference. The me/not me is just explained by thediagonalisation: if Dx gives xx, DD gives DD.Again, does not explain it to me.

`It makes possible to have program defined in term of their own code.`

`It solves the conceptual difficulties described by Descartes and`

`Driesch about life. I used it to implement "planarias" (self-`

`regenerating programs, or collection of programs). It explains self-`

`reference at least in the technical sense that it provides the tools`

`to handle self-reproduction, and self-reference. It is *the* tool in`

`proving the arithmetical completeness of the logic of self-reference G`

`and G*. It gives a precise mathematical notion of self, defined`

`relatively to a universal number/machine/probable-neighboor.`

`You can use it to show that there is no possible algorithm for the`

`stopping problem. Just define the following "duplicator D"`

Dx = if stop(xx) then continue, else stop. Then "stop" fails on DD: DD = if stop(DD) then continue, else stop.

`I can give a more formal view with the phi_i, or with the W_i, but the`

`basic idea is very simple. It starts the whole subject on`

`(arithmetical) self-reference.`

A good introductory paper is

`SMORYNSKI, C., 1981, Fifty Years of Self-Reference in Arithmetic,`

`Notre Dame Journal`

of Formal Logic, Vol. 22, n° 4, pp. 357-374. Bruno

And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream ofthought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same questionhere that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactlyhow do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon eachother within an immaterialist scheme?By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computerscience in arithmetic.There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more onthis on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system,you get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of causewith the notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existingnumber relation implements all the possible relations between allpossible universal machine.You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene'spredicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. Forthe non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, theproblem is not having too much of them.Exactly. It's the problem of having proved too much. To say allcomputations can exist and if consciousness is computation thenall conscious thoughts will exist is true but meaningless - liketautologies are.It is not tautological because we can test if there are too muchcomputations and if they obey quantum logic or not, so it iscertainly not tautological. You forget that the laws of physics aregiven by the statistics on those computations.BrunoBrentKeep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not asolution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmeticalquantization to test test the quantum tautologies.We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantumcomputer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside allcomputations.BrunoMight it be that 'subjective agreement" between streams ofthought is just another form of what computer science denotes asbisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic versionof it)?--Onward! Stephenhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.