On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Jun 2012, at 19:35, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 17, 2012 at Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

    > We can perhaps agree that consciousness-here-and-now is the
    only truth we know which seems undoubtable, so it might be more
    easy to explain the illusion of matter to consciousness than the
    illusion of consciousness to a piece of matter.

If consciousness is more fundamental than matter then it's difficult to explain why it's easy to find examples of matter without consciousness but nobody has yet found a single example of consciousness without matter.

This is debatable. nobody has found, nor can found, example of primitive matter. It is a metaphysical hypothesis brought by Aristotle (and of course it is a popular extrapolation among animals)

And almost all numbers have not been found.

  Hi Brent,

Umm, almost none? Could you point to a single report of an instance of a number being found and not just a representation of a number? It has never happend! All we think we know about numbers is strictly taken from our ability to understand the significance of representations of numbers. For example, this 5 is not really a number; it is a symbolic representation defined in terms of a pattern of pixels on your computer's monitor or other output. It is not actually a number!

Now, it is easy, when assuming comp, to have example of consciousnes without *primitive* matter, like all experiences emerging from the arithmetical computations.

Yeah yeah I know, it's all just a illusion, but why only that illusion? Why is the "illusion" always that matter effects consciousness and consciousness effects matter if one is more fundamental than the other?

Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my first person actual state.

How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought?


Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other within an immaterialist scheme? Might it be that 'subjective agreement" between streams of thought is just another form of what computer science denotes as bisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic version of it)?



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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