On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jun 2012, at 19:35, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jun 17, 2012 at Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
> We can perhaps agree that consciousness-here-and-now is the
only truth we know which seems undoubtable, so it might be more
easy to explain the illusion of matter to consciousness than the
illusion of consciousness to a piece of matter.
If consciousness is more fundamental than matter then it's difficult
to explain why it's easy to find examples of matter without
consciousness but nobody has yet found a single example of
consciousness without matter.
This is debatable. nobody has found, nor can found, example of
primitive matter. It is a metaphysical hypothesis brought by
Aristotle (and of course it is a popular extrapolation among animals)
And almost all numbers have not been found.
Umm, almost none? Could you point to a single report of an instance
of a number being found and not just a representation of a number? It
has never happend! All we think we know about numbers is strictly taken
from our ability to understand the significance of representations of
numbers. For example, this 5 is not really a number; it is a symbolic
representation defined in terms of a pattern of pixels on your
computer's monitor or other output. It is not actually a number!
Now, it is easy, when assuming comp, to have example of consciousnes
without *primitive* matter, like all experiences emerging from the
Yeah yeah I know, it's all just a illusion, but why only that
illusion? Why is the "illusion" always that matter effects
consciousness and consciousness effects matter if one is more
fundamental than the other?
Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a
separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my
substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical
interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my
first person actual state.
How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that
define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with
other streams of thought?
Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question here
that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how do
computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other within an
immaterialist scheme? Might it be that 'subjective agreement" between
streams of thought is just another form of what computer science denotes
as bisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic version of it)?
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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