On 6/19/2012 12:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2012, at 00:08, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/18/2012 2:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent, Stephen,


On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my first person actual state.

How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought?

Brent



They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on UD* (or 
arithmetic).

That still seems very vague. I can suppose that many computations go thru the same or similar sequences which later branch and so have indeterminant futures. But is that 'interference'?

Sure. Of course a priori it is not wave like, for the probabilities add only, untilm you take the self-reference constraint into account, which leads to the arithmetical quantization, which imposes a quantum logic on the consistent extensions.


To quick for me. Is this spelled out somewhere.




And why should it produce any "me", "not me" boundary?

It does not. "personal identity" is an illusion due to disconnected memories,

But they are not 'disconnected'. It's their connectedness that is essential to the 'illusion'.


and correct self-reference. The me/not me is just explained by the diagonalisation: if Dx gives xx, DD gives DD.

Again, does not explain it to me.

Brent






And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.






Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other within an immaterialist scheme?

By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer science in 
arithmetic.

There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on this on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with the notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relation implements all the possible relations between all possible universal machine.

You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For the non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the problem is not having too much of them.

Exactly. It's the problem of having proved too much. To say all computations can exist and if consciousness is computation then all conscious thoughts will exist is true but meaningless - like tautologies are.

It is not tautological because we can test if there are too much computations and if they obey quantum logic or not, so it is certainly not tautological. You forget that the laws of physics are given by the statistics on those computations.

Bruno



Brent


Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.

We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all computations.


Bruno



Might it be that 'subjective agreement" between streams of thought is just another form of what computer science denotes as bisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic version of it)?--
Onward!

Stephen


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>



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