On 6/18/2012 5:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Brent, Stephen,

On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my first person actual state.

How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought?


They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic).

Hi Bruno,

You seem to have an exact metric for this "measure" of "the first person indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic)". What I need to understand is the reasoning behind your choice of set theory and arithmetic axioms; after all there are many mutually-exclusive and yet self-consistent choices that can be made. Do you see a 1p feature that would allow you to known that preference is not biased?

And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.

If it does not have "subjective argeement" with other mutually exclusive then there would be a big problem. No?

Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other within an immaterialist scheme?

By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer science in arithmetic.

    What "part" is not embedded?

There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on this on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with the notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relation implements all the possible relations between all possible universal machine.

Universality (of computations) requires the existence of an equivalence class (modulo diffeomorphisms) of physical systems over which that computation is functionally equivalent. No? If not, how is universality defined? Over a purely abstract set? What defines the axioms for that set?

You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For the non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the problem is not having too much of them.

Correct! You get an infinite regress of "interactions"! Way too many! In fact, I bet that you get at least a aleph_1 cardinal infinity. But what about the continuum hypothesis? Do you take it as true or false in your sets? If you take it as false then you obtain a very interesting thing in the number theory; it looks like all arithmetics are non-standard in some infinite limit! You have to have a means to necessitate a limit to finite sets. The requirement of Boolean satisfyability <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem>exactly gives us this "rule".

Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.

We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all computations.

What physical experiment will measure this effect? If there is no physical effect correlated with the difference, then this idea is literally a figment of someone's imagination and nothing more. The physical implementation of a quantum computer is a physical event. I thought that your idea that computations are independent of all physicality was completely and causally independent from such. =-O

My argument is that a computational simulation is nothing more than "vaporware" (a figment of someone's imagination) until and unless there exists a plenum of physical systems that all can implement the "best possible version" of that simulation. When we recall that Wolfram defines the "real thing" as the "best possible simulation, we reach a conclusion. This "plenum" is the trace or action (???I am not sure???) of (on?) an equivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under some ordering*. I am not certain of the wording of the first part of this, but I am absolutely certain of the latter part, "an equivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under some ordering*" I am unassailably certain of.



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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