On 6/19/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 19 Jun 2012, at 08:01, Stephen P. King wrote:On 6/18/2012 5:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Brent, Stephen, On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduceda separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below mysubstitution level get stable and persistent by the statisticalinterference between the infinitely many computations leading tomy first person actual state.How does on computation interfere with another? and how does thatdefine a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreementwith other streams of thought?BrentThey interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy onUD* (or arithmetic).Hi Bruno,You seem to have an exact metric for this "measure" of "the firstperson indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic)".Not at all. I only reduce the mind-body problem (including the bodyproblem) into the problem of finding that metric. UDA must be seen asa proof of existence of that "metric" from the comp hypothesis. ThenAUDA gives the logic of observable which is a step toward that metricisolation.

Dear Bruno,

`What I fail to understand is how the currently well known and`

`existing proofs of the non-existence of generic metrics on infinite sets`

`that are, AFAIK, identical to your concept of computations (as strings`

`of numbers) do not seem to impress you at all. It is as if your are`

`willfully blind to evidence that contradicts your claims. I am`

`sympathetic to your motivation and am interested in finding a path`

`around this serious problem that I see in your reasoning. My point here`

`is that this claim that "UDA must be seen as a proof of existence of`

`that "metric" from the comp hypothesis" has no epistemological "weight"`

`if it cannot be associated with the other aspects of mathematics. One`

`must show how one's new idea/discovery of mathematical`

`"objects/relations" are related to the wider universe of mathematical`

`objects and relations; or one is risking the path of solipsism.`

`I have tried to get your attention to look at various`

`possibilities, such as the axiom of choice, non-well founded sets, the`

`Tennenbaum theorem, etc. as possible hints to a path to the solution but`

`you seem to be trapped in a thought, like light orbiting a black hole,`

`endlessly repeating the same idea over and over. Would you snap out of`

`it and see what I am trying to explain to you?`

What I need to understand is the reasoning behind your choice of settheory and arithmetic axioms;I don't use set theory. Only elementary arithmetic. At the ontologicallevel.

`But Bruno, you are being disingenuous here. The phrase "only`

`elementary arithmetic" is not all that is involved! in order to have a`

`meaningful description of "only elementary arithmetic" one has to relate`

`to a wider univerce of concepts and one must connect to the physical`

`acts that support the experience of what numbers are.`

At the meta-level I use all the math I need, like any scientist in anypart of science.

I am not sure what that means.

after all there are many mutually-exclusive and yet self-consistentchoices that can be made. Do you see a 1p feature that would allowyou to known that preference is not biased?As I said, I use arithmetic because natiural numbers are taught inhigh school, but any (Turing) universal will do.

`Do you understand the idea that "natural numbers [as] ... taught in`

`high school" does not have special ontological status? I am trying to`

`get you to think of numbers in a wider context.`

the point is that neither the laws of consciousness, nor the laws ofmatter depend on the choice of the basic initial system, so I use theone that everybody knows.

`So, does a consensus of belief grant special ontological status?`

`What else am I to think of the implication of the phrase "... that`

`everybody knows". Closed sets of communications are (representationally)`

`studied in network, game and graph theory. From what I have read, finite`

`versions of these reach equilibrium in at least log_2 N steps and once`

`there never change again. This only illustrates the point that we have`

`to consider open systems and those are such that they do not allow for`

`exact closed form descriptions in math. This is a well known fact to any`

`competent engineer.`

Sometimes I use the combinators or the lambda algebra. I don't usegeometrical or physical system because that would be both a treachery,in our setting, and it would also be confusing for the completederivation of the physical laws.

Nice excuse! LOL!

And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream ofthought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.If it does not have "subjective argeement" with other mutuallyexclusive then there would be a big problem. No?No. It would be a refutation of comp+classical theory of knowledge (byUDA). That would be a formidable result.But the evidences available now, is that the physics derived fromarithmetic, through comp+ usual definition of knowledge, is similar tothe empirical physics (AUDA).

`Exactly what does this mean? You keep repeating these words... How`

`about finding a new set of words that has the same meaning? Truths are`

`independent of particular representations!`

Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question herethat I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how docomputations have any form of causal efficacy upon each otherwithin an immaterialist scheme?By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computerscience in arithmetic.What "part" is not embedded?The non elementary, second order, or analytical part. It is notembedded in the number relations, but it appears in the mind of theuniversal numbers as tool to accelerate the self-study. It isepistemological.

`So exactly how are numbers embedded themselves such that this`

`second order aspect can have some measure of the logical analogue of`

`causal efficasy (aka significance)? You are not avoiding the "other`

`minds" problem here! One has to explain how minds can have any influence`

`or even synchrony with each other. Even Leibniz recognized this and`

`postulated a "pre-established harmony" to account for it. It was a good`

`try, but ultimately it failed for the simple reason that such a`

`"pre-established harmony" is equivalent to the solution to an infinite`

`NP-Complete computational problem. You simply cannot ignore the`

`implications of computational complexity!`

There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on thison the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you getthem all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with thenotion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relationimplements all the possible relations between all possible universalmachine.Universality (of computations) requires the existence of anequivalence class (modulo diffeomorphisms) of physical systems overwhich that computation is functionally equivalent. No??

`Do I underestimate your ability to understand the English language?`

`Do we need to go through the discussion of universality again? Really?`

`OK, I will try to step though my reasoning slowly for you.`

`What does computational universality means if not some form of`

`functional equivalence between a large (possibly infinite) set of`

`physical systems? When we study General Relativity we discover something`

`known as the "Hole Argument`

`<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/>". It ultimately`

`shows the notion of "*Leibniz Equivalence*. If two distributions of`

`fields are related by a smooth transformation, then they represent the`

`same physical systems."`

`(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html)`

`I am assuming that the readers can understand that "sets of`

`physical systems" (as considered in the notion of computational`

`universality) are connected to representations of physical systems by`

`"distributions of fields" for my reasoning to be clear here. Perhaps I`

`have not explained this and made the mistake of just assuming that it is`

`understood that in physics we use mathematical objects to *represent*`

`the physical objects of experience. It is how *representation* works`

`that we seem to have differences in opinion.`

`How much more do I need to explain? You claim that universality is`

`completely separable from physical systems. I disagree.`

If not, how is universality defined? Over a purely abstract set? Whatdefines the axioms for that set?You don't need set. You can define "universal" in arithmetic. I amstarting an explanation of this on the FOAR list.

OK, I will continue to pay attention to your posts. :-)

You have to study the detail of GĂ¶del's proof, or study Kleene'spredicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For thenon materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the problemis not having too much of them.Correct! You get an infinite regress of "interactions"! Way toomany! In fact, I bet that you get at least a aleph_1 cardinalinfinity. But what about the continuum hypothesis? Do you take it astrue or false in your sets?I don't care at all.

`That is why I see your thesis as ultimately a failure. You are`

`ignoring the very thing that causes problems for your idea. You cannot`

`just assume that some kind of number is special without justification.`

`While it is true that a huge quantity of work has been done discovering`

`the properties of recursively enumerable functions and integers does not`

`by itself justify or offer a proof that they are somehow special, as`

`Kronecker and others seem to which with their statements such as : "/God`

`made theintegers <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integers>; all else is`

`the work of man/." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_Created_the_Integers`

If you take it as false then you obtain a very interesting thing inthe number theory; it looks like all arithmetics are non-standard insome infinite limit! You have to have a means to necessitate a limitto finite sets. The requirement of Boolean satisfyability<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem>exactlygives us this "rule".? (unclear).

`Where does the existence of non-contradiction in logic obtain from?`

`Mere or arbitrary postulation? No. It is necessary. But this necessity`

`in the axiomatic sense that we see when we consider logic as an abstract`

`entity does not transfer into or onto actual sets of propositions such`

`as those that would accurately represent physical systems interacting`

`with each other in our worlds of experience.`

Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not asolution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmeticalquantization to test test the quantum tautologies.We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantumcomputer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside allcomputations.What physical experiment will measure this effect?Well, here the physical events is the discovery of quantumcomputations in nature. That is what remain to be seen in thearithmetical physics. But we have already the quantization and aquantum logic.

`Have you tried this:`

`http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=quantum+computation++photosynthesis&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C41&as_vis=1`

`But how does the implementation of quantum computation in "natural"`

`(as opposed to "man-made) systems prove your idea? So far I have shown`

`you that there exists proofs that one cannot extract quantum logics from`

`classical logics without serious moduli. On the other hand, we can`

`extract plenums of classical (Boolean) logical algebras from a single`

`quantum logical lattice (modulo sufficient dimensions). Why are you so`

`eager to extract quantum from the classical?`

If there is no physical effect correlated with the difference, thenthis idea is literally a figment of someone's imagination and nothingmore. The physical implementation of a quantum computer is a physicalevent. I thought that your idea that computations are independent ofall physicality was completely and causally independent from such. =-OMy argument is that a computational simulation is nothing morethan "vaporware" (a figment of someone's imagination) until andunless there exists a plenum of physical systems that all canimplement the "best possible version" of that simulation.Arithmetic implements all computations already. And UDA explain thatthe physical emerges from that, and evidence are that the comparithmetical physics can implement the quantum computations. They arejust not primitive.

`Your use of the word "Implements" is nonsensical. Any concept of`

`implementation that is completely divorced from physical actions is`

`nonsense as it cannot imply things that it is unable to by its definition.`

When we recall that Wolfram defines the "real thing" as the "bestpossible simulation, we reach a conclusion. This "plenum" is thetrace or action (???I am not sure???) of (on?) an equivalence classof spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under some ordering*.I am not certain of the wording of the first part of this, but I amabsolutely certain of the latter part, "an equivalence class ofspaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under some ordering*" Iam unassailably certain of.Wolfralm is unaware of consciousness and first person indeterminacy.

`So? We could equally claim that you do not understand the role of`

`complexity in computations and thus be dismissive of your ideas, but we`

`chose not to.`

-- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.