On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> > There is no sense to ask who is "really" me

I'm glad to hear you say that.

> > what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeing
> Washington ", or seeing "Moscow".

That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington and
Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a sense
signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your environment is the
same and so are you and so there is no differentiation (assuming quantum
randomness can be ignored) and so there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the
cities start to display their differences then things will change,
especially you.

> > > So "first person indeterminacy" is functionally equivalent to "the
> environment is changeable and unpredictable" and the idea can bring no
> enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness.
> The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their
> stability.

If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions, so they
can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1 and Brono2
starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would be no difference
between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no splitting of viewpoints,
so  there would be only one Bruno Marchal until something changed.

> In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room,
> the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all.

By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters you, as
long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's irrelevant, only when
its opened does it become an environmental factor.

> >> If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only
> one first person point of view
> > We agree on this since the start.


> > and so it remains unique;  and if 2 things have a different first person
> point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from
> anything else.  OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most
> theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true.
> > And ... ?

And so there is nothing insightful about "first person indeterminacy" and
it can not help us understand how the world works.

>> I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before
>> the experiment the subject had written in his diary "I will feel like I'm
>> in Washington and only Washington" and had written nothing else, and then
>> after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said
>> "I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow" then you would concede that
>> your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect.
> >This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that
> the guy who understand the point will never write "I will feel to be in W
> and in only in W", as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in
> Moscow. The correct guy will predict "W or M", never "W only", nor "M
> only".The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does
> not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small.

OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory,  so I repeat
my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD DISPROVE YOUR
THEORY? I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if
you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything then
it predicts nothing and it is not science, and the world already has enough
metaphysical mush.

 John K Clark

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