On 05 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote:

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On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > There is no sense to ask who is "really" me I'm glad to hear you say that.> what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeingWashington ", or seeing "Moscow".That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washingtonand Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing asense signal that Moscow does not produce, until then yourenvironment is the same and so are you and so there is nodifferentiation (assuming quantum randomness can be ignored) and sothere is only one Bruno Marchal. When the cities start to displaytheir differences then things will change, especially you.

`In that sense OK. But so the first person indeterminacy remains on`

`what I will feel if I do the experience in practice.`

> > So "first person indeterminacy" is functionally equivalent to"the environment is changeable and unpredictable" and the idea canbring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity orconsciousness.The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for theirstability.If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions,so they can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1and Brono2 starring into two identical Black Holes, so there wouldbe no difference between the two Bruno brains, so there would be nosplitting of viewpoints, so there would be only one Bruno Marchaluntil something changed.

`OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has`

`been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of`

`self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any`

`way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I`

`will feel next.`

`There is no uncertainty in W and M which interfere with this`

`uncertainty.`

> In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop ineach room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all.By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encountersyou, as long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it'sirrelevant, only when its opened does it become an environmentalfactor.>> If 2 things have the same first person point of view then thereis only one first person point of view> We agree on this since the start. Good.> and so it remains unique; and if 2 things have a different firstperson point of view then each one remains unique because it'sdifferent from anything else. OK I admit that's not very profound,but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have thevirtue of being true.> And ... ?And so there is nothing insightful about "first personindeterminacy" and it can not help us understand how the world works.

`That is a quick jump. Also I am not saying that the comp indeterminacy`

`explains the world, at this stage three it makes things more complex.`

`It is a consequence of comp that we can just not put under the rug. I`

`am not solving a problem, I am formulating it.`

>> I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that ifbefore the experiment the subject had written in his diary "I willfeel like I'm in Washington and only Washington" and had writtennothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed thesubject in Moscow and he said "I feel like I'm in Moscow and onlyMoscow" then you would concede that your theory of first personindeterminacy is incorrect.>This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscatesthat the guy who understand the point will never write "I will feelto be in W and in only in W", as he knows that this will bedisqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict "Wor M", never "W only", nor "M only".The fact that some idioticpredict that he will win the lottery does not lake false theprobability that the he will win, which is very small.OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory, so Irepeat my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULDDISPROVE YOUR THEORY?

`The point is mathematical. Such diary entries would be trivial, like`

`both diaries containing "I am in Washington".`

`Given it consists of statistics, it is clearer in repeating the`

`experience, the theory would be disproved in the majority of the`

`copies find an algorithm to predict their outcomes, or if the P(having`

`be k times in W) does not fit with the Pascal triangle. Of course it`

`is non sensical.`

I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and ifyou can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything

`The theory predicts that we don't have a predicting algorithm, just`

`probabilities. It predicts P = 1/2. It would be refuted if the`

`statistics of the first person experience violated the Pascal`

`triangle, or the Gauss distribution. But it does not, for obvious`

`mathematical reason.`

`You reverse the charge. I am just saying there is no algorithm, but`

`easy probability distribution (with the current protocol). You are the`

`one saying the silly thing that the experience is determinist for the`

`1-pov, and fail to give a prediction satisfying all the copies, except`

`by stopping to care about their own 1-pov, and to care only on all 1-`

`pov seen in the 3-view, which was never asked.`

then it predicts nothing and it is not science, and the worldalready has enough metaphysical mush.

`Don't worry. It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, given that`

`it generates the set of all experimental device to refutes it. AUDA is`

`just UDA made completely explicit in arithmetic, and the logic of the`

`measurable events has already been isolated (accepting the classical`

`theory of knowledge), so it can be tested. Thanks to QM, things fits`

`up to now. But this is part 2 of sane04, and we are just at the`

`beginning of part 1.`

`And the theory is computationalism. If you have a better theory, you`

`might mention it.`

`Here, you just miss the theorem that P=1/2 for the simple duplication.`

`Read the definition of the 1-person and of comp. It follows from it`

`deductively, as you seems to understand sometimes, and then apparently`

`not enough to move on step 4. You might try.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.