On 05 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> There is no sense to ask who is "really" me

I'm glad to hear you say that.

> what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeing Washington ", or seeing "Moscow".

That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington and Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a sense signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your environment is the same and so are you and so there is no differentiation (assuming quantum randomness can be ignored) and so there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the cities start to display their differences then things will change, especially you.

In that sense OK. But so the first person indeterminacy remains on what I will feel if I do the experience in practice.



> > So "first person indeterminacy" is functionally equivalent to "the environment is changeable and unpredictable" and the idea can bring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness.

The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their stability.

If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions, so they can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1 and Brono2 starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would be no difference between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no splitting of viewpoints, so there would be only one Bruno Marchal until something changed.

OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next. There is no uncertainty in W and M which interfere with this uncertainty.






> In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all.

By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters you, as long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's irrelevant, only when its opened does it become an environmental factor.
>> If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only one first person point of view

> We agree on this since the start.

Good.
> and so it remains unique; and if 2 things have a different first person point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from anything else. OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true.

> And ... ?

And so there is nothing insightful about "first person indeterminacy" and it can not help us understand how the world works.

That is a quick jump. Also I am not saying that the comp indeterminacy explains the world, at this stage three it makes things more complex. It is a consequence of comp that we can just not put under the rug. I am not solving a problem, I am formulating it.




>> I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before the experiment the subject had written in his diary "I will feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington" and had written nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said "I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow" then you would concede that your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect.

>This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that the guy who understand the point will never write "I will feel to be in W and in only in W", as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict "W or M", never "W only", nor "M only".The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small.

OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory, so I repeat my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD DISPROVE YOUR THEORY?

The point is mathematical. Such diary entries would be trivial, like both diaries containing "I am in Washington". Given it consists of statistics, it is clearer in repeating the experience, the theory would be disproved in the majority of the copies find an algorithm to predict their outcomes, or if the P(having be k times in W) does not fit with the Pascal triangle. Of course it is non sensical.



I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything

The theory predicts that we don't have a predicting algorithm, just probabilities. It predicts P = 1/2. It would be refuted if the statistics of the first person experience violated the Pascal triangle, or the Gauss distribution. But it does not, for obvious mathematical reason.

You reverse the charge. I am just saying there is no algorithm, but easy probability distribution (with the current protocol). You are the one saying the silly thing that the experience is determinist for the 1-pov, and fail to give a prediction satisfying all the copies, except by stopping to care about their own 1-pov, and to care only on all 1- pov seen in the 3-view, which was never asked.


then it predicts nothing and it is not science, and the world already has enough metaphysical mush.

Don't worry. It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, given that it generates the set of all experimental device to refutes it. AUDA is just UDA made completely explicit in arithmetic, and the logic of the measurable events has already been isolated (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), so it can be tested. Thanks to QM, things fits up to now. But this is part 2 of sane04, and we are just at the beginning of part 1.

And the theory is computationalism. If you have a better theory, you might mention it.

Here, you just miss the theorem that P=1/2 for the simple duplication. Read the definition of the 1-person and of comp. It follows from it deductively, as you seems to understand sometimes, and then apparently not enough to move on step 4. You might try.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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