On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
>> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno
Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then
would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.
> No problem with that.
I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't
extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on
that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but
"you", the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is
something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense
organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a
difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's
meaningless to ask which one is "really" you.
There is no sense to ask who is "really" me, but this has never been asked. On the
contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events "seeing Washington ",
or seeing "Moscow".
Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom.
Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the answer is "the inner
god", alias the knower, alias Bp & p, alias S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT
arithmetical. Unlike the machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.
It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one person who does the
But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are two of them. There
is one person in Moscow, and one person in Washington, and those are the one we
interview. We just continue to use the "you" and "me", if they are used in the first
person indexical sense, in the usual way.
It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and Washington was seen
And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both Brent will see
one city, that they could not have predicted to live that one in particular. For each of
them subjectively the experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a
coin. You can replace "Brent" by machine having enough ability to be able to distinguish
Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such machine has no technic to
predict which location she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future.
I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person
perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own " "1)" and "2)"
But then there is not probability interpretation.
? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the "and" is an 1-pov "or".
It is the same as "head or tail".
You write, "The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is
isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in
the iterated and non iterated cases."
But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some
X such that "X is in Washington" or "X is in Moscow".
That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8. (assuming
If W="X1 is in Washington" and M="X2 is in Moscow", then there is no probability
interpretation of where X0 is.
Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I cannot know if the guy
who looks at the result is still me.
You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die. But if there are six Bruno's
seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6...
But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication) teleportation. So we
accept some local comp type of identity, and that it can be duplicated. So although you
will be in Washington and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any
of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes clearer)
among Washington and Moscow.
Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as that would
contradict the survival of the other. If you predict Moscow, you make the Brent in
Washington into a zombie, or a non-Brent. Comp says both are Brent.
Right. So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washington the answer is 1. And
the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1. The probability 1/2 only comes by equivocating on
you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it with you, before
accepting a duplication experience.
This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM. If
everything happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability?
But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theory explains why events
have relative probabilities. For the same reason not all arithmetical propositions are
true, not all physical propositions are true, and most factual truth are relative to
context and self-reference.
Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.
Yes, I only meant that in a shorthand way.
Gleason theorem justifies the Born rules, and this independently of any base. On the
contrary, you need Everett to predict the Brout-Englert Higgs Boson as I said to
François Englert. He agreed.
I don't see the necessity. Everett does some nice things, but I don't see that it is
I am not saying that comp or Everett is true, but up to now, they fit remarkably with
the facts. The collapse theory collapsed day one, from unclarity, as EPR made rather
clear, and Bell made enough precise.
It was clear enough as an epistemic collapse (c.f. Asher Peres or Leslie
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