On 05 Jul 2012, at 21:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one
Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to
Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a
> No problem with that.
I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious
that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion.
When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your
brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but "you", the
first person perspective, has not been and will not be until
there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a
change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the
environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference
between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's
meaningless to ask which one is "really" you.
There is no sense to ask who is "really" me, but this has never
been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of
the specific events "seeing Washington ", or seeing "Moscow".
Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom.
Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the
answer is "the inner god", alias the knower, alias Bp & p, alias
S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the
machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.
It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one
person who does the seeing.
But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are
two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in
Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to
use the "you" and "me", if they are used in the first person
indexical sense, in the usual way.
It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and
Washington was seen by Obama.
And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies
both Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to
live that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the
experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a
coin. You can replace "Brent" by machine having enough ability to
be able to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove
easily that such machine has no technic to predict which location
she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future.
I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future
first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as
your own " "1)" and "2)" prediction illustrates.
But then there is not probability interpretation.
? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the
"and" is an 1-pov "or". It is the same as "head or tail".
You write, "The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and
refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli
experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non
But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit
assumption that there is some X such that "X is in Washington" or
"X is in Moscow".
That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8.
If W="X1 is in Washington" and M="X2 is in Moscow", then there is
no probability interpretation of where X0 is.
Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I
cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me.
You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die. But if
there are six Bruno's seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6...
Not from their first points of view. The "Bruno" who see "2" is
unique. Same for each outcome here.
But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication)
teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and
that it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington
and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any
of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the
iteration makes clearer) among Washington and Moscow.
Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be,
as that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict
Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non-
Brent. Comp says both are Brent.
Right. So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washington
the answer is 1.
No because the question bears on the 1-pov and they are mutually
And the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1. The probability 1/2
only comes by equivocating on "you".
No, it comes from the fact that all Brent feels to be unique, and are
unique, from their 1-pov.
you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it
with you, before accepting a duplication experience.
This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's
interpretation of QM. If everything happens then what does it
mean to say an event has a certain probability?
But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theory
explains why events have relative probabilities. For the same
reason not all arithmetical propositions are true, not all physical
propositions are true, and most factual truth are relative to
context and self-reference.
Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.
Yes, I only meant that in a shorthand way.
Gleason theorem justifies the Born rules, and this independently of
any base. On the contrary, you need Everett to predict the Brout-
Englert Higgs Boson as I said to François Englert. He agreed.
I don't see the necessity. Everett does some nice things, but I
don't see that it is necessary.
The necessity comes from the fact that in quantum cosmology the
collapse makes no sense, nor does Bohm's hidden variable theory makes
any sense. Everett is just QM without collapse. Superposition never
disappear and are contagious due to the linearity of the tensor
products and evolution.
I am not saying that comp or Everett is true, but up to now, they
fit remarkably with the facts. The collapse theory collapsed day
one, from unclarity, as EPR made rather clear, and Bell made enough
It was clear enough as an epistemic collapse (c.f. Asher Peres or
Leslie Ballentine texts).
No problem with an epistemic collapse. That terming can be used in the
comp WM duplication thought experiment too.
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