On 05 Jul 2012, at 21:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent oneBruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal toWashington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having aWashington experience.> No problem with that.I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysteriousthat you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion.When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine yourbrain and body may have been instantly duplicated but "you", thefirst person perspective, has not been and will not be untilthere is something in the environment in Washington that makes achange to one of your sense organs that is missing in theenvironment of Moscow; only then, when there is a differencebetween the two, is your first person perspective split and it'smeaningless to ask which one is "really" you.There is no sense to ask who is "really" me, but this has neverbeen asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability ofthe specific events "seeing Washington ", or seeing "Moscow".Both are 'seen'. The question is by whom.Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that theanswer is "the inner god", alias the knower, alias Bp & p, aliasS4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike themachine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is oneperson who does the seeing.But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they aretwo of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person inWashington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue touse the "you" and "me", if they are used in the first personindexical sense, in the usual way.It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin andWashington was seen by Obama.And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp impliesboth Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted tolive that one in particular. For each of them subjectively theexperience is the same as having one in either city by throwing acoin. You can replace "Brent" by machine having enough ability tobe able to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can proveeasily that such machine has no technic to predict which locationshe (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future.I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my futurefirst person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, asyour own " "1)" and "2)" prediction illustrates.But then there is not probability interpretation.? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the"and" is an 1-pov "or". It is the same as "head or tail".You write, "The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation andrefutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilliexperience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and noniterated cases."But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicitassumption that there is some X such that "X is in Washington" or"X is in Moscow".That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8.(assuming comp)If W="X1 is in Washington" and M="X2 is in Moscow", then there isno probability interpretation of where X0 is.Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, Icannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me.You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die. But ifthere are six Bruno's seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6...

`Not from their first points of view. The "Bruno" who see "2" is`

`unique. Same for each outcome here.`

But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication)teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, andthat it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washingtonand Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and anyof you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as theiteration makes clearer) among Washington and Moscow.Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be,as that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predictMoscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non-Brent. Comp says both are Brent.Right. So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washingtonthe answer is 1.

`No because the question bears on the 1-pov and they are mutually`

`exclusive.`

And the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1. The probability 1/2only comes by equivocating on "you".

`No, it comes from the fact that all Brent feels to be unique, and are`

`unique, from their 1-pov.`

you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take itwith you, before accepting a duplication experience.This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett'sinterpretation of QM. If everything happens then what does itmean to say an event has a certain probability?But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theoryexplains why events have relative probabilities. For the samereason not all arithmetical propositions are true, not all physicalpropositions are true, and most factual truth are relative tocontext and self-reference.Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.Yes, I only meant that in a shorthand way.Gleason theorem justifies the Born rules, and this independently ofany base. On the contrary, you need Everett to predict the Brout-Englert Higgs Boson as I said to François Englert. He agreed.I don't see the necessity. Everett does some nice things, but Idon't see that it is necessary.

`The necessity comes from the fact that in quantum cosmology the`

`collapse makes no sense, nor does Bohm's hidden variable theory makes`

`any sense. Everett is just QM without collapse. Superposition never`

`disappear and are contagious due to the linearity of the tensor`

`products and evolution.`

I am not saying that comp or Everett is true, but up to now, theyfit remarkably with the facts. The collapse theory collapsed dayone, from unclarity, as EPR made rather clear, and Bell made enoughprecise.It was clear enough as an epistemic collapse (c.f. Asher Peres orLeslie Ballentine texts).

`No problem with an epistemic collapse. That terming can be used in the`

`comp WM duplication thought experiment too.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.