On 14 Jul 2012, at 18:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 7/14/2012 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Jul 2012, at 11:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:On 14.07.2012 11:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 14 Jul 2012, at 10:42, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:...If to speak about your theorem, it is unclear to me, how the first person view accesses numbers and mathematical objects.Like a digital machine, which can access numbers encoded in their memory, through logical gates, and so one. More details are given currently on the FOAR list, but the idea is simple, with comp ourbodies are statistical first person constructs related toinfinitiesof number relations, so we access to them a bit like a fish can access water. The price of this is that we have to abandon physicalism eventually.I am not sure if I understand. I would like to have an explanationfor a phenomenon, for example1) I see a cat; 2) I see a piece of paper with 2 + 2 = 4. Yet, when you start explaining, the phenomenon seems to disappear.1) I see a cat. This is explained by the fact that your currentcomputational state belongs to an infinity of computations makingyou singling out some stable patterns that you recognize, by accessto your previous experience as being cat. The qualia itself isexplained by the fact that when you refer to the cat, you arereally referring to yourself (with the implicit hope that itcorresponds to some relatively independent pattern), and the mathshows that such a self-reference involves some true but nonrationally communicable feature. The math explained why, if thisjustification is correct, machines/numbers will not be entirelysatisfied by it, for the first person is not a machine from its ownfirst person view.Hi Bruno,No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity ofcomputations making you singling out some stable patterns" requiresthe prior existence of the "you" to select it.

`With comp, you, the dreamer's bodies, and its soul, already exist (in`

`different modal sense) in arithmetic. Provably so, even in Robinson`

`arithmetic, for the 3-view.`

The observer (you here) effectively is the measure via a self-selection rule.

This makes no sense.

I cannot discount my own existence given the immediate fact that Iam experiencing myself as existing.

`You cannot discount the first person experience. But comp does not`

`discount it. It explains how it arises from the ability of numbers to`

`observe themselves and extrapolate, etc.`

Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of thisunassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that isemerging from the computations if the observer is the one that isselecting the class of computations that are generating said observer.

? You refute Darwin too?

A possible escape from this is to allow for non-well founded setsand such things as non-principle ultrafilters, but I don't know yourstand on their existence.

Good tools.

Our observation of the cat is a symmetric (within bounds)relationship, otherwise we fall into solipsism.

?

My claim is that the same thing follows for mathematical entities.We cannot claim that mathematical (or any other "abstract" entity!)is such that we (the observers and understanders thereof) areemerging from them.

Prove that claim. Then by UDA, you refute comp.

This would require that the "independence" is not and cannot be anunbridgeable gap at all, but a analytic continuum connecting theparticular instance of a physical system with the knowledge andmeaning of the abstraction. Maths do not refer explicitly to thephysical media that they are represented upon by patterns, but thisdoes not allow us to imagine them as completely independent and thusseverable from the physical instances.

So many implicit assumption. You seem again to assume the physical.

Even Plato's idea of the Forms as "casting shadows on the wallof the cave" tacitly assumes continuity between the Forms and whatwe the ideas in our individual minds. If I am not mistaken the ideaof conic sections where used to argue the idea. Shadow orprojections cannot be severed from the object casting them!

Which can be N, +, *.

2) The same with "2+2=4 written on some paper". It is also a stablepattern in the computations going through your state. Here youmight just refer to what you have learned in school, and you mightconsidered that the truth referred by that sentence on a paper ismore stable than a cat, but the conscious perception of cat or inkon paper admits the same explanation: some universal number reflecta pattern belonging to almost all computations going through yourstate. You have to take the first person indeterminacy intoaccount, and keep in mind that your immediate future is determinedby an infinity of computations/universal number, going through youractual state. For example, all the Heisenberg matrices computingthe state of the galaxy at some description level for some amountof steps. They all provably exist independently of us in a tinypart of elementary arithmetic, and admit at least as many variantsas there are possible electron location in their energy levelorbitals.This paragraph 2) gets dangerously close to my criticism of yourscheme and so it might help us come to some mutual understanding.For me, the "truth of the sentence 2+2=4" (i will denote this as X)is not the same thing as the "piece of paper with the symbols'2+2=4' on it" (I will denote this as Y).

That's part of my point.

What is the "pattern belonging to almost all computations goingthrough [one observers] state" generating in your thinking? Both Xand Y?

`X is far more general than Y. Y is not even well defined, only "the`

`truth that some numbers observe something like Y". Y belongs only to`

`the extension of human-like numbers belonging to stable extension in`

`front of piece of paper-like objects. X belongs to all consistent`

`extensions.`

For me, X and Y are duals that are related by the fact that thereexists at least one physical instance (experienced by multipleobservers in a incontrovertible way) that implements arepresentation of "2+2=4". Similarly by the duality relation as I amusing it, the particular abstract statement, "2+2=4" is true becausethere exists multiple observers that agree on its truth.

That is idealism.

Truths are conditional in my accounting. They are only absoluteif they are incontrovertible over *all possible* observers. Truthsdo not exist independent of observers, they are not severable fromthe possibility of observation of instances of their physicalimplementation.

`That is shown the case, in some sense, for physical truth. But we need`

`some theory to start. You have not presented one, and this makes many`

`of your statement philosophically or metaphysically, or theologically`

`ambiguous. This is troubling when you present them as making invalid a`

`derivation, which should be theory independent. Comp -> non`

`physicalism is valid independently of comp.`

I cannot be sure if this helps you as it relies to some familiaritywith the first person indeterminacy and the fact that our compstates are distributed in an infinity of distinct, from a thirdperson pov, computations (existing in arithmetic).BrunoAs I see it, 1p indeterminacy is strictly an a posterioricondition.

?

One's theory must postulate the prior possibility of multiplicity oflocations or instances that are distinguishable and that is notpossible if there is not an observer (up to functionalequivalence!). Does this help you understand my claim?

`The theory is arithmetic. You can prove in arithmetic the existence of`

`the multiple instances and their relative situations. And this leads`

`to a problem, indeed. An interesting problem in math and physics`

`capable of testing the comp idea, or of challenging the classical`

`theory of knowledge.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.